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ABSTRACT 
ENERGY SYSTEMS AND POLICY PLANNING:  
A Multi-level Optimization Study  
The objective of this study is to formulate an optimum multi-
level energy plan that can resolve the underlying energy policy 
issues and options and can, thus, deal with the energy sector 
problems. 
The main hypothesis of this study is that since there exists 
a multi-(two) level policy making system in the energy sector 
(government and private sector decision making), the formulation 
of a multi-level energy plan should take into account the choices 
and decisions of these decision makers. To accomplish this, an 
optimum multi-level energy plan should be developed within a 
framework of a multi - level optimization approach (MO). 
To support the.hypothesis, a theoretical energy planning 
model/approach is developed within the framework of (1) the 
theory of economic policy planning; (2) policy systems analysis; 
and (3) multi-level programming (MLP) (an operational multi-level 
optimization method). 
On the basis *of this theoretical model, an Australian Energy 
Policy System Optimization Model (AEPSOM) has been developed. 
The Parametric Programming Search (PPS) algorithm has been 
developed in order to provide an alternative algorithm for solving 
MLP which was adopted to solve AEPSOM. 
The MLO model has been used to formulate an Australian multi-
level energy plan. The results of this study suggest that a 
reformulation of existing Australian energy policies is needed. 
iii 
This study also draws a conclusion that an MLO approach can 
provide an operational methodology and a framework for optimum 
multi-level energy planning. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 ENERGY PLANNING: MULTI-LEVEL ENERGY PLANNING - ENERGY SYSTEM 
AND POLICY PLANNING 
Events in the world energy 1 market since the beginning of the 
1970s to the present time including the Iranian oil embargo and 
the dramatic oil price increases, and the heavy dependence of 
modern economies on energy have, created an increased awareness of 
the economic consequences of energy problems such as imported 
inflation, unemployment, recession, the finite nature of fossil 
fuels, and national security (Mork 11981], Munasinghe'and Schramm 
[1983], Webb and Ricketts [1980]). It has been argued that these 
energy problems are the manifestations of -market failures (Griffin 
and .Steele [1980]) in ensuring the allocation of resources in a 
socially desirable pattern. 
A long standing result from classical economics is geared for 
the establishment of the thesis that a market economy through 
competitive equilibrium ensures the most efficient allocation of 
1. Energy is the power to do things. In this study the following 
forms of energy : potential, kinetic, heat, chemical, electrical 
radiant, and nuclear which are produced from common sources such 
as crude oil, coal, natural gas, etc. are considered (Harder 
[1982]). Energy from such sources as human and animal muscles are 
not included. 
resources 1  (Debreu [1959]) judged by the Pareto optimality crite-
rion (Pareto [1971]): No one can be made better off without making 
home one worse off. 
In reality markets may fail to allocate resources in an opti-
mum manner (market failures). There are several reasons for 
which market failure may occur (Bator [1958]): externalities 
(economies and diseconomies), incomplete or non-existence of 
energy markets, existence of monopolistic elements, the public 
goods • and merit goods character of energy, government ownership, 
and the existence of a social contract for fair distribution of 
income and wealth (Webb and Ricketts [1980]). These market fail-
ures provide an economic rationale for the formulation of energy 
plans 2 . 
For either pragmatic or ideological reasons, almost every 
nation has initiated the formulation of energy plans (Meier 
[1984], Stancescu [1985], and Munashinghe and Schramm, [1983]) to 
1. A historical account of different views on the efficiency of 
different economic systems may be seen in Blaug [1985], Oser and 
Brue [1988]. 
2. Because of these market failures and the resultant problems in 
the energy sector, a number of issues and options has developed in 
the energy policy area. Some of these policy issues relate to 
short-term adjustments in the energy market (in the form of sup-
ply, demand, input . and price controls), an appropriate pricing and 
depletion of energy resources, conservation of energy, inter-fuel 
substitution, energy import independence, determination of appro-
priate tax regime in the energy sector, long-term adjustment in 
the economy etc. (A comprehensive discussion on these issues and 
options and their resolution will be provided in Chapter Six.) 
The development of these issues necessitates the formulation 
of an energy plan that can resolve these issues in the pursuit of 
solving energy problems. 
accommodate energy problems. An energy plan l may involve energy 
(systems) planning 2 and/or policy (system) planning. Energy plan-
ning involving both energy systems and policy planning can be 
defined as multi-level (two-level) energy planning: The upper 
level of this plan involves the formulation of a set of government 
optimum energy policies (energy policy planning) while at lower 
level an optimum plan of the sector or economic agents is speci-
fied which is referred to as energy systems planning. Thus in a 
developed Market economy context, multi-level energy planning 
generates (a) an energy policy plan of the government (a set of 
policies) and (b) an optimum energy system reflecting the optimum 
decisions of economic agents 3 . 
While previous multi-level planning studies have considered 
the interrelationships between macro and sectoral planning prob-
lems, the present multi-level planning approach recognizes the 
existence of multi-level decision making within a sector. The 
relevance of previous multi-level procedures and the case for the 
1. Energy planning may be defined as a process of influencing the 
energy sector resource allocation, directly or indirectly, by 
manipulation of the coefficients and variables of the energy 
system or by using a set of instruments such as taxes and subsi-
dies, so that the energy sector performs in the directions con-
sistent with the preferences of the policy makers. 
In this study, energy policy and energy planning are used 
synonymously. 
2. Energy systems planning refers to the determination of a set of 
energy sector activities (supplies, production, uses etc.) judged•
to be efficient by some criteria such as minimum cost, and maximum 
net social surplus (Munasinghe and Schramm [1983]). Energy policy  
planning involves the formulation of a set of optimum energy poli-
cies that will optimize the objective function of the policy 
makers (Tinbergen [1952)) and resolve the underlying policy 
issues. 
.3. Unless otherwise mentioned, energy planning will mean energy 
system planning or energy policy planning or both in this study. 
present multi-level planning approach have been summarized as 
follows (Hazell and Norton [1986], p.321): 
"In most cases of policy planning in market economies, 
macro and sector policy deliberations are not closely 
enough linked to benefit from such procedures. But at 
the sector level itself there is a two-level 
problem....The two levels are (1) the decentralized 
level of producer and consumer decisions  and (2) 
the policy choice level, at which decisions are made on. 
policy instruments." 
The rationale for the formulation of multi-level energy plan-
ning follows from the real world market failures common in the 
energy sector, and the concern for the attainment of societal 
objectives. Government intervention in these conditions is justi-
fied as a means for achieving the efficient allocation of re-
sources among other societal objectives. However major economic 
decisions in a market (mixed) economy are undertaken by individual 
economic agents, while government policy decisions influence the 
behaviour of economic agents. Therefore, an energy sector in a 
market economy is characterized by the existence of a two-level 
hierarchical decision making system. There are two types of deci-
sion makers: policy makers (the government) and the economic 
agents (producers and consumers). These decision makers attempt to 
optimize their goals (optimizing behaviour) subject to constraints 
and their decisions are interrelated. The goals of individual 
decision makers at various levels are rarely consonant, and inter-
vention is usually justified by this inconsistency. The policy 
makers can control the actions of the economic agents by some 
direct controls, such as import control, price fixation etc., or 
indirect controls such as taxes and subsidies, and policies which 
encourage expenditures for research and development. 
Decision making in the energy sector may be viewed as hierar- 
chical. 'The policy makers (the upper level decision. makers), an-
nounce their policy measures first. Then the economic agents in 
the energy sector (the ,lower level decision makers) choose their 
`-optimum actions. On the basis of the reactions of economic agents 
to policy announcements, the policy makers choose their optimum 
policy. 
The overall performance of the energy sector (resource allo-
cation and consumption) depends on the decisions of both these 
decision makers, and the achievement of the government's economic 
policy objectives depends on the reactions of the economic agents 
to the policy measures announced by the government. Therefore, 
decisions of the government and economic agents are interdependent 
in the following sense: optimum decision of any of them cannot be 
formulated separately, and a multi-level energy plan is appropri-
ate since such a plan can incorporate the interdependent plans of 
different decision makers at different levels in the multi-level 
hierarchical policy. system. 
Models help the co-ordination of data necessary for energy 
planning, the construction of future scenarios, and the formula-
tion of efficient and effective policy instruments (see James 
[1983], pp. 2-3). Because of the roles that models play in energy 
planning, it is now established practice to use a model to under-.: 
take any type of responsible energy planning study. 
1.2 OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH 
The objective of this research is to formulate a multi-level 
(quantitative) optimum energy plan. In the process,' this study 
will endeavor to achieve the following sub-objectives: 
(1) to evaluate the suitability of existing energy planning 
approaches/models for multi-level energy planning, 
(2) to • formulate a multi-level energy plan by adopting a 
multi-level optimization (ML0) 1 approach to energy planning (based 
on the structure of multi-level programming (MLP 2 ), the theory of 
economic policy planning (Tinbergen, [1952]) and of policy system 
analysis (Mesarovic, et al. [1973])), and 
(3) to explore the implication of this energy plan for a 
market economy. . 
1.3 PROPOSED METHODOLOGY 
A multi-level optimization approach is developed to formulate 
a multi-level energy plan that can resolve the underlying policy 
issues and options and can provide a set of comprehensive energy 
policies. The essential elements of the approach and its justifi-
cations are discussed below. 
1. For a definitiOn of optimization see Skrapek et al. [1976]. MLO 
may be defined as a process of obtaining the optimum (choosing the 
best alternative/option) solution (maximum social welfare, minimum 
cost, etc.) to,a problem involving several decision making sub-
problems at different levels of decision making and represented by 
a mathematical model consisting of several sub-models related to 
. different sub-problems. 
2. The term 'MLO ' relates to the general model structure, while 
MLP is a mathematical programming problem (emphasis is on solution 
algorithm) and multi-level planning refers to a plan which is 
the output of an MLO model. These different terms have been used 
to indicate different aspects of energy planning and modelling 
(Candler and Norton [1977]). 
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1.3.1 The MLO Approach  
An MLO (bi-level) model can formally be represented as 
follows : 1  
Optimize W = w(+T, X) 	(a) - policy objective function 
(T) 
s.t. 	 (1.1) 
	
gi (+T, X) < Ri 	(b) - policy constraints 
. Optimize C = c(+T, X) (c) - behavioural/energy 
(X 1 T) 	sectoral objective function 
s.t. 
• g2 (+T, X) < R2 (d) - behavioural/energy 
sectoral constraints 
X > 0 	(e) - non-negativity constraints 
where +T = a vector of variables controlled by the upper level 
decision makers/policy makers, 
X = a vector of variables controlled by the lower level 
decision makers/energy producers and consumers. 
For the policy studies, in the context of a multi-level 
. 1. Detailed discussion about the constraints, variables and the 
optimization problem in (1.1) will be provided in Chapter Two 
(Section 2.5.) and Chapter Three. 
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hierarchical policy system, policy system analysis l provides the 
conceptual framework, the theory of economic policy planning 
offers the analytical and operational framework and MLP provides a 
methodology. Therefore, a policy system study needs to be de-
veloped within the framework of policy systems analysis, the 
' theory of economic policy planning and MLP (Chapter Two). 
Within the above modelling framework, an optimum energy 
planning model for Australia (AEPSOM) is developed. AEPSOM is a 
price control 2 MLP energy sector model, which incorporates the 
underlying energy policy objectives and instruments, and reflects 
the economic and technical characteristics of the energy sector. 
To solve AEPSOM, the Parametric Programming Search (PPS) 
algorithm is developed. In this algorithm, the lower level problem 
is solved as a parametric programming problem. Alternative solu-
tions generated by the parametric programme are searched to find 
the solution which optimizes the upper level objective function 
and satisfies the upper level constraints. 
1.3.2 Justifications for an MLO Approach 
It should first be stressed that the MLO approach 	is not 
1. This study adopts a systems analysis/study of energy planning. 
The essential elements of this approach (Enthoven (1962]) are : 
"a cycle of definition of objectives, design of 
alternative systems to achieve those objec-
tives, evaluation of alternatives in terms of 
their effectiveness and costs, a questioning of 
the objectives, a questioning of the other 
assumptions underlying the analysis, the open-
ing of new alternatives, the establishment of 
new objectives." 
2. Different forms of MLP are defined in Chapter Two, Section 
2.5.2.3. 
the only methodology which can be adopted for energy planning. The 
MLO approach is proposed as an alternative approach to energy 
planning since it has several advantages as a methodology for 
formulating a particular type of multi-level energy plan charac-
teristics of which are discussed in Appendix B. The real intention 
of this study has been to stimulate further discussion about the 
suitability of various types of models/approaches for energy 
planning rather than giving a definite verdict. 
The justifications for adopting the proposed MLO approach to 
energy planning are summarized in the following paragraphs: 
(a) Representation of the underlying policy system: In order 
to specify an optimum government policy in a multi-level policy 
system, an MLO approach is necessary since an MLO model can repre-: 
sent the characteristics and elements of the multi-level hierar-
chical policy system (the multi-level policy making system can be 
defined as an MLO model). 
This is illustrated as follows: In the model (1.1), there are 
two objective functions and two sets of constraints (two optimiza-
tion sub-models). These two optimization sub-models (policy 
model (equations 1.1.a to 1.1.b) and behavioural model (equations 
1.1.c to 1.1.d)) represent the optimum decision making systems of 
the policy makers and economic agents. The policy makers optimize 
the policy objective function (maximization of social welfare, 
G.D.P. etc.) subject to the policy constraints (limits on taxes, 
budget deficit etc.). The economic agents optimize the behavioural 
objective function (minimization of total energy sector cost) 
subject to the energy sector constraints (demand, supply, and 
capacity constraints etc.). 
The MLO model also captures the simultaneous interdependence 
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and interactions between these two types of decision makers. Goal 
interdependence implies that the attainment of the upper level 
objective is dependent on the achievement of the objective of the 
lower level, although the objectives of the two levels are gener-
ally different (conflicting objectives). In (1.1) the two Objec-
tive functions (two sub-models) are interdependent through the 
variable +T which links both. The intervention of the authorities 
at the upper level on the lower level is also represented in the 
model by the policy instrument variable +T. The MO model also 
clearly makes a distinction between the variables which are under 
control of the two types of decision makers: policy makers con-
trol +T (taxes and subsidies) while the economic agents control X 
(energy supply and uses). 
The MLO model also represents the hierarchical structure of 
the policy system. In the MLO model, the upper level decision 
makers choose +T and then the decision makers at the lower , level 
adjust their behaviour to optimize their decisions. 
(b) Generation of a multi-level plan: In summary, an MLO model 
can generate a multi-level energy plan involving both an energy 
system plan and an energy policy plan. 
(c) Formulation of a comprehensive and consistent energy 
policy plan: A further attribute is that of coordination. It has 
been stated befOre that government energy policies are sometimes 
incompatible, so a set of energy policies should be formulated in 
a comprehensive and integrated framework so that the consistency 
of these policies are ensured. Existing practice in energy modell-
ing is •to use econometric models to study energy-economic poli-
cies such as taxes and subsidies policies, while mathematical 
programming models are primarily used to study technology policies for 
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example conservation policy. The achievement of consistency be-
tween these receives a major emphasis here. For example, optimum 
energy resource allocation and technological patterns suggested by 
a single level mathematical programming model in a behavioural 
model of the energy sector may not remain optimum if government 
taxes and subsidies are introduced into the policy system. Alter-
natively, the consideration of the detailed technical structure of 
the energy sector may provide a different set of taxes and subsi-
dies from that suggested by a macro-econometric model. Therefore, 
to formulate an appropriate multi-level energy plan, a methodolo-
gy is needed which can be adapted to the formulation of both 
types of policies simultaneously. As an MLO model contains both 
taxes and subsidies and technical details of the energy • sector 
(represented by +T and X respectively in model (1.1)), an MLO 
model can be used to formulate a set of energy policies embracing 
energy economic and technology policies. 
(d) Applied welfare economic applications: An MLO, model can 
also be used to study some welfare issues related to energy 
planning such as the desirability of government intervention. 
1.4 CONSTRAINTS ON THE STUDY 
A major constraint relates to the interdisciplinary charac-
ter of this study. The interdisciplinary character of energy 
system modelling requires the use of terms and concepts from 
different disciplines such as economics, mathematics, operations 
research, energy engineering and computer science. This has made 
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the present study relatively complex l . 
The recent origin of energy planning and ML?, non-availabil-
ity of computer programme and dearth of literature on the topics 
of this thesis have also posed problems for the normal progress of 
the thesis beyond that generally encountered in a Ph.D. thesis. 
1.5 PLAN OF THE THESIS 
The thesis is organized in the following manner 2 . 
Chapter Two contains a survey of literature on existing 
overseas and Australian energy policy models. In addition, a 
discussion of the theoretical and conceptual foundations of an MLO 
energy planning model is provided and an approach to such energy 
planning isdeveloped. 
Chapter Three consists of a discussion of the specification 
of AEPSOM. The rationale for specifying the elements (as they 
are in the study) of AEPSOM and the sources of its data are also 
discussed in this chapter. 
Chapter Four presents a discussion of the algorithmic ap- 
1. Although central concepts and terms of this. thesis have been 
defined •at the appropriate places, because of the space restric-
tions all the conCepts, ideas and terms from all these disciplines 
and used in this thesis have not been defined or elaborated in 
this work. However, references have been cited in the necessary 
cases. 
2. Like any other optimization study, this study follows the 
different phases of an optimization study (Taha (1976]): 
(a) definition of the problem under study/the objective of the 
study (Chapter One/Two), 
(b) development of the relevant model (Chapter Three), 
(c) solution of the model (Chapter Four/Five), 
(d) validation of the model (Chapter Five), 
(e) application of the model results (Chapter Six). 
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proach adopted in this study (PPS algorithm) and the mathematical 
properties and evaluation of the PPS algorithm solution of an ML? 
model. 
Chapter Five reports the essential results generated by 
'AEPSOM and provides tests for the reliability of these results. 
This chapter also highlights some essential characteristics of 
multi-level decision making. 
Chapter Six discusses the multi-level planning applications 
of the model: (a) it forecasts an optimum energy 'system, and (b) 
it prescribes an energy policy plan in the form of a set of opti-
mum energy policies for Australia. 
Chapter Seven consists of an overview of the main aspects of 
the study and discusses its limitations. This chapter also makes 
some recommendations for future research and ends with the main 
conclusions. 
CHAPTER TWO 
• TOWARDS A MULTI-LEVEL OPTIMIZATION APPROACH  
TO MULTI-LEVEL ENERGY PLANNING  
2.1 INTRODUCTION. 
The objectives of this chapter are as follows: (1) to discuss 
• 
the suitability of existing national sector-wide optimization 
models for the formulation of an optimum multi-level energy plan; 
and (2) to develop an alternative approach which will, possibly,. 
be free from limitations of existing models. 
The chapter is organized as follows: In Section 2.2, there is 
a discussion of the standard model validation criteria. Section 
2.3 discusses existing energy planning models, while Section 2.4 
evaluates existing models by some commonly used model validation 
criteria. Section 2.5 discusses the foundations of the new mo-
delling approach and in Section 2.6, an MLO model of energy 
planning is developed. Additional information on the charactr-
sistics of the proposed MLO approach and some analytical princi-
ples of a decentralized - energy-economic policy that the model can 
help formulate are given in Appendix B. 
2.2 MODEL EVALUATION CRITERIA  
In order to be able to investigate whether existing energy 
models are capable of providing an appropriate modelling framework 
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for multi-level energy planning, a critical survey of existing 
energy models in terms of some standard model validation criteria 
is necessary. However, it needs to be stated that the choice of a 
method is dependent on the uses of the model i.e., the objective 
of the modelling exercise. No method can be judged superior 
without reference to the underlying problems for which it is 
developed. For example, econometric methods are primarily used for 
quantitative estimation, analysis or prediction of some economic 
variables, while mathematical programming models are used mainly 
for optimum planning or forecasting. Econometric studies are 
based on historical data, while programming models use cross-
sectional data and depend on equality and inequality, constraints. 
In addition to the purpose (or use of the model) and nature of the 
study, several other factors such as the availability of data and 
computer programmes, and the size of information expected from the 
model after its implementation also influence the choice of an 
appropriate methodology. 
In an optimization model, validation of the model (the deter-
mination of exactness of a model in representing a system (Taha 
[1976], p.11)) is an important step. Validation tests are per-
formed to determine the appropriateness of the model and the 
reliability of the model results. There are three levels of 
validation tests (Kresge [1980]): descriptive, analytical and 
experimental. At the descriptive level, the following criteria 
are applied: (1) appropriateness of the model structure, (2) 
achievement of the objectives of the model, and (3) plausibility 
and usefulness of the results. At the. analytical level some of 
the criteria which are applied are model documentation, implemen-
tation "etc., while at the experimental level, audit by an inde- 
16 
pendent group and in-depth assessment are performed by undertaking 
sensitivity analysis and replication of results. 
In this section, the validation tests at the descriptive 
level will be discussed to evaluate existing energy models. The 
following model evaluation criteria are applied: 
(1) Appropriateness of the model structure in representing the 
underlying systems. 
Multi-level energy planning requires modelling of the energy 
policy and energy system. As an energy policy system is character-
ized by a two-level optimum decision making/policy formulation 
process (discussed in Chapter One), formulation of policies by 
the government in such a policy environment is dependent on the 
decisions of economic agents. Therefore, in this context, energy 
planning involves the determination of optimum decisions of eco-
nomic agents and optimum policies of the government simultane-
ously. This necessitates a multi-level optimization model repre-
senting two-level decision making for formulating an energy plan. 
Further, the energy system involves many technological alter-
natives and capacity limitations. A methodology that can represent 
adequately the complex energy system. operations is desirable. 
This requires that some of the constraints of an MLO energy model 
should reflect these types of relations of an energy system. 
Finally, the present study is undertaken to address medium 
and long-term energy planning issues involving substantial struc-
tural changes in the energy system. Modelling of medium-term or -
long-term energy sector planning involving inequality constraints 
requires a mathematical programming methodology (if the study is 
an optimization study) since mathematical programming models can 
capture structural changes in a system (Folie and Ulph, [1977]). 
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The relationships in the multi-level optimization model can 
be estimated either econometrically or they can be specified on the 
basis of the technical structure of the energy sector involving 
inequality and non-negative constraints (modelled as a mathe-
matical programming specification of the energy sector). The 
reasons for not applying econometric methods for energy sector 
planning may be summarized as follows (Norton and Schiefer, [1981] 
and Shumway and Chang [1977]): econometric methods can not be 
adopted in a multiproduct/activity and/or multi-regional environ-
ment since the degrees of freedom are usually inadequate; they are 
not applicable for policy planning in a situation characterized by 
fundamental structural and policy changes compared to the past 
period of statistical series or historical variation; econometric 
methods cannot include inequality constraints, such as the capaci-
ty constraint, which are important in energy sector planning; 
econometric models usually cannot provide much complementary 
information on the behaviour of the variables of a system model; 
econometric models are generally used for dealing with short-term 
energy policy issues (Folie and Ulph, [1977], not long-term energy 
planning problems. 
For these reasons, a predominance of mathematical program-
ming applied to energy planning is observed (Riaz, [1983]; Folie 
and Ulph, [1977]; Julius, [1981]). 
(2) Achievement of the objectives of a study by the model. 
As stated previously, if the purpose of this study . is 'the 
formulation of an optimum multi-level energy plan, both economic 
and technological, then an explicit statement of the policy plan-
ning problems should be made. This requires the specification of 
the policy objectives and constraints, and a classification of the 
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policy variables as targets and instruments. Yotopoulas and Nugent 
([1976], pp. 421-422) have stressed the importance of an identifi-
cation of the policy targets and instruments in the following way: 
"Perhaps the greatest shortcoming in planning to date has 
not been internal inconsistency, infeasibility, or subop-
timality of the plans per se but rather the failure to 
link planning goals with practical and specific policy 
instruments, the utilization of which would ensure ful-
fillment of the planning goals." 
(3) Plausibility, usefulness and adequacy of model results : 
A set of results generated by a model has to be plausible. 
Also a comprehensive set of information of the energy system is 
necessary for an appropriate energy planning work. An energy 
plan involves, among other things, (a) pricing policy, (b) tax and 
subsidy policy, (c) depletion policy, (d) exploration and develop-
ment policy, (e) conservation policy, (f) education and propaganda 
policy, (g) research and development policy, (h) an investment 
policy or plan, (i) technological policy, (j) equity policy, and 
(k) industrial policy. A methodology is required that generates 
information adequate for the formulation of a comprehensive set of 
energy policies containing as many of these elements as possible. 
Otherwise, consistencies cannot be tested. 
The above arguments may be summarized as follows: for the 
formulation of an'energy plan with emphasis on the economic and 
technical aspects of the energy sector in a market/mixed econothy, 
a model that can represent a multi-level decision making process, 
which incorporates inequality constraints, and provides.a compre-
hensive set of energy policies (economic and technological) is 
required. The modelling approach should be developed within a 
framework in which the energy planning problem, specifying targets 
and instruments, is explicitly described. 
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2.3 EXISTING ENERGY SECTOR OPTIMIZATION MODELS  
Energy policy models can be classified on the basis of the 
methodology adopted ill each type of model. These models can be 
classified as one of the following types: (1) Network/process 
models, (2) Mathematical programming models, (3) General equilib-
rium models, (4) Econometric models, (5) Dynamic optimization 
models, (6) Simulation models, and (7) Coupled/hybrid models. 
Since this study leads to the formulation of an optimum 
energy plan, and as optimizing behaviour of decision makers is 
assumed in this study, only optimizing models or models which can 
represent such behaviour will be relevant for this survey. 	Since 
not all of the above types of energy models can be, or have been 
used for optimum energy planning, only the ones which can be, 
or have been used for this purpose will be discussed here. For 
discussion, these models have been regrouped as static optimiza-
tion models, dynamic optimization models, and hybrid models. 
2.3.1 Static Optimization Models  
• 2.3.1.1 Mathematical Programming Models  
Mathematical programming models are developed in order to 
identify an optimum energy system. The optimization criteria are 
contained in the objective function of the mathematical 
programming problem as: 
C = f(X) 	 (2.1.a) 
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where 1 X = a vector of instruments/activities in the model (n 
1), as X = (x 1 ,x2 , ...,xn )". 
The objectives of the problem are usually in the form of 
minimization of pollution, imports; or, maximization of output, 
employment, profit, net (social) surplus; or, sometimes, in 
forms which involve different objectives such as the minimization 
of cost, pollution, and the maximization of employment 'simultane-
ously. 
Constraints in mathematical programming models are the 
structure of the energy system under study. A general representa-
tion of the structure of an energy system may be given as follows: 
H(X) > R 	(2.1.b) 
where H(X) = vectors of constraint functions (m x 1); 
R = vector of given constraint parameters (m x 1). 
The constraints in a programming model are usually the de-
mand, supply, resource, capacity and pollution constraints and the 
intermediate energy balance equations in . the present context. 
The solution to mathematical programming models determines an 
optimum energy system - either in the normative or behavioural. 
sense - and has been used to formulate an optimum energy policy. 
and to analyse the sensitivity of the energy system to some 
changes in the economy. The result of mathematical programming 
models can be used to formulate energy policies of the (a) and (c) 
to (i) types stated above. 
Some well known mathematical programming models include: the 
1. Symbols used in different chapters have been defined separately 
in each chapter. 
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Brookhaven model set (Kydes [1978]), PILOT, DIES, EFOM, the Bir-
mingham Energy Models, and CEC (see the following surveys: Hoff-
man and Wood [1976], Planco Inc [1979], Julius [1981], Rath-Nagel 
& Voss [1981] and Hildebrandt [undated)). 
2.3.1.2 General Equilibrium (GE) Energy Models  
These models are developed within the established tradition 
of general equilibrium analysis in economics. The modelling 
approach is based on the consideration of the simultaneous exist-
ence of equilibrium output and price in all sectors of an economy, 
which is achieved when demand and supply are equal in all the 
interdependent markets. GE models represent the relationships of 
demand and supply of primary inputs, intermediate products and 
final output in factor and commodity markets (Intriligator 
[1971]). 
Numerical GE models which are used for formulating an optimum 
economic policy can be classified into three groups: 
(i) activity analysis general equilibrium models; 
(ii).Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) models; 
(iii) macroeconometric general equilibrium models. 
(i) Activity Analysis Models  
An activity analysis GE model can be developed by specifying 
an input-output model in an optimization framework 	(Intriligator 
[1971]). 	In an activity GE model, the objective function is 
usually specified to constitute either a problem of maximization 
of the output in different sectors of the economy or the final 
demand, or a problem of minimization of input costs. A standard 
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activity analysis GE model is as follows: 
max W = InF 
{X,F} 
s.t. 
(I - A)X - F > 0 
eX < L 
kX < K 
dX < R 
(2.2) 
where: In = a vector of l's (1 x n) and I = identity matrix, 
X = a vector of outputs in different sectors (n x 1), 
F = a vector of final demands (n x 1), 
A = a matrix of the input-output coefficients(n x n), 
e, k & d = vectors of employment, capital, and 
energy coefficients (1 x n), 
L, K & R = vectors of available 	working-age 
population, capital and energy (n x 1) 
respectively. 
A theoretical model in this line is Park and Kubursi (1982). 
As far as the author knows, no numerical model has yet been de-
veloped. 
The solution to this model provides an optimum allocation of 
resources i.e., an optimum output level and structure, and opti-
mum input use levels and structure. Therefore, this type of model 
can be used to determine or plan the optimum allocation of re-
sources in the economy. For the energy sector, these models can 
provide information necessary for formulating energy policies of 
the types: (a) and (e) to (j) stated above. 
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(ii) Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) Models  
The tradition of 'computable general equilibrium' modelling 
goes back to Johansen's path-breaking work (Johansen (1960)). A 
general presentation of a CGE model is as follows: 
X = f(k, L) - Production function 
K = f(Px, Pk, Pl) - Input demand function (capital) 
(2.3) 
L = f(Px, Pk, Pl) - Input demand function (labour) 
C = f(Px, Pl) - Consumption function 
X = AX + C - Input-output model 
where X = a vector of output in different sectors 
.(n x 1) 
K,L = vectors of input demands in each sector 
of the economy (n x 1) and (n x 1); 
C = a vector of sectoral consumption (n x 1); 
A = a matrix of the input-output coefficients 
(n x n) . ; 
Px = a vector of output prices (1 x n); 
Pk, P1 = vectors of interest and wage rates - 
(1 x n) and (1 x n). 
The CGE model is represented by a set of simultaneous equa-
tions of demand and supply of inputs and outputs; inter-industry 
balances and aggregate macro-economic relationships. 
A CGE model in reduced form may be represented as : 
Y = f(X) 	 (2.4) 
where Y = a vector of endogenous macroeconomic variables 
X = a vector of exogenous macroeconomic variables 
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It can be reformulated as an optimum policy model by plugging 
in a policy objective function such as : 
Max W = f(X,Y) 
(X,Y) 	 (2.5) 
s.t. 
Y = f(X) 
Interpretation of the variables in this policy model is 
different from economic models. In a policy model, the endoge-
nous and exogenous variables of an economic model are the instru-
ment and target variables (Fox, Sengupta and Thorbecke (1973]). 
The model can provide an optimum set of values for policy 
instruments. It is important to note that no optimization CGE 
model has yet been developed for the energy sector. 
• (iii) Macroeconometric General Equilibrium Energy Models  
A Macroeconometric GE energy model in reduced form may be 
represented as : 
Y = f(X) 	 (2.6) 
where Y = a vector of endogenous maCroeconomic variables 
X ="a vector of exogenous macroeconomic variables. 
These models are simple extensions of macroeconometric 
models. In macroeconometric models, relationships between econom-
ic aggregates such as GDP, investment, saving, consumption, price 
level, money supply, and government expenditure are specified. 
The coefficients of the models are estimated econometrically. In 
macroeconometric GE energy models, the variables are defined 
25 
separately as energy and non-energy types. These models can be 
reformulated as optimum policy models as in (2.5). 
Some examples of macroeconometric GE energy models are: 
Sweeny [1981], Hogan and Manne [1977], and Allen et al. [1976]. 
Solution to an optimization macroeconometric GE model pro-
vides a set of optimum values for energy policy instrument varia-
bles such as prices, taxes and subsidies, and investment. 
2.3.2 Dynamic Optimization Energy Models  
Dynamic energy modelling involves the problem of optimiza-
tion of an energy system over a period of time (Intriligator 
[1971]). The optimization problem is evaluated in terms of an 
objective function (or performance index or integral), which is 
usually defined as: 
.T 
= 	IHI(X(t), U(t), t] dt 	(2.7) 
t o 
where X(t) = a vector of state variables 
U(t) = a vector of control variables 
t = time t o , t 1, 	, tT 
Dynamic energy systems, which are to be optimized, may be 
represented by a set of state equations: 
. 	dX 
X = 	= f(X(t), U(t), t) 	(2.8) 
dt 
	
dX 	dx1 dx2 	dxn 
here -- 	= 	, 	--- for each t 	to ,ti ,.,t T . 
• dt 	dt 	dt 	dt 
The optimization problem is also subject to some initial 
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conditions and some terminal conditions on the state variables 
. 	(energy resource supplies and capacity levels). 
X(t o ) = X 0 	and X(t T ) = XT (2.9) 
The feasible region or the boundary conditions of the control 
variables are specified, and the decision problem is to choose the 
optimum control trajectory from this feasible set: 
U(t) 	Un C En 	 (2.10) 
Similarly the boundary conditions on the state variables are: 
	
X(t) 	Xn E Rn 	 (2.11) 
The dynamic optimization energy models can also be discrete 
time stepped. The discrete time stepped dynamic optimization 
problem can be considered as a mathematical programming problem 
(Intriligator [1971], p.303) of the . following form: 
tT 
max J = 	Z I (X t ,Ut ) 
t o 
{Xt ,Ut } 	 (2.12) 
s .t. 
Xt+1 	Xt0 = f(X 	U ) t , 	t 
Xt = X 0 , given U t = Un E En 
Basu's (1981) model is an example of an optimum control 
continuous model for the energy sector. 
Solution of a dynamic optimization model mainly provides 
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information regarding prices, taxes and subsidies, optimum deple-
tion rate, investments, and technological pattern in the energy 
sector. 
2.3.3 Hybrid Models  
In most large scale energy modelling, different types 	of 
models have been coupled with optimization models to formulate 
a comprehensive set of energy policies. When both the energy 
sectoral and macro-economic interrelationships are included in 
hybrid model, varioui types of models such as input-output or 
macro-econometric and linear programming models are coupled in the 
hybrid model. In this hybrid-model, the values of the macro-
economic variables from a macro-model are used in'a linear pro-
gramming model as the exogenous parameters, such as demand for 
energy in the different sectors; or the results of linear pro-
gramming models (input-output coefficients in the energy sub-
sectors), are used in an input-output model to predict consist-
ent sectoral energy demand in the economy (Meier [1984]). 
Some of the hybrid models in the energy sector are: BEEM 
(Behling et al. [1975], Hoffman and Jorgenson [1977], BES (deLucia 
and Jacoby [1982]), PIES (see Hogan and Weyant [1980]). 
The output ot a hybrid model consists of the outputs of the 
models included in the model suite. But the main objective for 
which the modelling work is undertaken is the development of an 
optimum energy system. If macroeconomic energy models 
(macroeconometric 	models 	or 	CGE models), formulated in an 
optimization framework, are combined with mathematical pro-
gramming models, the hybrid model can provide a comprehen-
sive set of energy policies. 
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Output of a hybrid model has also been used to formulate 
multi-level planning involving planning at the macro-economic 
level and planning at the sectoral level (Chapter One). Results of 
the macro-economic model/economy-wide model provide information 
for general economic planning, while the energy sector model 
provides information for an energy sectoral plan (energy system 
plan). 
2.4 EVALUATION OF EXISTING ENERGY MODELLING APPROACHES  
The 	first point that needs to be made is that not all 	of 
the energy sectoral optimization models mentioned above were 
developed for formulating optimum energy planning. Some of 
these models were developed for forecasting future energy systems 
or for analyzing the impact of different energy policies or 
technologies. This evaluation of the energy models is directed to 
all optimization models in the energy sector, since even the 
optimization models which have not been used to formulate optimum 
energy planning are applicable to energy planning. 
Further, the present survey is not exhaustive. 	As the 
number of existing energy models is fairly large, all of them 
cannot be discussed individually. Therefore, limitations of dif-
ferent types of models (instead of individual models) are dis-
cussed. The limitations of a particular type of model are, to a 
large extent, valid for each model in that group. 
In addition, extensive work on the methodological issues in 
sectoral modelling already exists. Candler, Fortuny-Amat, and 
McCarl [1981], McCarl and Spreen [1980], and Norton and Schiefer 
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[1980] have discussed the general limitations of sectoral single-
level optimization models. 
2.4.1 Limitations of Existing Energy Planning Models/Approaches . 
Limitations of the existing energy models are discussed here. 
2.4.1.1 Inappropriateness of the methodologies (related to  
criterion 1)  
The first limitation of existing energy models is the inap-
propriateness of the methodologies adopted in these models in 
representing the underlying systems (energy system and energy 
policy system). 
(i) General Methodological Limitations of all Existing Models  
Outcome of government policy is dependent on the reactions 
of economic agents to such policies i.e., government and economic 
agents decisions are inter-related. To formulate a multi-level 
energy plan in this policy environment, a model is needed which 
can represent decision making systems of both the government and 
economic agents simultaneously, and therefore, can generate both 
an energy system plan and an energy policy plan. Technically, an 
appropriate model should be a multi-level one for the •reasons 
discussed in Chapter One. As existing optimization models contain 
one objective function and only one set of constraints, they are 
inappropriate in the representation of the two level decision 
making of the energy sector and in the formulation of a multi-
level energy plan. Consequently, they will also generate results 
unsuited to this problem (policies or forecasts). Single-level 
energy models can not generate analytical and numerical results 
related to the characteristics of multi-level decision making. 
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Examples of such results derived from an MLO model may be seen in 
Appendix B and Chapter Five. Therefore, existing models are not 
developed within the appropriate methodological framework for 
multi-level energy planning. 
As a basis of discussion, energy models may be classified 
as either positive or normative. A positive model represents the 
actual behaviour of the economic agents whereas a normative model 
represents the behaviour of economic agents as they ought to be. 
. For example, the following is a positive model which shows 
the cost minimization decision making of the energy suppliers: 
Min C = cX Behavioural objective function 
X } 
s.t. 	 (2.13) 
S = (XI AX > R; X > 0 } 
- Energy sectoral opportunity set 
The variables and coefficients are the same as in (2.2). 
This type of energy model is frequently used in energy planning by 
•conducting sensitivity analysis in investigating the impact 
some changes in energy policies or technologies; it can also be 
used to investigate changes in demand and supply on the energy 
system. 	This information is then supplied to policy makers so 
that they can choose a set of energy policies which they perceive 
as consistent with their preferences. 
As there is no policy objective function in these models, 
they cannot be used to formulate a set of optimum policies that 
provide the best strategy for policy makers considering all the 
possible alternatives. But when this type of model is used to 
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. formulate an energy policy, some criteria are applied implicitly 
by the policy makers to enable them to choose the one they think 
is consistent with their preferences. As preference criteria are 
neither made explicit nor part of the model, the optimum policy 
cannot be identified by these models'. Candler, Fortuny-Amat and 
• McCarl ([1981], p. 521) state this limitation as follows: 
" While models have been constructed to reflect the 
competitive behaviour of the decentralized decision 
makers ..., little attention has' been given to a clear 
articulation of policy objectives or the acceptable 
range for policy variables...." 
Positive models can be changed to normative models by incor-
porating a policy objective function in a model, instead of a 
behavioural objective function as follows: 
	
Max W = wX 	Policy objective function 
{ X } 
s.t. 	 (2.14) 
S = {X 1 AX > R ; X > 0 } 	Energy sectoral 
opportunity set. 
This type of policy model overlooks an important component 
of policy planning .problems. Policy maker's decisions are not 
subject to the contraints of the energy sector. These constraints 
represent energy market equilibrium conditions and technological 
characteristics of the energy sector. Norton and Schiefer 
([1980], p.207) also claim that such models do not represent 
adequately the policy problem (or even the descriptive problem). 
In another type of normative use of optimization methods, 
the objective function of the type shown in (2.14) is retained, 
but some additional constraints are included in the model. These 
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additional constraints are specified to include the preferences of 
the policy makers. The following model is an example of such 
practice: 
Min C = cX 	- Behavioural objective function 
{X} (2.15) 
s.t. 
S = { X I AX > R ; L < Xp > P X,Xp > 0 ) 
- Energy sectoral opportunity set and policy constraints. 
Xp is the vector of variables directly controlled by the policy 
makers, L and P are the lower and upper limits of the constraints 
on Xp. The same objections which have been raised in connection 
with normative models such as (2.14) are also valid for the 
present type of formulation. In addition, in this specification 
it is impossible to know a priori whether there exists any solu-
tion to the model satisfying the policy constraints. 
(ii) Methodological Limitations of Individual Models  
On the basis of the above general limitations of single 
level optimization models, methodological limitations of each type 
of model can now be evaluated. 
A. Mathematical Programming Energy Models  
The limitations of mathematical programming models are 
evident from the discussion of the limitations of single level 
optimization models, since existing mathematical programming 
models are of the single level type. But mathematical programming 
methodology has several advantages for energy planning. It is 
operational and can include inequality constraints. It can also 
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capture multi-input, multi-activity, and multi-output economic 
and technological systems of the sector. Furthermore, it can 
capture future structural changes in the sector and also provide 
complementary information such as pollution levels produced in the 
energy sector. 
B. General Equilibrium Models  
All the methodological limitations of single level optimiza-
tion . models discussed above apply broadly to all general equilib-
rium models. Usually, the reaction functions in general equi-
librium models are not decomposed into their relevant components 
which are the objective function of economic agents and con-
straints faced by them. Therefore, the policy reaction functions 
can not model the decision making of economic agents with its 
constituent components. And consequently, general equilibrium 
models cannot generate energy system plans, although they are 
uieful in formulating energy policy plans. 
To demonstrate this point, the three types of general equi-
librium models are separately evaluated below. 
Activity analysis GE models do not and cannot contain the 
decision making problems of economic agents as well as full de-
tails of an energy system (i.e. the energy sector constraints). 
Decision making problems of economic agents are suppressed in the 
input-output model. Also the energy sectoral decisions are influ-
enced by many non-economic factors such as technical convenience, 
safety and efficiency which are not included in an activity 
analysis GE model. The existence of such phenomena as peak and 
off-peak demand, excess capacity and reserve capacity requires the 
relationships to be represented in inequality form. This type of 
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information is missing in an activity analysis GE model. 
In the case of CGE models, the coefficients of CGE models are 
estimated econometrically. In some cases, the coefficients are 
derived from the national accounts system including the input-
output models. In both these cases, however, the methodological 
structures of CGE models are the same. The problem with this type 
of CGE model is that 	reactions of individual economic agents to 
policy initiatives are represented by equations, such 	as the 
demand function for energy. The limitation of this type of 
functional representation of individual reactions in an energy 
policy study is that the decision criteria of the economic agents 
which are represented by an objective function of an optimiza-
tion model are not explicitly shown in the policy model (CGE) 
structure. The decision problems of policy makers are shown 
explicitly, but decision principles of economic agents are shown 
by some equations without explicit representation of their deci-
sion making problem in the form of an optimization problem. In 
brief, CGE modelling does not provide the required multi-level 
dimension. 
The other limitation of the CGE model (2.5) in optimum energy 
policy studies is that econometrically estimated demand and supply 
functions emphasiie economic arguments such as prices and in-
comes, whereas energy demands and supplies depend on many techno-
logical factors. In a similar way to activity analysis GE models, 
CGE models do not contain detailed energy sector constraints, 
particularly none of a technical character. 
Generally, the limitations of macro-econometric GE models are 
the same as those of all other GE models: inability to present 
energy policy systems and details of the energy sector. 
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Since all the GE models are single level optimization models, 
these models cannot represent the optimum energy policy formula-
tion process. But, with regard to limitations imposed by a lack of 
detailed representation of the energy sector, it can be argued 
that some equations representing the energy system under study can 
be incorporated in a GE model by adding some additional relation-
ships. For example if the following set of equations represent 
an energy system : 
Ye - f(Xe) = 0 	(2.16) 
then a detailed GE model can be represented as : 
Max W = f(X, Y, Xe , Ye ) 
{X,Y,Xe,Ye} 
s.t. 
Y = f(X) 
Ye - f(Xe ) = 0 . 
X, Y, Xe, Ye > 0 
(2.17) 
where Ye, Xe are vectors of the energy sector endoggnous and 
exogenous variables, and X and Y are defined in . (2.5). 
The problem with the above type of presentation of an energy 
policy formulation system in a GE is that the energy system is 
being specified as a part of a macro-economic system and being 
evaluated (directly) in terms of the preference criteria the•
policy makers. But, an energy system optimization problem needs 
to be evaluated in terms of the preferences of the individual 
economic agents as well. Therefore, though societal objectives are 
included in GE models, "there is no pretense of simulating the 
actual behaviour of .economies" (Candler and Norton [1977], p.11), 
thus the model in (2.17) does not portray the two level decision 
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making problem at all. 
C. Dynamic Optimization Models  
These limitations of CGE models are also present in optimum 
control (continuous) models. Discrete dynamic optimization models 
possess the limitations of * mathematical programming models. 
Candler and Norton ([1977], p 11) state the limitations of control 
models in the following way: 
"Control theory utilizes an explicit usual econometric 
description of the underlying economic structure 
(feasible behavioural set). With the econometric de-
scription, the choice of instrument values is limited 
to that range of values which has been experienced 
during the period of historical observations. This 
restriction may be a strong one." 
D. Hybrid Models  
Hybrid models are constituted by various aspects of the 
models discussed above, each component of a hybrid model would 
have the limitations of each method. Generally, in existing hybrid 
models, preferences of the policy makers are not explicated and 
policy variables are not classified (ie, they fail to satisfy the 
second criterion). Again, hybrid models are not developed and 
solved as a single, integrated and interrelated MLO/policy model. 
Different levels of MLO problem are not treated simultaneously. 
2.4.1.2 Non-specification of the energy policy planning problem 
(related to criterion 2)  
There are conceptual problems in applying existing energy 
models for energy planning. First of all, preferences of policy 
makers are not made explicit and policy variables are not proper- 
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ly defined and classified to identify the 	underlying problems of 
policy planning. In some modelling studies, where the underlying 
energy policy targets and instruments have been stated, there is 
unprecise discussion of how these statements of policy problems 
relate to the preferences of policy makers. Also missing is a 
discussion of how some relevant quantitative information needed 
in a policy optimization study such as the classification of the 
policy variables and the.specification of the weights in the 
policy objective function are obtained. Secondly, 	the . elements 
of 	existing energy policy systems, for example multi-level hi- 
erarchical decision making systems, is not sufficiently incorpo-
rated. Therefore, existing models are not developed within the 
relevant conceptual, analytical, and operational framework. 
A more appropriate energy planning structure, therefore, is 
the one in which the energy planning model includes the underly-
ing policy preferences involving a classification of policy varia-
bles as target and instrument variables to provide a clear presen-
tation of the existing policy planning problem and embedded within 
it the relevant. systems: economic, energy and policy. 
2.4.1.3 Inadequate set of results (related to criteria 3)  
The third limitation of existing models is the inadequate 
nature of the results provided by these models. Existing energy 
models cannot provide a comprehensive set of energy policies. 
2.5 AN ALTERNATIVE MODELLING APPROACH: MULTI-LEVEL OPTIMIZATION 
OF ENERGY SYSTEMS AND ENERGY POLICY 
The limitations of existing energy planning approaches can be 
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overcome by adopting an MLO approach. The justifications and 
elements of this approach are discussed below. 
2.5.1  Arguments for an MLO Approach: 
The main justification for the proposed 1. ,iL0 model is that 
such models 	represent underlying policy problems accurately. As 
• 
the energy secto'r policy system is characterized by what is called. 
a 'multi-level (multi-goal) hierarchical policy system', under-
taking an optimum multi-level planning study In the energy sector 
requires the adoption of a model which can represent the charac-
teristics of the multi-level policy system. Since there are two 
optimization problems, an appropriate model should have two sub-
optimization problems embedded in it. 
. 2.5.2 Elements of the MLO Approach  
To overcome the limitations of the existing models, it is 
necessary to develop the MLO approach on appropriate (a) theoreti-
cal, (b) conceptual and (c) methodological foundations which have 
been found to be lacking in existing models. This can be accom-
plished if the MLO approach is developed within the framework of 
the theory of economic policy planning, policy systems analysis 
and MLP. 
It may, however, be mentioned that attempts for developing 
MLP models within an appropriate framework are not new. Fortuny-
Amat [1979] has made clear the similarities between multi-level 
multi-goal policy systems and MLP, although he did not integrate 
or analyse his model results, analytically or numerically, in 
terms of multi-level multi-goal policy systems. Candler and Norton 
[1977] have made some reference to the theory of economic policy 
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planning, although their studies have not been fully and explicit-
ly undertaken within the framework of the theory of economic 
policy planning. With this background, the present study has 
attempted to integrate MLP, policy systems analysis and the theory 
of economic policy planning in the energy sectoral context so that 
the integrated MLO approach may provide an improved methodology 
for and understanding of the policy formulation problem in the 
energy sector. 
2.5.2.1 The Theory of Economic Policy Planning 
2.5.2.1.1 Analytical Framework: 
The first requirement of an appropriate modelling approach 
can be satisfied if an optimization energy model is developed 
within the framework of the theory of economic policy planning 
(Tinbergen [1952]). Fox, Sengupta, and Thorbecke ([1973], p.11) 
state that 
"The theory of economic policy, is concerned with the 
analysis of decision situations and policy problems, 
using that part of general economic theory which can be 
quantitatively applied to economic data in some opera-
tional sense." 
Therefore, the theory of economic policy planning provides an 
analytical and operational framework for economic policy analysis 
and planning. It provides an analytical and operational framework 
for policy planning since it deals with the following aspects of 
policy planning: (a) The policy characterization problem (specifi-
cation of a policy system model including the policy objective 
• function, and a set of constraints of the system under study). (b) 
The policy selection problem (the classification of the variables 
of the policy model as the target and instrument variables). (c) 
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The policy steering problem (deviation of a set of optimum poli-
cies 1 ). 
There are three elements in the theory of economic policy 
planning (i) a policy objective function, (ii) a policy model of 
the system under study (a set of policy constraints), and (iii) a 
classification of the variables, mainly as policy targets and 
instruments (Fox, Sengupta, and Thorbecke [1973]). The basic 
.structure of the theory of economic policy planning has been 
extended in many directions and has been applied to different 
areas. The basic theoretical framework has been extended to devel-
op the theory of economic policy planning within the framework of 
mathematical programming and optimum control. It has been applied 
to various areas of economics involving the policy formulation 
problem such as growth, development planning, stabilization, and 
sectoral policy and planning (Fox, Sengupta, and Thorbecke 
[1973]). This study attempts to apply it to energy planning. 
Analytical strength of the theory of economic policy planning 
lies (a) in it's emphasis on the explication of the preferences of 
the policy makers and the identification of target and instrument 
variables, and (b) in it's analytical structure in* which direct 
and casual relationships between the target and instrument varia-
bles are established and derived, both theoretically and numeri-
cally, and (c) in its ability to define and derive an optimum 
economic policy. Therefore, the theory of economic policy planning 
provides an appropriate analytical and operational framework for 
studying the underlying energy policy planning problem, and thus, 
1.In this study, the energy policy characterization and selection 
problems will be discussed in Chapter Three, while the steering 
problem will be discussed in Chapter Five. 
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for the formulation of an optimum energy plan. 
2.5.2.1.2 Definition of an Optimum Economic Policy: 
An important reason for adopting the theory of economic 
policy planning is that it can define and help derive an optimum 
economic policy. At this point, therefore, it is needed to discuss 
the definition of an optimum policy and its derivation in. the 
Tinbergen framework. 
Generally an optimum policy is the "best" policy. It can be 
interpreted in two alternative ways: (1) Traditionally, an optimum 
policy is defined in terms of Pareto optimality criteria: A policy 
which can make no one better off without making someone worse 
of f 1 . 
(2) .Alternatively, an optimum policy may be defined as the 
policy which can attain the optimum value of the objectives of the 
policy makers. In terms of the Tinbergen approach, an optimum 
policy is the optimum value of a policy instrument (a set of 
1. In terms of the results of the model (2.21), a set of 
policy instruments: 
is Pareto efficient. if 
(a) it is feasible, 
(b) no other feasible states (G,+1. 1 ,+T 21 +T3 ,Yp ) exist 
so that 
W(G,+T1 ,+T2 ,+T3 ,Y,X,Z) >  
(c) for at least one policy 
W (g i , + t ii , ±t2j,±t 3 j ,Ypi ) 
W(gpili,±t2j,±t3j, Ypi) 
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tive function. 
In the theory of economic policy planning, the problem of the 
formulation of the optimum economic policy 1  is stated as follows: 
Min WL = W(x-x,u-u*) = (x-) TQ (x-x) + (u-u*) TR (u-u*) 
{ u ) 
s.t. 
where 
Q > 0, R > 0 
Ax + Cz = Bu + Dw 	- a macroeconomic model 
(2.18) 
x : Nx1 ;Nendogenous target variables 
: Nx1 ;Ndesired levels of the target variables 
: Rxl ;Rendogenous non target variables 
: Kx1 ;Kexogenous instruments 
u* : Ki1 ;Kdesired levels of the instrument variables 
W : Jx1 ;Jexogenous data 
and the dimensions of the coefficient matrix are: 
A : (N + R) x N; 
C : (N + R) x R; 
B : (N + R) x K; 
D : 	(N + R) x J; 
In many applied works, the macroeconomic model is defined as 
follows: 
AX = Bu + D 
A set of optimum policies can be formulated by solving the 
model as a classical optimization model (steering problem): 
-  
u = MTQM + R) -1 (Ru* + MTQY) (2.19) 
1. This section is adapted from Preston & Pagan [1982], Chapter 1 
which shows the characterization and selection problems. 
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where M = A-1B and Y = X - A-1D 
The classical optimization model presented above is most 
commonly used in the theory of economic policy planning. However, 
as it was stated above, other forms are used in formulating opti-
mum economic policy. In the present study, the theory of economic 
policy planning is embedded in ML?. In an MLP model, an optimum 
policy is identified by the optimum solution of MLP (characteris-
tics of an MLP optimum solution are discussed in Chapter Four 
(mathematical properties) and Chapter Five (economic properties). 
Therefore, an optimum policy is defined in the present study as 
the policy (a set of instrument variables) which attains the opti-
mum value of the policy objective function of the MLP model and 
corresponds to the optimum solution of the MLP model. 
• 2.5.2.2 Policy Systems Analysis  
Policy system analysis refers to the organization and analy-
sis of the various elements of the policy formulation process 
existing in an environment. 
One important type of policy system is what is called •a 
multi-level multi-goal system, two characteristics of which are 
goal inter-dependence or interactions among different levels of 
goal seeking, and intervention by one level on the other level 
(Mesarovic et al. [1973]). 
Interdependence or interaction between the different goals 
implies that achievement of one level's objective is dependent on 
the achievement of one of the other level's objectives. 
Two types of interdependence exist: direct and indirect. In 
the case of direct interdependence, 
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depend explicitly upon the outputs and behaviour of the 
casual systems" (Ibid Mesarovic et al., p. 301). 
In the case of indirect interdependence, 
"goals of a given higher level unit may explicitly 
depend only upon the goals of the lower level units and 
implicitly upon the performance of the basic casual 
system" (Ibid Mesarovic et al., p. 301). 
Intervention is another characteristic of the multi-goal 
- multi-level policy system. The authorities of the upper level 
usually intervene on the lower level. Two types of intervention 
exist: direct and indirect. In the case of direct intervention, 
the casual sub-system is partly controlled by the upper level 
along with the control of the lower level. In'case of indirect 
intervention, the upper level cannot directly control the decision 
of the lower level - but can modify the behaviour of the lower 
level by adopting a set of appropriate instruments. In this case, 
the decision making on the upper level's part is to choose the 
best method of modifying or influencing the behaviour of the lower 
level decision makers. 
The justification for developing an MLO approach within the 
framework of policy systems analysis is that it provides a concep-
tual framework for policy planning studies. The adoption of the 
conceptual framework is useful since it will allow extensive use 
of formal concepts and analytical or quantitative techniques 
in policy planning studies.(Mesarovic et al. [1973], p. 294). It 
is revealed that the development of the MLO approach within the 
framework of policy systems analysis helps systematic and im-
proved study of the policy making system in the energy sector. 
Generally, policy system analysis is developed theoretically 
or conceptually. This study develops a numerical policy system 
analysis for the energy sector (Chapter Five). 
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2.5.2.3 Multi-level Programming 
Since a multi-level multi-goal policy system exists in the ' 
energy sector, a methodology that can represent that policy 
system is required. This methodological requirement is satisfied 
by multi-level programming (MLP). The following discussion demon-
strates this point. 
MLP consists of a series of nested optimization problems at 
different levels (Candler and Norton (1977], Bialas and. Karwan 
[1980]). An MLP model involving two levels of optimization is 
representedl as follows: 
Opt. W = w( X 0 , +T) 
{X1 , +T) 
s.t. 
X0 = g0 (Xl , X2 ) 
g1 ( X0 , X1 , +T) = Ri 
Opt. C = f( X2 , +T) 
{ X2 I +T, X1 } 
s.t. 
g2 ( X1 , X ) > R2 
Policy objective function2 
Definitions of Target Variables 
Policy constraints 
Behavioural objective function 
(2.20) 
Behavioural constraints 
X X X > 0 0 , • 1 , ..2 — 
where X0 = vector of policy target variables (1 x n 1 ) such 
1. This bi-level programming problem is a special case of MLP. In 
this study only bi-level programming problems (models and solution 
algorithms) have been considered. However, the term MLP has been 
used to represent bi-level programmes since some statements, argu 
ments and conclusions made in this study have general MLP implica-
tions. 
2. The mathematical properties of the functions and feasible 
regions of an MLP model will be discussed in Chapter Four. 
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as energy conservation, 
X1 = vector of resource control policy instrument 
variables (1 x n 2 ), 
• 
+T = vector of price control policy instrument variables 
(taxes and subsidies) (m x 1), 
X2 = vector of behavioural variables (1 x n 2 ) such as 
supply, production, and end-uses of energy, 
Ri = vector of right hand side policy constraints (n l x 1) 
for example total sectoral budget allocation, 
R2 = vector of right hand side behavioural constraints 
(n2 x 1) -constant values as supply of resources, 
demand for energy, capacity limits. 
w = policy objective function containing policy 
objectives such as conservation of energy, 
,f = behavioural objective function representing 
criteria such as cost minimization or social 
surplus maximization, 
go = functions defining the policy target variables. 
gl = policy constraints in the form of budget constraint, 
limits on the changes on taxes and subsidies, • 
and import control, 
g2 = behavioural constraints such as energy supply 
and demand constraints, 
n = nl + 
The MLP given by (2.20) consists of two sub-optimization 
problems: the policy problem (upper level problem) and behaviour-
al problem (lower level problem). The two sub-optimization prob-
lems have two objeative functions: the policy objective function 
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and the behavioural objective function. There are two types of 
constraints: the policy constraints and the constraints on the 
behaviour of individual economic agents. There are three types of 
feasible regions which are searched to find the policy optimum. 
The feasible regions are: the policy feasible region generated by 
the 	policy constraints, and the policy target and instrument 
variables; 	the behavioural feasible region generated by the 
behavioural constraints; 	and the policy-behavioural feasible 
region generated by the reaction functions through the interac-
tions of policy instruments, behavioural variables and policy 
target variables. The variables of an MLP model can be classified 
into three .types: policy target variables, policy instrument 
variables and behavioural variables which are related to the beha-
viour of economic agents. 
MLP can be of one of the following types: price control,  
resource control, and price and resource control. . In a price 
control MLP model, the upper level decision makers control the 
behaviour of the lower level decision makers through (+T) prices, 
taxes, and subsidies while in a resource control MLP, the control 
is through the allocation of resources (X1 ) 1 . fn price and re-
source control MLP, both prices and resources are controlled by 
the policy makers. 
Advantages of MLP for studying policy planning problems are 
made explicit in the following statement by Candler and Norton 
([1977] p. 40) (next page): 
1. Examples of each type of MLP will be.provided in Chapter Four. 
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"The separation of the policy problem into two compo-
nents, the policy sub-problem proper and the behaviour-
al (or 'forecasting') . sub-problem, has long been 
.accepted as a rational approach. However, this approach 
has not often been implemented systematically. We hope 
that multi-level programming is a step in this direc-
tion." 
An MLP problem has two objective .functions and two sets of con 
straints. So, MLP can represent exactly the features of multi-
goal, multi-level, hierarchical policy systems. The MLP model in 
(2.20) resembles a multi-goal multi-level policy system. This has 
been discussed by Fortuny-Amat ([1979], Section 4.5, pp.34-39). In 
the MLP model, the policy makers have some targets or goals (X 0 ) 
which they try to achieve by directly or indirectly controlling the 
decisions of economic agents (producers and consumers of energy) 
through the instrument variables (+T, X 1 ). These two types of deci 
sion makers optimize their respective objectives f l and f2 , there-
fore, there are two separate domains of control which are inter-
related by the reaction functions (go ). While policy makers con-
trol +T, X1 , economic agents control X2 . The MLP model, therefore, 
represents the multi-goal, multi(two)-level policy making system, 
and thus, can fit within the conceptual framework of policy systems 
analysis. Consequently, an MLP Model can provide Some useful infor-
mation regarding the characteristics of the multi-level decision 
making both analSrtical (as shown in Appendix B) and numerical (as. 
shown in Section 5.3). An MLP model also can represent the techni-
cal characteristics of an energy system since the constraints of an 
MLP model can be in inequality form. Consequently, an MLP model 
satisfies the validation criterion (1): can represent the system 
under study. Moreover, the elements of the theory of economic policy 
planning can be incorporated in an ML? model. In the above MLP 
modelling framework, there is a policy objective function: . the varia- 
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bles can be classified as: X 0 = the target variables, +T, X 1 = the 
instrument variables, and X 2 = irrelevant variables (behavioural 
variables, in this study); and a model is (2.20). Therefore, MLP can 
represent and incorporate the elements of energy policy systems, and 
can also accommodate the elements of the theory of economic policy 
planning and can thus incorporate the underlying policy planning 
problem adequately and appropriately. So an MLO model satisfies the 
validation criteria 2. Since MLP is an optimization technique 
developed within a mathematical programming framework containing 
economic variables such as taxes and subsidies and a detailed tech-
nical structure of the energy sector, MLP can provide information 
adequate for formulating a comprehensive set of energy policies 
(Chapter Five). As MLP is an operational method, it satisfies the 
model validation criterion (3) and it can be used for a comprehen-
sive and integrated quantitative energy planning study of a 
country 1 . 
Justifications for an MLO Approach : A Summary, To summarize, an 
MLO energy plan developed within the above mentioned framework can 
overcome the limitations of existing energy planning approaches: 
it can represent the underlying energy policy system and there-
fore, generates an energy system plan and an energy policy plan 
simultaneously, can contain an explicit statement of the energy 
policy planning problem and can provide a comprehensive set of 
energy policies. Therefore, an MLO approach can be considered an 
appropriate modelling framework for multi-level energy planning. 
Although , MLP has Seen applied to other areas and sectors of the 
economy (Candler, Fortuny-Amat, & McCarl [1981]), MLP has not yet 
been applied for energy planning. So the present study will, 
probably, be the first multi-level optimization study in the 
energy sector. 
It may, however, be mentioned that this study in its process 
of developing an energy sector MLP model will attempt to make some 
extensions in the MLP literature - in model specification (Chapter 
Three), policy applications (Chapter Five) and solutions algorithm 
(Chapter Four). Justifications for making efforts for these 
extensions may reveal from the survey of the current state of MLP 
models provided in Appendix A. 
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2.6 A MULTI-LEVEL OPTIMIZATION ENERGY MODEL  
2.6.1 An Illustrative Representation of the Model  
Within the conceptual, analytical and methodological framework 
proposed above, and considering the current level of development of 
MLP, the following abstract and illustrative representation of an 
multi-level energy planning model' is specified: 
Max W = wG 	(a) Policy objective function 2 
G,+1.1 ,+T2 ,+T3 ,Y0 
s.t. 	 (2.21) 
T1 < {+T1 ,+T2 ,+T 3 } < T 	(b) Policy constraints (price control) 
G = I 1Y + I X + I3 2 (c) Equations defining energy targets 
Yp < Yc 	(d) Policy constraints: resource control 
Min C = (c 1+ Ti )Y + (c 2 + T2 )X + (c 3 + T 3 )2 
(Y,X,2 I G,+T1 ,+T2 ,+T3 ,Yp) 
(e) Behavioural objective function 
s.t. 
Z >D 
Z= aX 
X = bY  
(f) Energy demand constraints 
(g) Intermediate energy balances 
(h) Supply balances 
1. The model specified here is a static partial equilibrium 
model. To show the possibility for extension of the model, a 
general equilibrium dynamic MLO energy planning model is presented 
in Appendix B. 
2. In this specification of the policy objective function, the 
policy instruments have not been included. However policy instru-
ment (+T) will be included in the policy objective function in the 
subsequent specifications.of MLO models (Chapters Three and Four). 
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Y + Yp < Y 	(i) Supply constraints 
X < X (j) Capacity constraints 
G, Y, X, Z, Yp > 0 
(k) Non-negative constraints 
wherel 
w = vector of the coefficients Of the policy objective 
functions (1 x m1 ), 
G =-energy target variable vector (k x 1), 
Y, X, Z = vectors of primary energy, secondary energy and 
end-uses of energy: (1 x 1), (n x 1), and (p x 1), 
1,2,3 = matrices the elements of which are either 1 or 0, 
+Ti , +T2 , +T 3 = vectors of tax and subsidy related to Y, 
X, and Z: (1 x 1), (n x 1), and (p x 1), 
Yp = amount of Y that is directly controlled by the policy 
makers (sub-vector of Y), 
T1, Tp = lower and upper limits on +T, 
D = the vector of given end-uses of energy (p x 1), 
Y, X = total supplies and capacities of fuels (1 x 1) and (n x 1), 
a, b = matrices of technical coefficients (1 x n) and (n x 1). 
The. above model is a partial equilibrium energy sectoral MLO 
model which should be used for formulating medium or long term 
energy plans. The characteristics of the modelling approach and the 
analytical characteristics that the model (2.21) can demonstrate are 
stated in Appendix B. 
1. A description of the economic and analytical characteristics 
of this type of MLO energy planning model will be given in Chap-
ter Three. 
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2.6.2 A Discussion of the Model  
In this model, the government's choice is to determine a set of 
policy instruments and strategies including taxes, subsidies, 
prices, government expenditures, etc. which will optimize the policy 
objective function involving the minimization of the use of energy, 
crude oil and imported oil. The governments choice is constrained by 
the limits on the variation of taxes and subsidies and by the condi-
tion that net government revenue should be positive. The behavioural 
model represents the choice problem of economic agents in the form 
of the choice (for production and consumption) of the set of energy 
activities which can be provided at the minimum cost given the 
government choice of a set of energy policy instruments and strate-
gies. The decisions of economic agents are subject.to  the energy 
resource supply, capacity and demand constraints. 
CHAPTER THREE  
A MULTI-LEVEL OPTIMIZATION ENERGY PLANNING MODEL FOR 
AUSTRALIA 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
From the discussion in the previous chapter it is now appar-
ent that an energy model needs to be based on the foundations of 
the theory of economic policy, policy system analysis and on •the 
methodology of ML?: The model should be developed within •the 
general framework proposed in the last chapter. Therefore, the 
model will be a partial equilibrium energy sectoral micro-economic 
planning model, explicitly based on the MLO approach (Appendix B). 
The objective of this chapter is to develop a numerical 
multi-level optimization/ multi-level energy planning model for 
Australia. The model is a static one year model and named as the 
Australian Energy Policy System Optimization Model l : AEPSOM. 
The structure of this chapter is as follows: Section 3.2 
provides a brief discussion of the Australian energy sector to 
prepare a background for the specification of AEPSOM. Section 3.3 
presents some preliminary information about AEPSOM to provide a 
• general context of AEPSOM. Within this energy sector conceptual 
and methodological context, Section 3.4 specifies the detailed 
structure, variables, relationships and coefficients of 
1. Although the model is a multi-level energy planning model, it 
is named as the Australian Energy Policy System Optimization Model 
since the emphasis of this model is on the optimization • of the 
policy system. 
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AEPSOM. Section 3.5 presents a' classification of the energy policy 
variables. Section 3.6 describes briefly the data used in the 
model and Section 3.7 summarizes the contents of the chapter. 
3.2 THE AUSTRALIAN ENERGY SECTOR: THE CONTEXT FOR ENERGY 
PLANNING AND MODELLING IN AUSTRALIA 
The process of transformation of the Australian economy from 
a predominantly agricultural towards a modern manufacturing one is 
clearly characterized by the increased importance of the energy 
sector in the micro-economic structure of the economy. This is 
explained by the fundamental and pervasive role of energy in the 
modern production and consumption processes in an industrialized 
'economy. The role that the energy sector plays in the Australian 
economy is clearly indicated by the higher energy-GDP ratio (Folie 
and Ulph 11982]), and by the substantial contribution of the 
energy sector to GDP, employment', capital expenditure, government 
revenue and export earnings (Department of National Development 
[1979], Department of Primary Industries and Energy [1988]). 
In the following sub-section, some aspects of the Australian 
energy sector such as the supply of and demand for energy re-,. 
sources, energy related problems in the economy, and the initia-
tion of energy policies are discussed to justify the' undertaking 
of an energy policy study for Australia. In view of the indis-
pensable role of a model in energy policy studies, this discussion 
will also provide the background for an Australian energy model. 
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3.2.1 Energy Resources: Supplies and Consumption  
Australia is well-endowed with most fossil fuels: coal, 
natural gas, uranium and oil shales. The major constraint on the 
Australian energy supply system is the inadequacy of oil re-
serves. It has a moderate hydro-electricity supply and- a large 
biomass and solar energy potential, although its potential' for 
other renewable energy sources such as wind, wave, ocean, and 
geothermal energy is considered conservatively. 
In Australia, the demonstrated economic recoverable black 
coal reserve is 31.0 gigatonnes which, at the 1983 production 
rate, is expected to last for about 300 years. Australia's brown 
coal reserve is higher than its black coal reserve: a reserve of 
37.4 gigatonnes is expected to last for about 1,000 years. Other 
non-renewable energy reserves are also substantial: the natural 
gas reserve, which is mainly located offshore, is sufficient for 
55 years, and the uranium supply is good for 15.3% of the total 
supply of recoverable fossil fuel (Department of Resources and 
Energy [1983]). 
Australia's oil reserve can last only until 2000 A.D - its 
reserve, including condensate and LPG, is only 1.0% of the total 
recoverable energy resources of Australia. The possible supply of 
fuel from biomass is about 461 petajoules, although biomass fuels 
such as methanol, ethanol and seed oils are found costly compared 
to oil products (Stewart et al. [1979]). 
Like any other country, energy consumption in Australia is 
shaped by its industrial, economic, demographic and geographic 
characteristics. Australian primary energy consumption in 1979-80 
was 51.2 Million Tonnes of Oil Equivalent (MTOE) almost all of 
which was supplied from commercial energy sources. Total energy 
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consumption has also grown historically to facilitate the in-
creased development activities in the country. For example, over 
the period of 1977-78 and 1981-82, total energy demand has in-
creased at the annual rate of 2.1 percent (Department of Resources 
and Energy [1983]). 
The Australian economy depends heavily on liquid fuels, 
particularly for meeting its transport needs. Demand for differ-
ent fuels in 1979-80 in MTOE was as follows: oil: 32.1 (44.40%), 
coal: 28.1 (38.87%), natural gas: 8.8 (12.17%), hydro-electricity: 
1.2 (1.66%), and other fuels (bagasse and wood): 2.4 (3.32%) 
(Department of National Development and Energy [1981]). 
Australia is among the 5 net energy exporting OECD countries. 
Export of energy consists of black coal, uranium, coke and some 
petroleum products. Total export of energy in 1979-80 was 217.7 
MTOE. One of the major characteristics of the Australian -energy 
system is the dependence on imported oil. Total import of energy 
crude oil and petroleum products - was 14.2 MTOE in 1979-80 
which was 49.76% of the total production of domestic crude oil and 
30.5% of the total oil demand in the same year (Department of 
National Development and Energy [1982]). 
3.2.2 Prospects of The Energy Sector: Justifications and 
Initiation of Energy Policies and Modelling -in Australia 
3.2.2.1 Prospects of the Energy Sector  
The government forecasts for the energy production and con-
sumption are as follows (Department of National Development and 
Energy [1981]): Total domestic energy production in 1989-90 will 
be 258.5 MTOE - a 256.7% increase in ten years. Total net energy 
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consumption will be 64.1 MTOE. Australia will be a net exporter 
of energy: the total import of energy will be equal to 8.1 MTOE, 
which is lower than the total export of energy: 171.3. However, 
the country's oil imports are expected to increase because of its 
dwindling reserves of oil l . 
In the past, Australia experienced the adverse macro-economic 
effects of past events in the world energy market, in particular 
the three oil price shocks of 1973, 1979, and 1990 in the form of 
inflation, unemployment and recession (The effects of the first 
two price shocks are discussed in Vincent, et al. [1980]). 
3.2.2.2 Why Energy Policies for Australia? 
The survey of 'the Australian energy sector in the previous 
section highlights its salient characteristics: Australia is well 
• endowed with major energy resources except crude oil; it is a net 
exporter of energy although heavily dependent on imported oil 
to meet the domestic need for liquid fuel; it is expected that 
Australia will remain dependent on imported oil for some decades. 
The question is now: Does the Australian situation warrant the 
formulation and implementation of energy policies? The answer to 
this question in general has been discussed in Chapter One. Al-
though the answer . was not straight forward, the existence of 
market failures in the energy sector was the justification for 
government intervention in this sector. Australian writers are 
1. The dependence of the Australian economy on oil (liquid fuel) 
is caused by'such.factors as the present transport system and 
nonexistence of natural oil substitutes as shale oil, tar sands 
and oil from coal or natural gas. And since the domestic produc-
tion of crude oil is not expected to increase enough to meet the 
domestic needs for oil, the dependency on the imported oil will 
remain or even increase in the future. 
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divided on the subject: one group believes in the infallible 
power of the market in solving all the problems in the energy 
sector (Hocking [1975], Tengrove [1986]), while another group 
advocates government intervention ' in the form of deliberate 
energy policies to solve the energy related problems and to cor-
rect for market failures (Folie and Ulph [1979], Gruen and Hillman 
[1981]). 
The justifications l for energy policies in Australia suggest-
ed by the second group are based on the following arguments: The 
Australian reserves of crude oil will be exhausted in the near 
future, uncertainty about the required supply of oil and its 
price, possible macro-economic problems in the form of inflation, 
unemployment, recession and the balance of payment deficit caused 
by the oil supply embargoes or price increases of 1973, 1979 and 
1990, the merit-good character of energy, and the inefficient 
operation of the energy market (Folie and Ulph [1979], Gruen and 
Hillman [1981]). The following statement may show the importance 
of a set of energy policies/energy management in Australia. Allan 
Powell has stated (quoted in Lloyds (ed.) [1984], p. 323) that 
"Even a lucky country cannot afford to squander the 
.resources with which it is barely endowed". 
Hall [1984] has argued more directly and strongly for a set of 
energy policies for Australia. 
Because of the existence of market failures and the possibil- 
1. Saddler [1981] has discussed and examined in detail the views 
of both groups on the formulation of energy policies in the con-
text of energy problems in Australia from their broad socio-
economic - technical perspectives and suggested the formulation of 
energy policies for the provision, distribution and utilization of 
energy resources. 
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ity of exhaustion of oil in Australia, a certain amount of gov-
ernment intervention is viewed as essential: Interventions de-
signed to correct energy market failures, specifically to provide 
information and to ensure greater distribution of the income 
arising from the energy sector. This view is consistent with the 
government's attitude towards public intervention in the energy 
sector (Department of National Development and Energy [1979], p.4, 
Department of Resources and Energy [1984], and Department of 
Primary Industries and Energy [1988]). 
The formal initiation of energy policy activities goes back 
as far as 1972 when the Department of Minerals and Energy was set 
up. There was no policy document until the publication of 
"Australian Energy Policy - A Review" by the Department of Nation-
al Development in 1979. From then onward, national energy policy 
has become more comprehensive and integrated, although not to the 
desired extent. 
Since Australian energy policies are still at the formative 
phase, some issues related to the objectives, strategies and 
instruments of energy policies are being discussed. Such issues 
relate to the selection of appropriate energy policy objectives, 
such as the question of whether import independence should be an 
objective of Australian energy policies (Folie and Ulph [1979]). 
There are other issues that relate to the choice of appropriate 
energy policy strategies and instruments. For example, the ques-
tion of suitability of stockpiling or broader adjustment in .the 
macro-economy for facing any possible oil shortage has received 
careful consideration. These issues of Australian energy policies 
will be given due treatment in the appropriate places: issues 
related to policy objectives in Section 3.4.1, issues related to 
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strategies and instruments in Chapter Six. 
3.2.2.3 Institutional Aspects  
Politically, Australia is a federation with a high degree of 
delegation of power between the Commonwealth and State Govern-
ments. 
In situ on-shore and off-shore minerals are owned by the 
Crown, except for uranium in the Northern Territory. The Common-
wealth government controls the price of oil and the allocation of 
leases for exploration of oil, coal and natural gas. The State 
Governments produce and supply electricity and determine its 
price. 
The private sector supplies or produces coal, oil, natural 
gas, wood, uranium and solar energy. The prices of these fuels are 
determined by the individual suppliers or producers except oil. 
Consumers make their decisions about end-uses of different fuels. 
The economic agents have greater freedom in making their 
optimum decisions independently. Their decisions are, as is re-
vealed from above discussions, affected by some government ac-
tions. The behaviour of economic agents are subject to the influ-
ence of the following government quantitative policies and strate-
gies: taxes and subsidies, price control, government expenditures 
for research and development etc, and exploration, conservation 
and technology policy strategies. 
The role of energy markets (decisions of economic agents) in 
Australia has been stated as follows (quoted in 'Department of 
National Development [1979], p. 4): 
"Quite clearly, the Commonwealth Government's role 
should not be to attempt to indicate the precise future 
path along which energy producers and consumers should 
move. It is however, necessary to set the scene within 
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which the private sector and Government instrumentali-
ties can operate with confidence, while as far as prac-
ticable, i.e. given our other objectives, allowing the 
forces of the market to allocate our available re-
sources of manpower, capital and technology. 
The thrust of the Australian energy policies is stated in 
the following (Department of National Development, p. 4) : 
"There are circumstances where market forces will not 
achieve the Government's objectives. The Government has 
used taxes and subsidies to encourage conservation, 
advance production of new sources of energy and inten-
sify exploration and development of oil and 	gas . 
fields." 
From the above analysis, it may appear that in Australia 
there exists a multi-level (two-level) policy system characterized 
by the presence of government and economic agents in policy making 
processes. The major form of government intervention in the 
decision making of economic agents is the control of energy 
prices. 
3.2.2.4 Energy Planning Modelling in Australia  
It should be mentioned here that the existence of these 
problems and their resolution require the formulation of a set of 
energy policies. To undertake such policy studies, energy mo-
delling has started in Australia. 
Energy Modelling activities in Australia are relatively new. 
An initial study in this area is the work of the National Energy 
Advisory Committee (NEAC) (1978). The need for, and scope of 
energy modelling 	in Australia has been 	discussed in NEAC 
(1978). Four types of models were proposed in the energy model 
suit: Reference Energy System (RES), the Brookhaven Energy System 
Optimization Model (BESOM/ AUSTESOM), an input-output model, and 
a Hudson-Jorgenson type model (DRI/CRES/UNSW model). 
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RES was necessary to develop the data base and structure for 
an optimization model-BESOM (or Australian version, AUSTESOM). 
But instead of a static optimization model BESOM, a dynamic opti-
mization model (MARKAL) has been formulated by CSIRO (Musgrove et 
al. [1983]). MARKAL is a special version of DESOM. 
An input-output model named MERG has also been developed by 
James [1984]. Development of a Hudson-Jorgenson type of model 
named CRES/UNSW model was attempted (Folie and Ulph [1976)), but 
was not implemented. An independent modelling work is GESOM 
(Schuyers [1979]), which is an application of BESOM to Australia. 
This model has been coupled with the IMP macro- model ( Brain and 
Schuyers [1981]). Another hybrid model is MERG-MARKAL ( James et 
al. [1986]). 
Strictly speaking, MARKAL and GESOM are the only two optimi-
zation models which belong to the type of energy models 	consid- 
ered in this study. These are mathematical programming models 
whose characteristics have already been discussed above. 
Australian energy models belong to one or other category of 
the models mentioned in the model survey in Chapter Two. A classi-
fication of Australian models is as follows: 
(a) Mathematical Programming Model: 
- MARKAL . 
- GESOM 
(b) Input-Output Model: 
- MERG 
(c) Hybrid Model 
- IMP macro model + GESOM 
- MERG + MARKAL 
The limitations of different types of energy models discussed in 
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Chapter Two apply to the different types of Australian models. 
Since the general counterparts of the Australian models have been 
evaluated separately, a general statement can be made that the 
Australian energy models also do not satisfy the model evaluation 
criteria. Therefore, there is a need for developing an alternative 
energy model in Australia, similar to the one proposed in Chapter 
Two. 
3.3 THE AUSTRALIAN ENERGY PLANNING MODEL - AEPSOM: SOME 
PRELIMINARIES  
(a) Abstract Presentation of AEPSOM 
An abstract presentation of the structure of the model l to be 
specified in this section is given here, and can be used as refer-
ence in the subsequent discussion. Two alternative specifications 
of the model are provided: in the first specification, budget 
constraints are included in the policy, model (+T is not in the 
policy objective function), while in the second specification, +T 
(budgetary implications of policies) is included in the policy 
objective function (budget constraints are not in the model). 
Specification 1 . 
MinWL = wG 	(a) Policy objective function 
{+T} 
s.t. 
G = 1 1Y + I2X + I 3 2 (b) Definitional equations 
   
1. This model is similar to the model (2.21) in Chapter Two. But 
this model is a price control MLP model, while the model (2.21) is 
a price and resources control MLP model. 
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T <± T < T 1 — — — P (c) Policy constraints 
{(+T1 )Y + (+T 2 )X + (+T 3 )Z) - {(-T l )Y + 
(-T2 )X + (-T3 )Z} > 0 	(d) Budget constraints 
Min C = (c 1 + T 1 )Y +(c 2 + T2 )X +(c 3 + T3 )Z 
{Y,X,Z I +T) 	(e) Behavioural objective 
function 
s.t. 	 (3.1) 
Z >D 
X bY 
Y < Y 
X < X 
G,Y,X,Z > 0 
(f) Demand constraint 
(g) Intermediate energy balance 
constraints 
(h) Energy supply balance 
constraints 
(i) Resource constraints 
(j) Capacity constraints 
(k) Non-negativity constraints 
where: 
141., = the value of P.O.F., 
w = vector of coefficients of the policy objective, 
function (i x e) 
G - vector of energy target variables (e x 1), 
Y = a vector of primary energy (p x 1), 
X = a vector of energy products (n x 1), 
Z - a vector of end-uses of the energy products (m x 1), 
D = a vector of end-uses in various sectors (q x 1), 
c l , c 2 ,c3 = costs for supplying, converting and using 
energy {(p x 1),(n x 1),(m x 1)), 
+T = {+T 1 , +T2 , +T 3 ) - vector of different taxes 
• and subsidies {Sub-vectors +T 1 , +T2 , +T3 	(p x 1), 
(n x 1),(th x 1)) (+T = taxes, -T 	subsidies; lower 
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case t's are the elements), 
. a, b - matrices of technological coefficients ((m x n), 
(n x p)}, 
I's = identity matrices the elements of which are either 
1 or 0, 
T l = lower level of +T, 
T - upper level of +T. 
Specification 2. 
Min WL = wG - 
+ (+T 2 )X + (+T 3 )2) - ((-T 1 )Y + (-T 2 )X + (-T 3 )2}] 
{+T} 
(a) Policy Objective Function 
(P.O.F.2) 
s.t. 
G = I1Y + I 2X + I 3 2 	(b) Definitional equations 
< + T < Tp 	(c) Policy constraints 
(3.2) 
Mm C - (c 1 + T i )y + (c 2 + T 2 )x + (c 3 + T 3 )2 
(Y,X,2 1 +11 	• (d) Behavioural objective 
function 
s.t. 
(e) Demand constraint 
Z = aX 	(f) Intermediate energy balance 
constraints 
X = bY 	(g) Energy supply balance 
constraints . 
(h) Resource constraints 
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X < X 	(i) Capacity constraints 
G,Y;X,Z > 0 
(j) Non-negativity constraints 
(b) A Discussion of the Model  
Model (3.1) is a price control MLP in which the policy makers 
at the upper level of the hierarchical structure intervene in the 
behaviour of the energy producers and consumers by taxes and 
• subsidies (+T) 1 . Policy makers are only interested in the policy 
target and instrument variables (G and +T). The policy optimiza-
tion problem involves the minimization of the policy objective 
function consisting of target variables such as energy import, 
total energy use etc. subject to such constraints as policy con-
straints and budget constraints. The policy constraint imposes 
limits on the changes of taxes and subsidies, while the budget 
constraint requiras that the government budget (taxes and subsi-
dies) in the energy sector should be balanced or surplus. 
The behavioural model is a cost minimization linear program-
ming model in which the economic agents choose variables : Y, 'X, 
and Z after +T is announced by the policy makers. The objective 
function of the behavioural model (3.1.e) consists of total costs 
for supplying, producing and using energy plus taxes minus subsi-
dies. Marginal costs of various types of energy are constant 
irrespective 	of the levels of input and output, however rela- 
1. The government influences indirectly the economy. Decisions in 
the energy sector are indirectly controlled by the government 
through taxes and subsidies (+T), prices, government expendi-
tures, education and propaganda, and the supply of technical 
information. 
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tive prices influence resource allocation in the energy sector 
since in the model, price is equal to cost + taxes/subsidies which 
is endogenous in the model (see equation.3.1.e). The equations 
3.1.f to 3.1.j (relationships, variables and technical coeffi-
cients (a and b)) represent the characteristics of the underlying 
energy system, modelled as different types of constraints on the 
demand for energy, maximum possible energy supply and capacity 
utilization etc. 
The primary inputs in the production processes are the pri-
mary fuels which are either converted into secondary •energy or 
are transported to the end-users for final uses. Activities 
in the model represent the flows of energy from the stage . of 
supply of primary energy to the end uses. The energy inputs and 
outputs are perfectly divisible. The quantities of inputs and 
outputs in case of conversion activities are in fixed propor-
tions. Substitutability among primary energy, energy products, and•
end-uses of energy (inter-fuel substitution) exists. The linear 
production function of the multi-input, multi-activity and multi-
output type (Naylor and Vernon [1969), Chapter .Eight) exists in 
the energy sector. The production function embedded may be 
written as Q(Z,X,Y) 0, where Z, X, Y vectors of energy end-
uses, energy .products and primary energy. 
Capital and labour inputs are not endogenous variables in 
the 	model. Therefore, the inter-factor substitution possibility 
is 	not specified in the model l . Only capital supply is con- 
1. The inter-factor (labour, capital, energy and raw materials) 
substitutability has been a major focus of the econometric studies 
on the aggregate relationships between macroeconomic activity and 
energy. use (Julius [1981) contains a survey). Different degrees 
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strained. 	The supply of labour is not constrained (due to avail- 
ability of 	sufficient labour to supply the required amount of 
energy). Demand for energy in each sector of the economy is given 
• exogenously. 
As the demand for energy and the supply of inputs are 
exogenous in the 'model, this is a partial equilibrium energy 
sector model. 
In summation, the MLP model (3.1) (or (3.2)) is a 'mathemati-
cal definition of the constituent components of the multi-level 
decision making system in the form of two objective functions and 
two sets of constraints. The programming problem embedded in the 
model is to determine the optimum values of the decision variables 
of both levels of decision makers. 
(c) Foundations  
(1) 	The above model is a price control non-linear MLP 
(price control bi-level programming) . model. The model consists of 
two optimization problems, the policy optimization problem and 
...Continued... 
of substitutability are assumed and specified in different types 
of production functions (for example Cobb-Douglas, CES and trans-
log production functions (Berndt and Wood (1979])). Findings of 
these studies have been used to predict the aggregate energy use 
or other energy macroeconomic relationships in the economy. It 
may, however, be mentioned that in mathematical programming energy 
models, the emphasis has been on the inter-fuel (coal, natural 
gas, oil etc), substitutability. This is so because most of the 
mathematical programming energy models are developed to capture 
the technical details and processes of the energy sector in which 
case inter-fuel substitution appears to be more important than 
inter-factor substitution. Relative merits and demerits of mathe-
matical and econometric models were discussed in Chapter Two. It 
was stressed that which method should be adopted in a study de-
pends on the objective, nature and uses of the model. Approaches 
and assumptions made in this study to undertake a specific type of 
energy planning study require the adaptation of an MLP model in 
which inter- .fuel substitution appears to be a dominating issue. 
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the energy systems optimization problem, which are as follows: 
(Specification 1): 
(i) Policy Optimization Problem 
Min WL wG 
(+T) 
s.t. 
G = I1Y + 12X + 1 3 Z 
T1 < + T < Tp 
(a) Policy objective function, 
(3.3.a) 
(b) Definitional equations 
(c) Policy constraints 
((+1. 1 )Y + (+1 2 )X + (+T 3 )Z) - ( Z-T1 )Y + (-T2 )X + (-T3 )Z} > 0 
(d) Budget constraints 
G,Y,X,Z > 0 	(e) Non-negativity constraints 
(ii) Energy Systems Optimization Problem 
Min C = (c l )Y + (c 2 )X + (c 3 )Z 
{Y,X,Z} 	(a) Behavioural objective function 
s .t. 
(b) Demand constraint 	(3.3.b) 
Z = aX 	(c) Intermediate energy balance 
constraints 
X - bY 
Y < Y 
X < X 
Y,X,Z > 0 
(d) Energy supply balance 
constraints 
(e) Resource constraints 
(f) Capacity constraints 
(g) Non-negativity constraints 
(2) 	The model has the three elements of the theory of 
economic policy: (a) a policy objective function (equation 3.1a), 
(b) a set of constraints to represent the energy technology, 
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policy and economic systems under study, (c) a classification of 
the variables: 
G = the target variables 
+T - the instrument variables 
' Y,X,Z = the behavioural variables. 
	
(3) 	AEPSOM is specified within the conceptual framework of 
policy systems analysis. There are several goals (G) that the 
policy makers (such as energy conservation) and economic agents 
(such as cost minimization) try to achieve. Goals of the two 
level decision makers are inter-dependent. The existing policy 
system has a hierarchical character, i.e. the upper level decision 
makers (policy makers) influence the behaviour of economic agents 
by indirect intervention (+T). This two-level decision problem is 
interactive - simultaneously interdependent; The attainment of 
economic agents' objective is dependent on the selection of taxes 
and subsidies by the government. The fulfillment of the government 
objective is also dependent on the outcome of economic agents' 
behaviour: the attainment of the optimum value of the policy 
objective function is determined by the choice of energy activi-
ties by the economic agents. 
Therefore, the model contains the characteristics of a 
multi-goal (G), multi(two)-level, hierarchical policy system. 
3.4 AEPSOM: MODEL SPECIFICATION 
The elements of AEPSOM will be specified as follows: The 
policy objective function in Section 3.4.1, and the constraints 
71 
in Section 3.4.2, 
. 3.4.1A Policy Objective Function (P.O.F.)  
The policy objective function l of AEPSOM represents the value 
judgments of 'Australian policy makers about the allocation of 
energy resources. So it provid'es the criteria for the evaluation 
of policy alternatives. 
• 
3.4.1.1 Specification of Policy Objective Function: 
The specification of a policy objective function is partly a 
political exercise. The political philosophy of the policy makers 
will largely determine the nature of the policy objective func-
tion. Economic conditions also influence the specification of a 
policy objective function. 
A policy objective function in an energy sector planning 
model should contain the existing energy policy objectives and 
preferences regarding the allocation of resources and the distri-
bution of income. It should be mentioned here that the policy 
objective function may take the form of what an economist .or a 
planner thinks it should be on the basis of his own arguments and 
preferences. Alternatively, it may manifest only the preferences 
1. 	Inspite . of the Arrow impossibility theorem (Arrow (1951)), 
which rules out' the possibility of specifying a social welfare 
function without violating one or more of the five acceptable 
axioms of social preferences, economists' endeavor to construct 
and analyse social welfare functions has proceeded steadily. One 
development in the mechanism of the specification of the social 
welfare function has been suggested by Downs (1957). In this 
approach it is assumed that the social preference is revealed 
through. the political process of voting i.e., the individuals' 
preferences are signaled to the government policy makers by their 
vote in favour of the party elected. Therefore, the policy objec-
tive function is used as a proxy for the social welfare func-
tion. And this is how Tinbergen viewed the social welfare function 
. (Tinbergen (1952)). 
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of the current policy makers. In the present study, the latter 
approach has been followed. 
To 'establish a policy objective function, the following 
information is necessary: 
(1) the functional form, 
• 	(2) the' variables appearing in the function, 
(3) the weights attached to each variable, 
(4) the units of measurement of the variables. 
3.4.1.2 Alternative Methods of specifying the Policy  
Objective Function 
The alternative approaches for revealing the preferences of 
policy makers are: direct interview, indirect interview, imagi-
nary interview, inference from planning documents, and the re-
vealed preference method (Johansen 11974]). Because of the prob-
lems associated with the interview methods such as the non-avail-
ability of enough appropriate information to specify analytically 
and numerically a policy objective function (by either of the 
first three methods), an approach that consists of some elements 
of the last two methods has been adopted. Thus the adopted method 
of establishing the policy objective function requires one to 
study the policy documents and to make inferences from the actions 
of policy makers. 
3.4.1.3 Functional Form 
The methods for establishing the policy objective function 
stated above have been applied to specify the functional form of 
the policy objective function. Frisch has adopted the direct 
interview method (Johansen [1974]), van Eijk and Sandee [19519] 
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adopted an imaginary interview method, while Fox, Sengupta and 
Thorbecke ([1973], Chapter 15) used the methods of inferences 
drawn from published documents and revealed preferences to specify 
the functional form of the policy objective function in their 
studies. For the reasons stated above, the methods of inferences 
from the policy documents and revealed preferences were used in 
the present study. 
A policy objective function can take many economically ac-
ceptable functional forms (Frish (1976]) such as: linear, quadrat-
ic, cubic, log, log-inverse etc. Quadratic and linear forms are 
most commonly used in macro-economic and sectoral policy studies 
(Fox, Sengupta and Thorbecke [1973]). 
For example, in Theil's macro-econometric studies of optimum 
policy formulation in which some desirable values of the targets 
and instruments can be identified, a quadratic policy objective 
function involving the squared deviations of the desired and 
actual values is specified. An alternative approach is what is 
termed. as the multi-target policy objective function (linear or 
non-linear). In van Eijk and Sandee's [1959] approach to the 
multi-target policy objective function, no macro-economic fixed 
targets were identified; a linear function involving macro target 
variables such as GDP, employment, inflation and the balance of 
payment was found to be appropriate. 
In most of the MLP literature so far, relatively simpler 
policy objective functions have been specified because of the 
computational problem of an MLP model. In all large or medium 
scale real applications of MLP models, a linear policy objective 
function has been specified (see Candler and Norton [1977], Bis-
schop et al. [1982] and Fortuny-Amat [1979]). For example Candler 
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and Norton [1977] have specified a linear policy objective func-
tion involvihg the following agricultural sector policy target 
variables: employment, farm income, the level of wheat production 
and the size of government budget. The policy objective function 
was maximized by the programming problem. - 
Relative superiority of different functional forms has been 
disputed by economists (Yotopoulas and Nugent [1976]), without any 
definite agreement. 
Theil's quadratic welfare function has gained wide applica-
tion in macroeconomic policy studies. The justifications for 
adopting Theil's quadratic function have been stated as follows 
(Fox, Sengupta and Thorbecke [1973], p. 192): 
"It is not necessary to believe that the preference 
functions of policy makers are necessarily and precise-
ly quadratic forms; we may simply use quadratic forms 
as reasonable approximations to the true preference 
functions over limited ranges on either side of the 
desired values of the instrument variables. The justi-
fication for using quadratic preference functions, says 
Theil, is analogous to that for using minimum-variance 
estimation in statistics and mean-square error minimi-
zation in engineering, which derived their popularity 
mainly from considerations of mathematical convenience. 
A more profound argument in favour of quadratic prefer-
ence functions is that. this form allows us to have 
decreasing 'marginal rates of substitution' between the 
various instrument variables and non-controlled varia-
bles." 
Theil's quadratic function has several disadvantages. Since 
in this approach the specified objective is to minimize the sum of 
the weighted squares of deviations of instruments and targets from 
a desired level (the fixed target variables), it is necessary to 
implement this approach to determine some fixed values of the 
target variables. One problem of the determination of the fixed 
values of targets by an analyst is that it may be arbitrary, 
unless these values are determined by the policy makers. 
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In Australia, no effort has so far been devoted to determine 
the target values of energy conservation, oil use, oil import, 
. etc., by either academics or government. Therefore, the specifica-
tion of Theil's quadratic welfare function will be arbitrary 
because of the arbitrary character of the targets to be deter-
mined. 
Another drawback of Theil'a approach has been stated by Yoto-
poulas and Nugent ([1976] p. 423]) as: 
"Moreover, this specification has the 	unfortunate 
characteristics of treating as equally undesirable 
positive and negative deviations from the fixed tar-
gets". 
Finally, although Theil's approach has mathematical conven-
ience (for which it has gained wider application in.macro-economic 
policy studies), a linear multi-target policy objective function 
also has mathematical and computational convenience in mathemati-
cal programming models. 
For all these reasons, a multi-target policy objective func-
tion (linear or non-linear) is being advocated here. A 'multi-
target policy objective function approach is a  flexible and 
commonly accepted approach (Yotopoulas and Nugent [1976] and Fox, 
Sengupta and Thorbecke [1973]). This has been argued by Yotopoulas 
and Nugent ([1976], p.423) as follows: 
"Some of the short-comings of Theil's quadratic objec-
tive function can be overcome by specifying a somewhat 
more general objective function, that is, a complete 
multi-target social welfare function, each different 
goal being weighted by its relative importance from the 
point of view of the decision makers." 
The conclusion is that a multi-target (linear or non-linear) 
policy objective function may be considered as a suitable func-
tional form for energy policy planning studies, particularly in a 
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study where an MLP or mathematical programming model is used. 
Therefore, a multi-target policy objective function of the 
following form is specified: 
W = F(wixi , w2x2 , . 	wnxn ) 	 (3.4) 
where: w's are the weights of the policy target variables 
x's are the policy target variables. 
This is a genekal presentation of the policy objective func-
tion. Specific presentations of the two specifications of policy 
objective function's will be given in (3.5) and (3.18). 
3.4.1.4 Variables in the Objective Function 
3.4.1.4.1. The Objectives of the Australian Energy Policies: 
The study method ((a) the study of the energy policy docu-
ments and (b) inferences from the revealed preferences of the 
policy makers) has been adopted in order to identify the relevant 
variables appearing in the policy objective function (the policy 
target variables). 
Many governments adopted energy policies before the Australi-
an government did so. Australia did not initiate any formal energy 
policies until the establishment of the Department of Energy in 
1972. Since that time several government energy policy statements 
and documents have been published to highlight the salient fea-
tures of Australian energy policies. 
It was stated before that in the absence of any market fail-
ures, a perfectly competitive economy can attain an optimum allo-
cation of resources in the energy sector. But because of the 
occurrence of market failures, manifested in several energy 
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problems (stated in Chapter One), government policies have been 
designed to correct these market failures and to solve these 
energy problems. All these policies are aimed at the efficient 
use of the energy resources, the determination of efficient 
prices, and 	the provision of some social goods (research and 
development). 	Furthermore energy policy objectives also embrace 
the need for an equitable distribution of benefits accruing in the 
energy sector. In 1977, the objectives of the Australian energy 
policies were as follows (Anthony (1977]): 
"to move crude oil prices in the direction of interna-
tional levels; for the average rate of growth of energy 
consumption, particularly in liquid fuels, to be re-
strained; the highest degree of self-sufficiency in 
liquid fuels consistent with the broadly economic 
utilization of energy reserves; that economic oil and 
gas reserves be developed; to encourage individual 
major energy projects to meet overseas demand for 
energy minerals where those projects are economical and 
will provide an adequate return to Australia; and that 
energy research and development (R&D) be substantially 
increased." 
The emphasis of Australian energy policy has remained un-
changed since 1977. For example in 1979 (ESCAP (1979)), the 
policy objectives were stated as follows: to reduce energy con-
sumption, specially in liquid fuels, attain the highest degree of 
self-sufficiency, increase energy reserves, encourage exports and 
increase research ind development. In 1986, Tengrove [1986] stated 
that in general government policies are designed 'to increase 
security of supply, to encourage industrial development, to alter 
distribution of income and to reduce the rate at which resources 
are depleted.' Similar objectives are also stated 'in Department 
of Resources and Energy (undated, probably 1984) and Department of 
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Primary Industries and Energy (1988). 1 
Therefore, it can be stated that inspite of the changes in 
the government in power and changes in the energy sector, both 
locally and globally, the following energy policy objectives have 
been . common to all the above energy policy development initia-
tives:. (a) security of energy supply, (b) conservation of energy, 
(c) (specially) conservation of oil, (d) efficiency in energy 
supply, production and uses, (e) the development of the export 
energy sector, and (f) equity in the opportuni,ties generated in 
the sector. 
The above emphasis of the energy policy is not restricted to 
Australia. Countries of similar economic and energy sectoral 
backgrounds have pursued the same types of energy policy objec-
tives (International Energy Agency [1986]). Generally, Australia 
and other western industrialized countries have a common set of 
energy policies designed to achieve the objectives specified. 
The citation of the historical and cross-country energy 
policy experiences alone is not enough to justify the identifica-
tion of a set of energy policies for a country. An analysis of 
the energy sector problems and prospects for its developments, 
Australian and global, in the context of the overall macro-economy 
is necessary to justify the individual energy policy objectives 
relevant for a country. 
Such an analysis is provided below. 
1. For an account of the evolution of the Australian energy poli-
cies, see Marks [1986]. 
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(A) The Security of Supply/Import Independence  
The Arab oil embargoes have created a world wide sense of 
oil supply insecurity due to the expected non-availability of oil 0 
that may be caused by any further embargoes in the future. The 
problem has several interpretations (Griffin and Steele, [1980]). 
The most common one is that the non-secured oil supply is a na-
tional security problem. Oil embargoes are motivated by national-
istic policies, and, therefore, oil exporting countries may pro-
hibit oil exports for political reasons. This creates a political 
dependency of the oil importing countries, and may threaten their 
national sovereignty. Another interpretation of the problem is 
that though the non-secured oil supply problem may not appear to 
threaten national security of the oil importing countries, it 
may, however, create serious macro-economic problems in the form 
of unemployment, inflation, the balance of payment deficit, and 
recession due to oil supply shortages or oil price hikes, and may 
threaten the country's economic welfare. 
Whatever the exact interpretation of the problem may be, the 
situation had certainly created a market failure - the market can 
not internalize the expected cost of an oil supply embargo. 
Therefore, a deliberate policy response from the government is 
necessary to deal with this problem. 
At this stage a clear statement about what is meant by the 
terms "the security of energy supplies" is necessary for the 
subsequent discussion on the topic. The Department of Primary 
Industries and Energy [1988] defines it as follows: 
"...it is more a concept of relative assurance and 
dependability of overall energy supplies in foresee-
able circumstances"... 
As has already been discussed in Section 3.2.1 	although 
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Australia has vast reserves of coal, natural gas and uranium, 
making it a net exporter of energy, the country's indigenous 
reserves of crude oil and condensate will decline over the coming 
decade. This, together with the fact that no major discoveries 
have been made in recent years, will make Australia dependent on 
imported oil, in spite of the recent downward trend in the use of 
oil in Australia. "Hence a principal concern in energy security 
is to maintain a satisfactory supply of liquid fuels in the longer 
term" (Department of Primary Industries and Energy [1988]). . 
Therefore, the concept of "the security of energy supply" has 
been interpreted in the Australian context in the form of the 
security of supply of liquid fuels (oil) (Folie and Ulph [1979]). 
The conceptual difficulty with the phrase "the security of 
supply of oil". is that it is subject to different interpretations, 
.since the security of the oil supply can be achieved by pursuing 
several strategies such as: the reduction in oil import, self-
sufficiency of indigenous oil supply through increased supply of 
domestic oil, general adjustments in the macro-economy to increase 
the level of self-sufficiency in oil (through oil conservation, 
macro-economic policy adjustments etc.)', stock piling, and diver- 
' sification of energy supply and increase in the supply of oil 
substitutes (Folie and Ulph [1979], Department of Primary Indus-
tries and Energy [1988]). 
Because of the uncertainty in the possibility of increased 
domestic oil production in Australia in the near future, and of 
the possible non-effectiveness of other options in the short term, 
and due to the possible problems associated with he dependency of 
the importation of oil (inflation, embargo etc.), the emphasis of 
the issue of the security of liquid fuel supply in Australia has 
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been on the reduction of oil import, as an interpretation of the•
issue as well as as a policy response or objective. Therefore, a 
reduction in the importation of oil has become an explicit energy 
policy objective in Australia. 
The issue is also related to the conservation of oil (De-
partment of Primary Industries and Energy [1988]). This is dis-
cussed below (next page). 
(B) Conservation of Energy  
The principal concern of the developed countries is the 
security of an adequate energy (oil) .supply. This cannot adequate-
ly be addressed by only limiting oil imports, complementary 
strategies are also necessary. Because of the expected ultimate 
global exhaustion of fossil fuel, concern for inter-generational 
equity in the distribution of depletable energy resources, uncer-
tainty about the future viable backstop technology and pollution 
from the energy industries, it is now increasingly felt that . 
energy conservation should be specified as an energy policy objec-
tive, at least as a by-product of the concern for the security of 
an adequate energy supply. The Department of Primary Industries 
and Energy [1988 p. 4] states it in the following form: 
"... energy security in the broadest sense will be best 
served by pursuing, within a realistic economic frame-
work, an adaptive strategy incorporating....energy 
conservation." 
Energy conservation is defined as an acceptable or feasible 
reduction in the present consumption of energy (Griffin and Steele 
[1980], P. 213). Since the past history of economic development 
shows that there is a positive correlation between energy use and 
economic development, the rationale for energy conservation has 
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been debated. 	The advocates of energy conservation base their 
arguments on (1) what is called the energy theory of value (Webb 
and Ricketts, [1980]) (which implies that only energy has value), 
and (2) external consumption and production diseconomies (pollu-
tion etc.). However, the other position has aptly been summa-
rized by Griffin and Steele ([1980], P. 226) as follows: 
"...even though energy conservation is feasible, its 
desirability, when couched in terms of aggregate ener-
gy, is not obvious. Arbitrarily minimizing energy/GNP 
values will lead to much higher production costs and a 
loss in economic welfare". 
This leads us to interpret energy conservation in terms of 
control. of wastage, increased process (single or combined) effi-
ciencies and fuel specific energy conservation through inter-fuel 
substitution. In this sense, the conservation of specific fuels 
may lead to welfare gains caused by supply security, reduction in 
pollutions, and the efficient allocation of energy resources. 
In Australia, energy conservation has been 'adopted as an 
explicit energy policy objective, in a similar manner as in other 
OECD countries (Endersbee et al. [1980], Folie and Ulph [1982], 
ESCAP [1979], Department of Primary Industries and Energy [1988], 
Department of National Development and Energy [1979]). Regard has 
also been paid to the welfare and economic growth issues in the 
formulation of the Australian energy conservation policy. It was 
clearly stated in government policy documents. For example ESCAP 
[1979], P. 70) states that: 
"An important constraint upon the Government's energy 
conservation programme was that it should not detract 
from the attainment of socially desirable objectives 
such as economic growth and the welfare of the popula-
•tion" 
Therefore, energy conservation strategies in Australia con- 
sist of minimizing the use of energy in the economy by eliminat- 
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ing energy waste, by improving the efficiency of energy supply, 
production and end-use methods, and through the development of an 
efficient energy system (mix of various energy forms). 
(C) Conservation of Oil  
• The case for fuel specific energy conservation is strong. It 
. is argued that because of ( ) market failures due to externali-
ties, and government intervention creating differences between 
social and market costs and benefits, and, (ii) national security 
considerations, fuel specific energy conservation,would increase 
social welfare (Griffin and Steele [1980]). As a e result of this 
Argument, conservation of oil, the fuel with a high national 
security risk, has been the major fuel specific energy conserva-
tion policy strategy in many OECD countries as well as in Austra-
lia (International Energy Agency [1986]). 
In terms of the proven energy reserves and future energy 
demand, Australia is in a better position than many other OECD 
countries. However, its domestic oil reserve is low. Since the 
energy supply is very dependent on liquid fuels, it is forecasted 
that the country's dependency on oil, specially imported oil, will 
increase over time. This situation has resulted . in a serious 
concern for consuming oil. In some cases, the conservation of oil 
is seen as a separate policy objective. For example in the De-
partment of Primary Industries and Energy ([1988] p. 66) an objec-
tive of the Australian energy policy is stated as follows: 
"Putting more effort into conservation/efficient use 
of petroleum products." 
In some other cases, the objective of conservation of oil has 
been specified as part of the general conservation strategy. 	In 
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ESCAP ([1979), P.68) it is mentioned that one of the government 
energy policy objectives would be: 	• 
To restrain the average rate of growth of energy con 
sumption, particularly in liquid fuel." 
Therefore, one of Australian energy policy objectives is to 
minimize the use of oil in the economy. 
(D) Efficient Utilization of Energy Resources  
Efficient utilization of energy resources involves the mini-
mum cost supply of the energy demand in the economy. Efficiency 
can be achieved by adopting cost minimizing production, transpor-
tation and end-use processes and by avoiding waste. An appropri-
ate energy price structure is fundamental in this process of 
efficiently allocating resources. As efficient allocation and 
utilization of energy resources are more imperative than that of 
any other resources because of the limited supply of the major 
energy fuels, this objective has received considerable attention. 
(E) Maximization of Government Revenue: 
In Australia, the energy sector contributes significantly to 
the government budget: revenue from indirect taxes including 
royalties was $m 4729 in 1981-82 (Department of Primary Industries 
and Energy [1988)1. The possibility of increased government tax 
earning in the energy sector has risen with the advent of large 
scale mining in the economy and the introduction of the import 
parity pricing of crude oil. The government is aware of this 
potential of the energy sector and a government policy has been to 
maximize the contribution. This is reflected in the government ' 
decision to introduce resource rent tax - a tax to siphon off the 
surplus rent generated in the energy sector - which should be 
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utilized for the development of the sector and the community. 
Further discussion on the justifications for the revenue 
maximization objective of the government is provided in Section 
3.4.1.9. 
(F) Development of the Export Energy Sector  
Following what is called the export-led growth strategy, 
Australia has adopted a policy of increasing its exports, special-
ly its mineral (including energy) exports, inspite of the problem 
indicated by Gregory [1984] 1 . Because of Australia's balance of 
payment deficit and its international competitiveness in coal and 
liquid natural gas (LNG), the Australian economy can gain substan-
tially by developing the export energy sector. To help realize 
this potential, one of the objectives of the Australian energy 
policy has been the development of the export energy sector 
(Department of Primary Industries and Energy [1988]). 
(G) Equity  
Equity considerations of the energy sectoral resource alloca-
tion utilization and development have also been dominating in 
Australia (Gruen and Hillman [1981], Saddler [1981], Tengrove et 
al. [1986]). 2 The'objective has been "to seek an equitable shar 
ing of the benefits of energy resources development amongst the 
1. Gregory thesis states that exports of minerals in a primary 
commodity exporting country may deindustrialize the country in-
stead of industrializing it. 
2. Scepticism in the market determined. equity in income and 
property in the energy/resources sector has been an important 
issue in Post-Keynesian economics (Eichner(ed.) [1979]). 
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Australian. Community" 	(Department of Resources and Energy 
(1984), 	P.47). 
Since an optimum allocation of resources can be determined 
for every given distribution of income and wealth, and because of 
the problem of the incorporation of the efficiency and equity 
objectives in one model, it is generally argued that in policy 
studies these two objectives should be studied separately (Griffin 
and Steele [1980]). 
The present study is primarily concerned with the allocative 
implications of energy policies. Therefore, the equity objective 
has not been included in this model. 
3.4.1.4.2  Quantification and Incorporation of the Energy Policy  
Objectives in the.Model/Policy objective Function  
The international trade sector will not be explicitly speci-
fied in the model, thus the objective of the development of the 
export energy sector can not be specified in variable form in the 
policy objective function. However, constraints will be speci-
fied in the energy sector model to ensure that the given foreign 
demand for Australian energy is satisfied by the domestic produc-
tion of energy (see equation 3.8). 
The objective of the efficient utilization of energy re-.. 
sources will be taken care of by the energy sectoral behavioural 
model since the energy sector behavioural model will be specified ' 
as a cost minimizing linear programming model. 
The remaining objectives of Australian energy policy namely 
reduction of oil imports, reduction in the use of oil, conserva-
tion of energy and the maximization of net revenue will be incor-
porated in the policy objective function. These objectives will 
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be represented by the following target variables (quantities): oil 
import (Te l ) total use of oil (CNo R2 + le l ) and total use of 
energy (TCe R1 + + R6 + Te l ) (p. 102), and t(+T) - (-T)}. 
In the first type of specification the first three target 
variables will be included. In the second type of specification, 
all the four target variables will be included. 
3.4.1.5 The Weights of the Policy Target Variables  
(A) Mechanism for the Specification of the Weights  
Specification of weights of policy target variables (the 
coefficient of the policy objective function) from the quantita-
tive information obtained through the revelation of the prefer-
ences of policy makers is a difficult task, since hardly any 
information is available for this purpose (Fox, Sengupta, and 
Thorbecke [1973]). Two approaches are usually adopted to specify 
the weights of the target variables. The first approach is to 
derive the weights as accurately as possible through one or sever-
1 methods for the specification of the preferences of policy . 
makers (Johansen [1974]). The second approach involves the deri-
vation of a set of weights as a working set from the quantitative 
information gathered from published documents and announcements 
of policy maker's, and later evaluating the sensitivity of the 
optimum solution of the policy model to changes in the coeffi-
cients of the policy objective function, in order to determine the 
robustness of the weights used in the initial specification. In 
AEPSOM, the second approach has been adopted. 
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(B) Past Examples  
Several past efforts for determining the weights of the 
policy objective function are worth mentioning here. 
(i) In Theil's quadratic welfare function approach (Theil 
[1970]), a quadratic function of the deviation between the desired 
and the actual values of the target and instrument variables is 
minimized. Therefore there is no need for specifying the weights 
of the target variables. 
(ii) Frisch [1976] used a method based on direct interview of 
the policy makers to extract enough quantitative information about 
the coefficients in the policy objective function. 
(iii)Another approach involves the determination of weights 
of the policy objective function from studies of the underlying 
policy environment (for example Van Eijk and Sandee [1959]). In 
this approach, an analysis of policy statements, actions, and pub-
lished documents provide information on the initial specification 
of weights, although the weights are subsequently changed to study 
the sensitivity of the optimum solution to these changes. If the 
optimum solution is not very sensitive to the alternative sets of 
weights, then the initial set of weights can be considered to be 
appropriate. 
(iv) In some policy studies, the coefficients of the policy 
objective function can be obtained from the economic system under 
study. For example, if the policy objective function is in a form • 
that represents the social surplus (consumer's surplus 	plus 
producer's surplus) the coefficients of the policy objective 
function can be obtained from the model under study. 
(v) In the HIP policy studies, the issue of the selection of 
appropriate weights has not received any serious attention, proba- 
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bly because of the fact that attention has mainly been paid to the 
computational problems and other fundamental problems associated 
with the mathematical properties of MLP such as existence, unique-
ness and global optimality of the ML? solution (Chapter Four; 
Candler and Norton [1977]). 
Candler and Norton [1977] have adopted a method similar to 
van Eijk and Sandee [1959]. In that study the selection of the 
weights of the variables in the policy objective function was 
somehow arbitrary, although some motivation for the initial speci-
fications was given. A sensitivity analysis was conducted to study 
the effects of the changes of the coefficient in the policy objec-
tive function on the optimum solution: In other MLP studies, 
either there is no need for specifying weights because of the 
nature of the policy .objective function (fob example, maximization 
of net benefit) as in Sparrow et.al . [1979] or in some other 
studies (Fortuny-Amat [1979]) the weights, have been purely arbi-
trary. 
(C) Weights in AEPSOM 
No quantitative information about the relative importance of 
the various Australian energy policy objectivesis available from 
the government or from academic publications in this area. There-
fore, the apecriication of the weights in the policy objective 
function in the present study is mainly based on past experience 
in this area, professional judgment, and partly on the revealed 
preferences of the policy makers. 
Of the three policy objectives to be included in the policy 
objective function (1), reduction in oil import may appear to be 
more important than the other two objectives because of its direct 
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implications in terms of national security. But the objective of 
reduction of oil import may lose some weight if oil can be import-
ed from a friendly country or oil use can be reduced by diversify-
ing the domestic energy sector. The other two policy objectives 
may appear to be of equal weight i.e., conservation of oil and 
conservation of total energy are of equal concern. 
Because of the apparent equal importance of the three policy 
objectives and since no information about the relative weights of 
different policy objectives is available, it is maintained that 
these three target variables will have equal weight in the policy 
objective function. This means that one unit reduction in the 
import of oil is equally important to the policy makers as one 
unit reduction in the total use of energy or oil. However, one 
unit reduction in oil import will be three times more important 
than one unit reduction in the use, say, of natural gas, since oil 
import is appearing three times in the three target variables. 
Similarly the reduction in oil use will get two times more weight 
than the reduction in the use of natural gas. 
Attaching equal weights to all target variables may appear 
as a simplification of the exercise of the specification of the 
policy objective function. However, as it was stated above, liter-
ature in this area in energy economics has not yet developed 
unlike macroecoriOmics where relative prioritization of target 
variables is merely a duplication job (Fox, Sengupta and Thorbecke 
• (1973]). The problems of relative prioritization of targets have 
been discussed by Griffin and Steele ([1981], p.342) and they have 
expressed their concern as follows: 
"How, then, does one assess the success or failure of 
in energy policy - weighting all goals as equal 
and computing a batting average?" 
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Also, as it was mentioned above, in existing MLP literature, 
weights of the policy objective function have, so far, been simple 
(one). 
Sensitivity analysis will, .however, be conducted to study 
effects of the changes in weights on the optimum solution to the 
model to test the robustness of the initial specification of the 
weights (Chapter Five). 
The specification of the weights of the policy objective 
function 2 will be discussed in Section 3.4.1.9. 
3.4.1.6 Units of Measurements  
The policy target variables (physical variables)) in Specifi-
cation 1 are measured in petajoules, while in Specification 2 they 
(physical and monetary variables) are measured in petajoules and 
million Australian $ (respectively). 
3.4.1.7  The Policy Objective Function: Specification 1  
In Specification 1, a linear policy objective function has 
been adopted. A linear policy objective function is based on the 
assumption of separatibility and additivity of the target varia-
bles. The specification of a linear policy objective in economic 
policy studies (macro-economic, planning, and sectoral) is an 
established practice specially in development and sectoral plan- 
' ning (see Fox, Sengupta and Thorbecke, [1973), Chapters 7, 13, and 
15). Although the linear policy objective function has the char-
acteristics of separability and adaptivity, these characteristics 
do not yet appear to be inconsistent with the nature of policy 
preferences in the energy sector. For example, energy policy 
targets such as the reduction of energy imports and conservation 
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are not highly inter-dependent. 
The policy objective function 1 of AEPSOM is specified (in 
the AES symbols discussed below) as: 
P.O.F.(1): VL =wG 	lel + CNo + TCe 	(3.5) 
where WL =, the value of the policy objective function . 
. The policy objective function which shows the level of 	the 
values of all the target variables is the policy criterion in the 
Australian energy sector. 
3.4.1.8 The Policy Objective Function: Specification 2  
It has been mentioned that at the present level of develop-
ment, most large or medium scale MLP models have linear policy 
objective functions (Candler and Norton [1977]). An alternative 
form of the policy objective function is also specified in AEPSOM 
to test the model solution's sensitivity to a more complex and, 
probably, more realistic policy objective function. In Specifica-
tion 2 a multi-criteria approach (Gal [1979]) to the policy 
objective function is adopted. 
Cherniavsky 	([1981] p. 399) has summarized the essence of 
energy modelling incorporating a multi-criteria objective function 
as: The purpose of multi-objective analysis is to identify and 
quantify the trade-offs between different social objectives, and 
to aid policy makers in formulating decisions which achieve the 
best possible compromise between conflicting goals. 
In this approach, several conflicting or incompatible goals 
are specified, some of these goals may be measured in different 
units (petajoules., money, environmental damage etc.). 
• There are •three methods which are generally adopted for 
specifying or solving a multi-criteria model: a) generating tech- 
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niques, 	(b) 	utility function approach, and c) 	interactive 
methods. In the first method, the objective functions are ordered 
according to some decreasing preference by the modeller. In the 
utility function approach, all objective functions are collapsed 
to form a single function by giving different weights to differ-
ent objectives. In the third method, information about the prefer-
ence ordering is obtained interactively from policy makers. Chern-
viasky [19811 has reported the experimental results of trying the 
three above mentioned solution techniques in the Brookhaven model. 
It was not possible to establish the superiority of any method in 
any absolute sense. The conclusion was that the choice of solu-
tion technique should depend, to a large extent, on "the suitabil-
ity of the method to the structure of the problem" (Cherniavsky, 
op. cit. p. 416). 
Cherniavsky [1981] has provided a survey of multi-criteria 
modelling of the energy sector. In energy planning, the Brookha-
ven Model' (BESOM) is one good example of adopting multi-criteria 
policy objective functions (Chapter . Two;.Kydes (1978)). In BESOM 
the following objective functions (in alternative combinations)  
were adopted: total annual energy system cost, investment re-
quirements, total crude oil use, oil import, total energy use, 
environmental effect index, total use of nuclear fuel. 
The solution technique adopted in the PPS algorithm is the 
utility function method. In this method various objective func-
tions are collapsed into a single objective function by relating 
those functions by some weights attached to each of them. Follow-
ing the utility function method approach, the policy objective 
function 2 of AEPSOM is specifie'as follows (a general presenta 
tion): P.O.F.2: a (Part 1) + b (Part 2). 
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For specifying weights firstly, both a and b were set equal 
to 1, and secondly, the values of a and b were varied subject to 
a + b = 1 (five other alternative sets were adopted) (Gal 
[1979]). 
The specification of the parts/policy goals in AEPSOM has been  
similar to that of the Brookhaven model : The alternative policy 
objective function has two parts: the first part dealing with the 
real variables and specified in linear form (the policy objective 
function (1) as in (3.5)) and the second part relating to finan-
cial variables (taxes and subsidies) and specified in non-linear 
form. The first part involves the minimization of the use of oil, 
reduction of the import of oil and energy conservation. The 
second part of the policy objective function involves the minimi-
zation of the budget deficit (maximization of revenue) in the 
energy sector. The alternative policy objective function is of 
the following form (using the AES symbols): 
P.O.F.(2): WL = LING] - b[{(+T i )Y + (+T2 )X + (+T3 )2) 
- {(-Tl )Y + (-T2 )X + (-T 3 )2)] 	 (3.6) 
where: +T = {+T 1 , +T2 , +T3 } = vector of three types of 
taxes, and -T = {-T1 , -T2 , -T3 } - a vector of three types of 
subsidies. 
In this alternative specification of the policy objective 
function, considerations of real and monetary or transfer effects 
(Harberger [1971]) of government energy policies have been . incor-
porated. This specification of a policy objective function has 
important economic significance in formulating public policies. 
The importance of such considerations has been stated by Sparrow 
et al. ([1979], p. 181) as : 
"Considerations of real versus monetary, or transfer 
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effects have long been recognised by economists as 
crucial to the evaluation of all forms of public activ-
ity: their application is usually very limited because 
of insufficient data." 
In this specification, real effects of energy policies are 
measured in physical units (peta joules); monetary effects are 
measured in million A$. The policy objective function embeds the 
choice that those government policies should be selected which 
cause minimum use of total energy, 'crude oil and imported oil in 
the economy and generate maximum revenue (minimize energy sector 
budget deficit) for the government. 
In estimating the transfer effects of taxes and subsidies, it 
is assumed that the burden of taxes and subsidies is borne by 
those on whom they are imposed (Sparrow et al., [1979]). 
It may be necessary to mention here that some of the elements 
of the +T vectors are zero i.e., taxes and subsidies are only 
applicable to energy activities which are subject to government 
fiscal instrument. control. A specific presentation of P.O.F. (2), 
including the AEPSOM symbols, is given in (3.18). 
3.4.1.9 The Policy Objective Function : The Economic Perspective  
Recently, the optimum intertemporal use of natural resources, 
both exhaustible and renewable, has been a major .concern in eco-
nomics. This is so since it has been alleged that profit maximiz-
ing multi-nationals and private enterprises are using the world's 
natural resources at a higher rate than they should. Also the 
environmental implications of the consumption and uses of re-
sources by an exponentially increasing world population provides a 
pessimistic prediction. A large volume of economic literature has 
grown in this area to investigate the significance of natural 
resources in economic development, the economic implications of an 
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ever increasing use of natural resources and to determine the 
optimum use/economic use/minimum usg of natural resources (Howe 
[1979]). A survey of the literature in this area is provided in 
Julius [1981]. From this growing volume of literature on the 
economic utilization of natural resources, one issue certainly 
does emerge: an efficient (intra- and inter-temporal) Utilization 
of natural resources is essential. (Chapter Six of this study will. 
deal with this issue in detail to highlight the economic implica-
tions of the issue and its resolution by the AEPSOM results.) 
In the present specification of the policy objective func-
tion, this central issue of resource economics has played the 
prominent role since the physical target variables relate to the 
economic utilization of energy resources (specially, the use of 
total energy and crude oil). 
The present specification of the policy objective function . 
has also incorporated another major economic concern of the western 
• 
industrialized countries : self sufficiency in oil. The economic 
problems experienced by these countries due to their dependence on 
. imported oil have been stated before. It was clear from the dis-
cussion that the dependency on imported oil has been advocated as 
a major cause of the macro-economic problems experienced by these 
countries in the 70s, 80s and 90s. Therefore, the policy objective 
of minimization of import dependency has crucial economic implica-
tions for a country. 
In addition, the policy objective function incorporates the 
implications of the monetary/budgetary implications of energy 
resource allocations and government policy intervention. As the 
resource sector has been a leading sector in the development in 
many resource rich countries including Australia, the policy 
97 
objective of the maximization of net revenue in the energy sector 
has an appropriate and wide economic perspective. 
In this connection, it may be restated that these energy 
policy objectives are typical in the OECD countries. Energy policy 
studies in these countries have been undertaken with explicit 
recognition of these objectives (Webb and Ricketts [1980]). Also 
in some mathematical programming energy planning models, a similar 
set of energy policy objectives has been incorporated. The Brook-
haven models, BESOM and MARKAL (Kydes op. cit.), which are very 
widely used energy models have incorporated a similar set of 
energy policy objectives (stated above) involving physical and 
monetary target variables/goals. 
3.4.2 The Constraints of the Model  
The objective of an energy planning exercise is to optimize 
the value of the policy objective function which is subject to 
some constraints. These constraints relate to the availability of 
resources, technological structure, consumers' choice, producers' 
behaviour and institutional and political set -up of the economy. 
Since there are two types of decision makers who formulate 
their own optimum decisions, these constraints can be classified 
into two types: (S) the constraints on the optimizing behaviour of 
policy makers and (b) the constraints on that of economic agents: 
producers and consumer's of energy: (a) The constraints on the 
policy makers' decision making are in the form of limits on their 
budget expenditures, restrictions imposed on the policy instru-
ments by the underlying socio-political system, and the nature of 
response of the economic agents to the policy measures of the 
policy makers (represented by the behavioural model in an MLP 
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model). (b) The economic agents' optimum decisions are also sub-
ject to some constraints: resource availability, technological 
structure, habit, existing productive capacity, market size, 
controls by the policy makers. 
In the following sections, the specification A the two sets 
of constraints will be discussed. 
3.4.2.1 Policy Constraints  
Several alternative types of policy constraints have been 
specified in the MLP literature. (i) Constraints on the changes 
of the policy instruments: In Candler and Norton [1977], the 
policy instruments (such as subsidies on fertilizer, water taxa-
tion, price support etc.) were made subject to variations of a 
certain range. (for example, subsidies on fertilizer had a range of 
zero to 50% of cost). In Bisschop et al. [1982], certain ranges 
of the policy instruments were also specified. (ii) Budget con-
straints: In Sparrow et al. [1979], the policy constraints were 
specified to make the transfer effects of policy instruments equal 
to zero (taxes equal subsidies). A quadratic policy constraint in 
the following form: government revenue - government expenditure 
- K, was included in Fortuny-Amat's [1979] example of the large 
scale application bf ML?. 
While in the existing MLP literature, only one of these 
constraints is specified, in the present study, both the types of  
policy constraints are specified. The first type imposes limits 
on the variation of the taxes and subsidies. 	In the abstract 
model, equation (3.1.b) represents this type of constraint. 	A 
range of 0 to 20% of the cost on the variation of the taxes and 
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subsidies is specified: 
0 < ± tj < 20% of the cost of the respective variable j . 
In Australia, no literature exists dealing with this type of 
specification of the limits on the range of fiscal instruments. 
This specification seems reasonable for Australia for a 
medium-term planning period of 10-15 years. The range is the 
maximum possible allowed variation of taxes and subsidies. An 
optimum policy solution may be obtained by only small changes 
(less than 20%) in many policy instruments and 20% changes (maxi-
mum 20%) in few policy instruments. 
A second type of constraints is specified following the long 
established practice in economics in which economists have argued 
that the public programmes should be self-financing (taxes should 
equal subsidies and other government expenditure (Harberger 
[1971])). The constraint in the present model is specified to 
make the net revenue (taxes minus subsidies) of the government to 
be,positive, so that other government expenditures can be met from 
the sectoral revenue (transfer effects are positive): 
{(+Ti )Y + (+T2 )X + (+T ) } - ((-1. 1 )Y + (-T2 )X + (-T 3 )2) > 0 
(3.7) 
This constraint takes care of the monetary (budgetary) impli-
cations of government policies and restricts the selection of a 
set of policy instruments which does not cause a budget deficit 
in the sector. 
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3.4.2.2 Behavioural Constraints: The Energy System Model l 
The other type of constraints in AEPSOM are the behavioural 
constraints which are represented by a behavioural model of the 
energy sector simulating the optimization behaviour of the energy 
producers and consumers. For surveys of the behavioural model in 
the agricultural sector, see Norton and Schiefer [1981] and of the 
energy sector models, see Hoffman and Wood [1976]). Chapter Two 
also contains a survey of existing single level energy sectoral 
behavioural models. 
In MLP studies, a variety of different types of behavioural 
models have been specified: a non-linear agriculture sector model 
involving the optimization of the sum of consumer's and producer's 
surplus where the producers are risk averters (Candler and Norton 
[1977]), a cost minimization linear programming agriculture sec-
toral model (Bisschop et al. [1982]), and a mixed-integer program-
ming model of the iron and steel sector (Sparrow et al. [1979]). 
Since linear programming sectoral models replicate the opti-
mizing behaviour of economic agents in a perfectly competitive 
market situation (Samuelson [1952]) and they are computationally 
easier in an MLP model, a linear programming cost minimization 
energy sector model has been specified as the behavioural model in 
AEPSOM. However, as taxes and subsidies appear in the objective 
1. An energy system model is a mathematical model consisting of 
the various entities, elements or parts (supplies, fuels, technol-
ogies, processes, end-uses etc.) and their inter-relationships 
(demand, supply, intermediate balance etc. equations) of the 
energy sector. Alternatively, an energy system model is a mathe-
matical model of the energy sector containing the sector-wide 
entities such as energy flows, costs, prices, conversion losses, 
processes, technologies etc. 
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function of the linear programming behavioural model in AEPSOM, 
the behavioural model becomes non-linear. 
The .constraints of AEPSOM (the equations 3.1.e to 3.1 . .j) form an 
energy system (ES) model of the Australian energy sector. So, to 
specify the behavioural constraints of AEPSOM, it is needed to 
specify an ES model for Australia as in (3.3). 
For a detailed specification of the Australian ES model first 
• the salient features of the Australian Energy System (AES) will be 
described (for a discussion of the general features of energy 
systems, see Meier (1984]). AES will provide us with the neces-
sary information for specifying the ES model. In our analysis of 
AES, the variables, parameters, and coefficients which are includ-
ed in the ES model will be defined. 
(I) AES 
Figure 3.1 shows an aggregate AES. AES presents a network of 
flows of primary energy to the end-uses via several steps of 
conversion, transportation, transmission and distribution. The 
different steps shown in the "AES figure such as extraction, refin-
ery etc. are the different stages through which a particular 
primary energy flows until it reaches the end-users. AES is a 
multi-input • (primary energy), multi-activity (technologies), 
multi-product (energy products) and multi-use (end-uses) energy 
production and consumption system. 
Seven types of primary energy l are specified in AES: coal 
1. Harder (1982] provides a comprehensive discussion of the defi- 
nitions and descriptions of different forms of energy - their 
chemical and thermodynamic principles, technologies 	(supply, 
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(R1 ), crude oil (R2 ), natural gas (R3 ), hydro-electricity (R 4 ), 
biomass (R5 ), solar (R6 ) and uranium (R 7 ). These forms of energy 
are either converted into energy products or transported to the 
end-users. 
At present coal is used either in electricity . production 
(steam cycle)(E l ) or by the end-users in different sectors. There 
are two sources of crude oil: domestic production and imports. 
.Crude oil is a compound of the methane group, containing carbon 
and hydrogen with a large number of atoms in their molecules. The 
refinery processes separate its components by primarily using a 
fractional distillation technique. Some of the other techniques 
used in the Australian refineries are: cracking, reformer. and 
alkylation - for the extraction of lighter distillates and the 
purification of the petroleum products (naphtha, kerosene, light 
distillates, gasoline, cracker feedstock, LPG, motor spirit and 
lubricants). We have assumed that oil from these different sources 
is refined to produce petroleum products (x 2 ), that is we have 
aggregated all the fractions of the refinery outputs into a broad - 
group. Refinery loss is represented by y. 
Natural gas is used for electricity generation (steam cycle 
and gas turbine) (E,) and for end-uses (x 3 ). 
The primary source of electricity is hydro electricity (R4). 
Other sources of electricity are: coal E l , oil E2 and natural gas 
E3 . Total electricity generation is x 4 . 
There are various sources of biomass (R 5 ) in Australia such 
as wood, bagasse, sugar-cane, crop residues and oil seeds, among 
others. Though they have the common characteristic of being 
composed of living matter, they differ substantially in their 
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chemical properties, resulting in different end products, such as 
methanol and ethanol. In spite of this heterogeneity in the chemi-
cal properties of these fuels, here they are classified as biomass 
fuel (x5 ) since total use of these fuels in Australia is rela-
tively low in comparison with other fuels. 
Solar energy (R 6 ) is considered to be feasible only in the 
domestic sector using water heated in solar panels. Therefore 
solar energy goes to the final users (x 6 ) instead of being sup-
plied to the national grids. 
All uranium (R 7 ,x7 ) is exported in the form of ore and triu-
ranium octoxide (U308) (E e3 ) since there is no present domestic 
use. 
In AES, the important conversion losses are defined. 	The 
transmission and distribution loss of electricity, distribution 
loss of natural gas and conversion loss of refinery 	are the 
major forms of conversion losses included in AES. 	These are 
represented by the coefficients eo , 6 and 
Four end-use sectors are identified in AES: manufacturing 
industry, agriculture (including mining), transport and domestic 
(including services). Not every energy product is used in every 
sector. A detailed listing of the uses of the fuels in all the 
end- use sectors is given below: 
• a. Manufacturing Industry (DE') 
1. coal (d1 ), 2. petroleum products (d2 ), 3. natural 
gas (d3 ), 4. electricity (d 4 ), and 5. biomass (d 5 ) 
b. Agriculture (DEA ) 
1. petroleum products (d6 ), and 2. electricity (d 7 ) 
c. Transport (DE T ) 
1. petroleum products (d8 ), and 2. electricity (d9) 
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d. Domestic (including commercial sectors) (DED ) 
1. coal (d10 ), 2. petroleum products (d 11 ), 3. natural 
gas (d12 ), 4. electricity (d13 ), 5. biomass (d 14 ), and 
6. solar (d15 ) 
e. Exports 
1. coal (Eel ), 2. petroleum products (Ee2 ), and 3. 
uranium (Ee3 ) 
This background information about AES will be used to specify 
the constraints of the ES model. 
(II) Constraints of the ES Model  
There are five types of constraints in an ES the model: the 
demand constraints; the constraints that represent the intermedi-
ate energy balances and the supply balances (with separate speci-
fications of the electricity and petroleum product sub-sectoral . 
balances); and the resources and capacity constraints (for a 
discussion of the necessary constraints of an ES model, see Meier, 
[1984]). One feature of the present specification is that the 
end-uses are defined in terms of energy products, not in terms of 
the energy services as in Meier [1984]. The symbols used in 
specifying these ct;nstraints are identified in Figure 3.1. Symbols  
with bars on them indicate their fixed quantities in 1979-80. 
(1) Demand Constraints  
The demand constraints require that the energy supplies from 
different end-use flows must be greater than or equal to the total 
energy demand in each sector and exports. The following equations 
are formed by incorporating the sectoral flows of energy that are 
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defined in Figure 3.1. The demand constraints of the ES model are: 
d1 +. d2 + d3 + d4 + d5 > DE' 
d6  + d7  > DEA — 
d8 + d9 ?. DET 	 (3.8) 
d10 + d11 + d12 + d13 + d14 + d15 	DED 
Eel iel 
E > e2 — e2 
Ee3e3 
The first four constraints are the demand constraints in the 
four sectors of the economy. The last three constraints are export 
constraints. 
(2) Intermediate Energy Balance Equations  
The constraints 'ensure that the uses of different energy 
products in the different sectors must equal the total supply of 
the energy products. The constraints, which are formed by the 
flows of end-uses and energy products defined in AES, are: 
xi = d1 dlo 	Eel 
x2 = d2 +d6 + d8 + d11 + Ee2 
(1/6 ! )x3 = d3 + d12 
x4 = d4 4 d7'+ d9 + d13 
x5 = d5 + di4 
x6 = d15 
x 7 = Ee3 
(3.9) 
(3) Supply Balance Equations  
These equations ensure that the supplies of primary energy in 
Australia must equal the supplies of energy products plus the 
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conversion losses. The balance equations are: 
(i) Petroleum Products Supply Balance Equation 
E2 + x2 = R2 + 'el 
(ii) Electricity Supply Balance Equation 
(1/e.)x4 = e lE i +e2E 2 +e 3E3 + E 4 
(iii)Other Supply Balance Equations 
Ri = xl + E l 
R3 = x3 + E 3 
(3.10) 
(3.11) 
R5 = x5 	 (3.12) 
R6 = x6 
R7 = x 7 
(4) Resource Constraints  
In the ES model, all the primary energy supplies. have been 
constrained to their supplies in 1979-80. 	The resource con- 
straints of the model are: 
R11 
R < 2 — 2 
R3 	R3 (3.13) 
R5 -5. 
R6 .5- i6 
R77 
(5) Capacity Constraints  
The capacity constraints require that the supplies of energy 
cannot be higher than that which can be produced by the capacity 
of the existing equipment, techniques and plants for mining, 
• producing, converting, transporting and distributing, and end-uses 
of energy. We have specified only the constraints on electricity 
generation and petroleum refining since these are the major con- 
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straints. 
where: 
The constraints are: 
E 4 	kHe 
x4 < kTe 
(1/ y)x2 < RK 
(3.14) 
He = hydro-electricity generation capacity 
Te = total capacity of electricity generation 
RK = total capacity of the refineries 
k = capacity factors 
= refinery losses 
(6) User-Defined Constraints:  
It is conventional to include some 'user-defined constraints' 
in ES models in addition to standard ones required for the normal 
presentation of the energy system. This is done to make the 
energy systems model to (Musgrove et al. [1983] p. 15) 
"reflect the real life situation where relative prices 
will play an important role in the choice of technolo-
gies, but other factors may also be important". 
Some of these factors are the upper, lower or fixed bounds on the 
investment, capacity and market penetration or share of a technol-
ogy or end-uses. MARKAL, a large number of such constraints 
were specified (Musgrove op. cit. p. 16). 
The advantage of this type of user-defined constraints is 
that, they make the ES model more realistic to represent the tech- 
. nical characteristics of the existing energy system and to fore-
cast the short-term or medium term energy system accurately. 
However, they have the disadvantage that they make the energy 
system model restrictive, thus leaving not much freedom to choose. 
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In addition, this practice may not be suitable in a study designed 
for the formulation of optimum energy systems and policies since 
in such a study what is needed is not a positive forecasting of 
the future system, but a presentation of normative results showing 
the desired/optimum structure/directions of resource allocations 
and technological developments in the energy sector. 
In AEPSOM, a 'compromise' situation was adopted as only one 
type of such user defined constraints was included in it. These 
constraints were in a form that restricted the model not to choose 
electricity uses in different sectors below their actual or pre-
dicted uses in 1979-80 1 . These constraints limit the possibility 
of substitution of electricity by other fuels as there exists 
short-term technical non-substitutability in the power .using 
industries (more discussion on pp. 207-208). 
These constraints on the uses of electricity are as follows: 
d4  > — 4 
d 7 T17 
d9 T19 
(3 : 15) 
(III) Behavioural Objective Function (B.O.F.)  
The objective function of this ES model is a cost equation. A 
cost equation is specified so that the behavioural model repli- 
1. It should be mentioned that these constraints (Musgrove et al. 
[1983], p.15) 
"affect the outt.ut from the model and this must be 
borne in mind when analysing the optimum solution". 
This point will be again referred to in Chapter Five. In Chapter 
Six, the AEPSOM results will be analysed for their policy impli-
cations, in particular, for their technological policy implica-
tions in this perspective.  
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cates the behaviour of an atomistic market consisting of cost  
minimizing producers and end-users (Samuelson (1952]). It con-
sists of the following types of costs (net of taxes or subsidies): 
the cost of supplying primary energy (ci), the cost of oil imports 
(cm), the cost of 	conversion of primary energy to energy 
products(cj-), the cost of generation of electricity (c e ), 	and 
the cost of end-uses (c k ). Each type of cost consists of both 
fixed and variable costs (capital, labour, energy, and other 
operation and maintenance costs). Transportation and distribu-
tion costs of energy are included in the end-use costs. 
By incorporating all the different types of costs, the cost 
equation can be defined as: 
7 	7 	4 	15 
C = E c iRi + cmIe + E c j xj 4- E c eEe + .Eckdk 
i=1 j=1 	e=1 	k=1 	(3.16) 
	
The costs are measured in terms of millions of 	per 
petajoules of energy. 
In AEPSOM, the objective function of the behavioural problem 
contains +T ( the tax and subsidy instruments). The above presen-
tation of the objective function of the behavioural problem does 
not contain the tax and subsidy instruments. To specify the tax 
and subsidy instrument variables, we need to discuss the existing 
fiscal instruments which are now being applied in Australia. This 
will be done in the next section. However, the following is the 
form of the objective funct4on of the behavioural problem contain-
ing existing taxes and subsidies in the Australian energy Sector: 
7 	7 	4 	15 
C = E (c i + T i )Ri + cmI e +E c j xj + E c eEe + 	(ck - Tk )dk 
i=1 j=1 	e=1 	k=1 
(3.17) 
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3.5 AEPSOM POLICY VARIABLES  
The following listing and classification of the policy varia-
bles in AEPSOM is based on the hierarchical multi-goal multi-level 
energy policy system in Australia. 
I. Policy Target Variables  
The target variables were defined and specified in the previ-
ous section. These are reproduced here: 1. Import of oil; 2. 
consumption of oil; and 3. total consumption of energy. 
II. Instruments and Strategies  
Energy policy options/instruments are pursued to remove 
impediments of market failures to achieve the Pareto• optimum 
resource allocation consistent with the other policy objectives in 
the energy sector such as the security of energy supply. A large 
number of policy instruments is available to the policy makers. 
The policy instruments set includes (1) physical controls or 
direct controls such as import quota, (2) technical efficient 
methods (determination of an intertemporal efficient energy system 
- fuel and technology mix), (3) determination of depletion and 
exploration rates, (4) fiscal instruments (taxes and subsidies), 
(5) direct 'invditment, (6) price fixing, (7) expenditures and 
strategies related to research and development, education and 
information/public exhalation, (8) other non-quantitative policies 
such as monopoly purchasing, (purchases by state agencies) partic-
ipation (providing capital and receiving profit) (Webb and Rick-
etts [1980], Munasinghe and Schramm [1983], Griffin and Steele 
[1980]). However, the task of choosing a set of policy instru- 
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ments is always determined by the policy objectives to be achieved. 
The choice will depend on the prevailing political, economic and 
technological conditions in a country. 
. A. Existing Policy Instruments and Strategies in Australia  
In 1979-80 three types of instruments were used in Australia 
to achieve energy policy objectives (prices, taxes and subsidies; 
and government expenditures) in conjunction with other policy 
strategies. 
(i) Pricing Instrument  
The price of domestic crude oil is determined by the Common-
wealth government. 
(ii) Taxes and Subsidies  
The taxes and subsidies are: (A) Prigary energy: t 	a levy 
on coal, t 2 = resource rent tax on crude oil, t 3 = resource 
rent tax on natural gas; (B) End-uses: -t 1 - subsidy on the use 
of coal in the manufacturing industry sector; -t 3 - subsidy on 
the use of natural gas in the manufacturing industry sector; -t 5 
- subsidy on the use of wood in the manufacturing industry sector; 
-t10 - subsidy on the use of coal in the domestic .sector; -t12 
subsidy on the us 'e of natural gas in the domestic sector;' -t14 - 
.subsidy on the use of wood in the domestic sector, and -t 15 
subsidy on the use of solar energy in the domestic sector. 
(iii) Government Expenditure  
The major heads of government expenditures in the energy 
sector are research and development, conservation, education and 
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propaganda. 
(iv) Energy Technological Strategy  
The government announces the policy strategies related to the 
major forms of energy mainly for providing information to the 
private sector about the optimum or expected developments in the 
energy sector. 
(v) Other Strategies  
Other energy policies such as depletion policy and explora-
tion policies are also pursued by the government. 
3.6 AEPSOM: COMPLETE DESCRIPTION, MODEL SOLUTION OUTPUT 
AND DATA:  
3.6.1 A Complete Description of AEPSOM 
1. Policy Objective Function: (a) Equation 3.5 or (b) Equa-
tion 3.6. The general statement of the policy objective function 
in (3.6) (the alternative specification) can now 'he restated by 
including the symbols used in AES as follow: 
7 	15 
Min WL . = Iel + CNo + TCe - E +tiRi +E +tkdk 	(3.18) 
i=1 	• k=1 
The specific +t i and -tk (specific +T) which were adopted by 
the Australian government in 1979-80 were reported in Section 
3.5(11) above. 
2. Constraints: 
(1) Behavioural obiective function: Equation 3.17 
(2) Behavioural constraints set: Equations 3.8 to 3.15 
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(3) Non-negativity constraints: All the variables be > 0. 
3.6.2 Data 
The details of the estimations of these data are given in 
Appendix C. 
A general note on the justifications and usefulness of the 
data used in this study is necessary at this point. There were 
several sources of data used in this study : government and aca-
demic publications. Various estimates of the same data were 
available from these sources, specially at different dates. For 
example, government energy publications have produced different 
estimates of energy data as more accurate and up-to-date informa-
tion was available. Efforts were made at the primary stage of this 
research to adopt a set of consistent and accurate data (available 
at that .time) for AEPSOM; alternative data available at later 
stages could not be incorporated. This problem may exist in other 
applied modelling work which has been pointed out by Hazell and 
Norton ([1986), P. 272) as: 
"Building an applied model is a process, and the most 
successful models evolve through time to take account 
of new findings. There never is a definite version, 
but rather at any moment in time the model represents a 
kind of orderly data bank that reflects both the 
strengths and limitations of the available, quantitative 
information." 
• As stated above, the set of data used in the present study, 
has been adopted partly from published sources and is partly 
estimated by the present author. Adaptation of the present set of 
data is not an indication of the refusal of the reliability or 
accurateness of other available data. Sources of data were select-
ed in this study by the criteria of suitability and easy avail-
ability of the data necessary for AEPSOM. 
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3.7. SUMMARY 
Australian energy model AEPSOM is a static model for 1979-80. 
The model is based on the framework of a price control ML?, the 
theory of economic policy and policy systems analysis. Justifica-
tion and methods for the specification of the AEPSOM elements have 
been discussed in this chapter. Data for the model are either 
estimated from different published sources, or originally calcu-
lated by the author. 
CHAPTER FOUR 
MLP SOLUTION ALGORITHM: THE PARAMETRIC 
PROGRAMMING SEARCH APPROACH 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
In the previous chapters, the existing energy models were 
reviewed and the need for a new modelling 'approach was exposed. 
A theoretical energy planning model was developed and a numerical 
model - AEPSOM was specified. The next task in . the modelling 
exercise is to address the issue of how AEPSOM can be numerically 
implemented to facilitate Australian energy policy studies. 
It was stated in Chapter Two that multi-level programming l is 
recently developed mathematical programming technique (Candler 
and Norton, (1977]). Although it is a powerful analytical tech-
nique for multi-level optimization, experiments, mostly at aca-
demic levels, are still going on to develop an algorithm to solve. 
an ML?. In most of the existing MLP algorithms, some sort of 
transformation of the original problem is necessary. This makes 
the ML? 'solution relatively difficult, because the size of the 
transformed MP becomes large in comparison with the original 
problem. Existing algorithms are usually not commercially avail-
able. 
1. In this Chapter, only one special type of MLP which is bi-level 
programming is considered. 
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Therefore, as it was argued in Chapter Two, there is a gener-
al need for developing both MLP algorithm and software that are 
easily operational and readily available. The objective of this 
chapter is to develop an algorithm of that type to solve an MLP. 
The present chapter is structured as follows: Section 4.2 
provides some definitions. Section 4.3 discusses the PPS 
approach. Section 4.4 demonstrates how the present algorithm can 
solve an ML?, while an alternative specification of an ML? (in-
cluding +T in the upper level policy objective function) is given 
in Section 4.5. Some issues in the application of this algorithm 
are discussed in Section 4.6. Section 4.7 contains a brief summary 
of the steps of the algorithm. Computer programmes used or usable 
for implementing the algorithm in this study are stated in Section 
4.8. Section 4.9 identifies the alternative types of policy plan-
ning studies that can be undertaken by solving an NIP model using 
the PPS algorithm, while Section 4.10 discusses the advantages 
and limitations of the proposed algorithm. Finally, Section 
4.11 summarizes. the discussions in this chapter, and tries to 
point out the usefulness of the proposed search method for solving . 
ML?. While this Chapter deals with price control ML? (price con-
trol bi-level programming), uses of the PPS algorithm to solve 
different other types of MLP such as resource control, dynamic, 
and non-linear (behavioural model) MLP are discussed in Appendix D. 
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4.2 DEFINITIONS:  
Some definitions are provided in this section l . 
A. Linear Programming: 
The following is a linear programme (LP): 
Max C = cX22 
(X22 ) 
s.t. 	 (4.1) 
A2 X22  > R — 
X22 	0 
Assumptions : 
(1) A is an (M X N) matrix ; rank of (A) = M < N ; 
(2) c, X22 E E N , R E EM ; 
(3) Si = (A2X22 > R, X22 > 0) is a non-empty, convex and compact 
set; 
(4) the objective function is linear and continuous; 
(5) the LP problem has a unique optimum solution 2 . 
Definitions : 
(1) Activities: 
X22 is the vector of the activities of the model (4.1). 
1. The main mathematical terms used in this chapter will be de-
fined at the appropriate places. The mathematical dictionary of 
Skrapek et al. [1976] contains most other terms and concepts used 
in this chapter. 
2. In large scale numerical linear programming models, this as-
sumption is generally correct (Candler and Norton [1977]). 
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(2) Basic solution: 
A basic solution to LP is a solution vector X 22 C EN (an 
extreme point) which is obtained through solving the LP for M 
variables by setting the remaining N - M variables equal to zero. 
(3) Basic feasible solution and optimum solution: 
A basic solution vector X 22 E EN that satisfies the con-
straints :A2.X22  >Rand X22 	0 is defined as the basic feasible — 
solution and the basic feasible vector that optimizes (in the 
present case maximizes) the objective function C = cX 22 is the 
optimum solution. 
• 
B. Parametric Programming. 
If 0 is the parameter of the variation of the objective 
function (C = cX 22 ), then a parametric programme can be defined 
as: 
Max C = (c + GU)X 22 	( A l <9 < Op )• 
"22 }  
$.t. 
(4.2) 
A2X22 R 
X22 ?: 0 where 
= (111 , u2 ,.,..un ) is a constant vector of the units of the 
parametric variation; A = a scalar 	parameter, 
A I = lower level of 0; 	= upper level of O. 
Assumptions: 
(1) A is an (M X N) matrix 
(2) c, X22 E EN , R E EM ; 
(3) U E EN 
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Solutions of a Parametric Programme 	111 
Parametric programming involves the determination of the 
region K s:El so that for each A .EK, G t E l there is an 
.optimum solution to the problem (4.3) and for 0 E El - K (ie, 
outside the determined region), there is no solution to the prob-
lem. In the case of linear parametric programming, the solution 
procedure involves the generation of all the relevant extreme 
point optima in the region K E El for each 0 € K. Computational-
ly, an algorithm for parametric programming involves the following 
two separate stages: 
(a) finding the optimum solution vector with 0- 0 (a basic 
optimum solution), 
(b) a systematic generation of the alternative optimum solu-
tion vectors (generation of all pertinent adjacent 	extreme 
points/basic optimum solution) as 0 varies from G i to Gp . 
The first solution to the problem (4.2) is a usual solution 
to the linear programming problem with 0 = 0 using the simplex 
finds the optimum basic solution to the problem from the alterna-
tive basic solutions. In subsequent solutions, the objective 
function coefficients are changed parametrically; as: C c + GU 
with G > 0. This yields new solutions to (4.2) which are the 
alternative optimum,basic solutions. In other words, as the cost 
coefficients change by GU (0 1 < 0 < O) alternative basic solu-
tions are chosen as the optimum basic solutions. to the problem 
(4.2). So, parametric programming obtains the alternative optimum 
basic solutions as . a result of the continuous changes in the•
coefficients of the objective function. 
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Conditions for the Generation of Alternative Parametric Solutions  
• To demonstrate the conditions for the generation of alterna-
tive parametric solutions (adapted from Taha (19761), the varia-
bles and coefficients of the linear programme are 'classified as 
basic (with b subscript) and non-basic (with m subscript) as: 
• Objective function: 
C = cbX22b+ cmX22m 
and the constraints: 
A2b1(226 + A2mX22m > R 
The optimum solution to the linear programme is: 
X22b= =AR  2b 
since at the optimum solution X22m = O. This optimum solution will 
0 occur when 0 = O. Let it be defined as X 22b . 
The optimum solution X 22b will remain optimum as long as 
	
0 	0 the condition zj - c j > 0 corresponding to this solution is sati- 
fied for all j (where z j = cbB1- A 1); 	A2bj P jth elements of 
0 	0 
,j, 
A2b ). 	When zj - c j < 0, 	there will be a critical value of 
1 which is A l for which an alternative optimum solution X22b exists. 
Figure 4.1 shows the solution to the parametric programming 
problem. In the first case (Figure 4.1.a), the coefficients of 
the objective function are varied parametrically (01 ,0 2 , and 03) 
1 22 
FIGURE 41 
SOLUTION TO A PARAMETRIC PKOGRAMMING PIZO6LEM 
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thereby producing three, alternative solutions • in 	parametric 
programming: 1 1 , 1 2 and 1 3 . This implies that the optimum value 
of the objective function of a parametric programming problem is a 
function of parametric levels, as shown by Figure 4.1.b. 
C. Multi-level Programming (Price Control Bi-Level Programming): 
The following is a non-linear price control MLP model': 
Min WL 	wX11 (4.3.a) 
{+T} Policy/Upper level problem 
s.t. 
X11 	I*X22 	 • (4.3.b) 
T I < +T < Tp (4.3.c) 
{(+T)X22 - (- T)X 22 ), > 0 	 (4.3.d) 
Min C = (c + T) X 22 (4.3.e) 
{X22I +I} 	Behavioural/Lower level problem 
s.t. 
AX22 	R (4.3.f) 
X11 , X22 (4.3.g) 
Assumptions: 
(1)The objective function (4.3.a) is linear and continuous, 
(2) S1 =, {X 1 A X22 > R; X11 	I*X22; X11, X22,> 0) 
is a non-empty, clinvex and compact set, 
(3) S 2 = {X Es i I C = Min {(c + T)X 22 : (X22 1 ±T), 
1. This is an' abridged version of the model (3.1) in Chapter 
Three.In this formulation of MLP, the lower level objective func-
tion is being perturbed by +T. The upper level's constraints on 
and preferences for +T are reflected(i) in the policy and budge-
tary constraints (4.1.c) and (4.1.d), and (ii) in the upper level 
objective function in model (4.21). 
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X11 =. I*X22, T l < +T < T. ((+T)X 22 - (-T)X22 } > 0)) is compact, 
but other properties are not known since S 2 is not explicit', 
(4) LP in the lower level problem has a unique solution. 
Definitions: 
Activities and Coefficients:  
w - a vector of coefficients of the policy objective function 
(1 x e), 
X11 - a vector of policy target variables (e x 1), 
X22 - a vector of sectoral behavioural variables (m x1), 
c, A = vector and matrix of cost and technological coefficients 
(1 x m) and (n x m), in the lower level problem, 
+T = a vector of taxes and subsidies (t 1 , t2 ,.., tm ) 
(if T < 0 are subsidies, and if T > 0 taxes), 
I = a matrix of (e x m) coefficients for defining the target 
variables, 
T i ,Tp = vectors of lower and upper limits of +T. 
Multi-level Programming Solution: 
The definition of an optimum MLP solution is as follows 
(Fortuny-Amat, [1979]; Bialas & Karwan [1980]): A solution to an 
MLP will be 'considered as an optimum (local) solution to the MLP 
if the solution satisfies the following conditions: 
(i) the solution is in the opportunity set of the behavioural 
1. A deficiency of single level models is that they cannot define 
S2 . For formulating an optimum policy S 2 is.the'relevant opportu-
nity set (feasible region). Therefore single level models generate 
wrong results/policies (Candler and Norton [1977]). 
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problem/lower level problem (feasible solution to the behavioural 
problem, 4.3.e to 4.3.g); 
(ii) the solution is optimum for the lower level problem (the 
behavioural optimum), 
(iii) the solution satisfies the constraints on the policy 
problem: Tl < +T < T p ; ((+T)X22 - (-T)X22 } a.. 0. . 
(iv) the solution is optimum for the policy problem (the 
optimum solution to the lower level problem that provides an 
optimum value for the objective function of the policy problem, 
(4.3.a.)) (the policy optimum/MLO optimum solution). 
Optimum: Local and Global  
An optimum over S may be defined as follows: 
(i) Matimum : 
X11 is a maximum solution vector of X 11 
so that 
for all X11 E S f (X11 ) f (X11 ) ' 
(ii) Minimum : 
X11 is a minimum solution vector of X 22 
so that 
f(X11 ) — f(X11)' for all X11 E S 
(iii)Local optimum : 
XII is a local maximum or minimum solution vector of X 11 
so that 
f(X11 ) — > "X11" or f(X 11) _ < f(X11 ) for all X11 E N 
where N is a neighborhood in S. 
(iv) Global optimum: Maximum (or minimum) defined in (a) or 
(b) above is a global optimum. 
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Feasible Regions: 
An MLP has the following three feasible regions. 
(i) Behavioural feasible region: The behavioural feasible 
region (S 1 ) is defined by the values that can be taken by the 
variables of the lower level problem (X 22 ), given the values of 
+T. 
(ii) Policy feasible region: The region defined by the 
constraints 4.3.c and 4.3.d imposed by the underlying policy 
system and/or budgetary considerations. 
(iii) Policy-behavioural feasible region: This region (S 2 ) is 
. defined by the attainable values of the policy .target variables 
(X11 or X22 as X11 = I * X22 )  under different values of the policy 
instrument variables (+T). 
4.3. PARAMETRIC PROGRAMMING SEARCH ALGORITHM 
In the parametric programming search algorithm, the lower 
level sub-model (equations 4.3.e to 4.3.g) is solved as a paramet-
ric programming problem (involving a Variation of a scalar (0) in 
•the cost coefficients). The parametric program generates alterna-
tive optimum solutions to the lower level sub-model for different 
levels of paiameei.ic variations. Then the solution to the complete 
multi-level programming problem (4.3.a to 4.3.g) involves finding 
that parametric solution to the lower level problem which yields 
the optimum value for the policy objective function (4.3.a) and 
satisfies the policy and budgetary constraints (4.3.c) and 
(4.3.d). 
To elaborate the PPS approach the ML? in (4.3) is reformulat- 
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edl as: 
Min WL wX11 
s.t. 
X11 = I*X22 
g l g gp 
i(+0U)X22 - (-0U)X22 ) > 0 
Min C = (c + GU)X22 
(X22 1 +GU - +T) 
s.t. 
A2X22 R 
X11, X22 0 
(4.4) 
The lower level problem of (4.4) is a parametric programming 
problem of the 'type shown in (4.3). Thus an MLP model can be 
reformulated as an MLP model with the lower level problem as a 
parametric programming problem. 
Therefore, the steps of the PPS algorithm will be: first, to 
solve the lower level problem as a parametric programme. This 
defines the policy behavioural-feasible region (S 2 ) by GU and X22 
or X11 , and second, to find the value of +GU and corresponding X 22 
(a point in S 2 ) that yield the optimum value for the upper level 
1. In MLP (4.4), equating +T = +GU needs some clarification. In 
MLP model (4.1) +T is a vector of variables, while +GU is a vector 
of parameters. Since 0 +T can be varied in a parametric program-
ming along a ray generating different values of GU along that 
ray., similarly +T +GU is made in that sense. Adaptation of 
different values of U provides the possibility for varying 0 along 
different rays (U10, U20,   , U0) and thus for considering a 
wide range of values (not all) of +T (T I , T2 ,....Tn) for finding 
optimum +T. This correspondence between +T 7 +GU is maintained 
through the whole thesis. 
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• objective function. It may however be mentioned that although in 
the algorithm the lower level objective function is being per-
turbed, the upper level is preferred. 
The above points are illustrated in Figure 4.2. 
Figure 4.2 shows the different levels of parametric varia-
tions (O lui , 	Anui ) and the different values of the 
lower level objective function (optimum values) together with the 
values of the policy objective function. Evidently therefore, 
the policy objective function attains its optimum value at the 9th 
level of parametric variation. Consequently, the optimum values 
- 
(the optimum MLP solution) of x l and Ou l , are x1(9) and g 9u1 , and 
the optimum value of the policy objective function: WL  
To illustrate the algorithm, the following linear programming 
problem 	is used (Daellenbach et al. (1983], p. 43): 
Max F = 24x 1  + 20x1 (xi ,x2 ) 
s.t. 
0.5x1 + x2 < 12 
xl + x2 < 20 
0.06x1 + 0.04x2 < 1 
1200x1 - 800x2 > 0 
xl , x2 > 0 
(4.5) 
A parametric programming formulation of the above linear 
programming problem is as follows (Daellenbach op. cit., pp. 131- 
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FIGURE 42 
CHOICE OF AN OPTIMUM PARAMETRIC VARIATION LEVEL. 
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132): 
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Max F - (24 + 248) x i + 20 x2 	(-1 < 0 < 100) 
ui = 24 
s .t. 
0.5x1 + x2 < 12 
xi + x2 < 20 
1.5x1 + x2 < 24 
1200x1 - 800x 2 > 0 
xi , x2 > 0 
(4.6) 
The following are the alternative solutions to the parametric 
programme within the 0 range of - 1 to 100. 
1. 0 = 0 	xi = 12 	x2 = 6 	F = 408 
2. 8 = -1 	xi = 6 	x2 = 9 	F = 324 
3. 0 = -7/12 xi = 12 	x2 = 6 	F =240 
4. 0 = 1/4 	xi = 16 	x2 = 0 	F - 384 
The initial solution with• 0 = 0 is the usual solution to the 
linear programming problem (4.5), in other words, it is the 
optimum solution to the linear programme in (4.6). In the para-
metric programme, as the cost coefficient was varied parametrical-
ly by 0, the alternative optimum solutions 1 to 4 were found. 
An MLP 1 can be defined by incorporating the linear program-
ming of (4.5) in (4.S . ) as follows: 
Max W = 2x1 x2 
1. To keep the example simple, it is assumed in this MLP model 
that only one tax (t i ) is imposed by the policy makprs, and that 
only the policy constraint exists. 
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s.t. 
-24 <t1  < 2400 — —
' Max F = (24 + ti )xi + 20x2 
s.t 
0.5x1 + x2 < 12 
xi + x2 < 20 
1.5x1 + x2 < 24 
1200x1 - 800x2 > 0 
xi , x2 , > 0 
(4.7) 
and by using its parametric programming reformulation (4.6) as: 
Max W = 2x1 + x2 
s.t. 
-24 < 240 < 2400 . 	(ti - 240) 
Max F = (24 + 240) x i + 20x2 	= 24) 
s.t. 
0.5x1 + x2 	12 
xi + x2 < 20 • 
1.5x1 + x2 < 24 
1200x1 - 800x2 > 0 
(4.8) 
 
In the PPS algorithm, the lower level problem in (4.8) is 
solved as a parametric programming problem in the same process as 
is used to solve model (4.5). In the present example, the alterna-
tive .solutions were obtained: solution 1. 0 = 0; solution 2. 0 - 
-1; solution 3. 0 = -7/12, solution 4. 0 = 1/4. 
The PPS algorithm searches these four alternative solutions 
to find the solution which provides the optimum value for the 
policy objective function, and satisfy the constraint that 
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-24 < 240 < 2400. The different values of the policy objective 
function for various parametric solutions are: 
(1) W = 30, 
(2) W = 21, 
(3) W = 30, and 
(4) W - 32.
• It is evident that solution no.4 generated the maximum value 
for the policy objective function. Thus the PPS algorithm finds 
the parametric programming solution no.4 is the optimum solution 
to the MLP in (4.6 or 4.7) satisfying the constraint -24 < 240 - 6 
< 2400 and tixi = 96. 
The relevant optimum results are: 
(1) policy objective function: W 
(2) tax: t i 	0u1 - (0.25 x 24) 7 6; and 
(3) activities: xl = 16, x2 = O. 
4.4.MLP SOLUTION BY THE PPS ALGORITHM 
4.4.1  MLP Solution and its Proof  
The arguments stated so far become obvious looking at the 
structural similarities between a usual MLP (4.3) and a parametric 
programming embedded MLP (4.4): 
A comparison of these models reveals that they 	are essen- 
tially similar. The only difference is in the objective functions 
of the lower level problems of these two models. In (4.4), the 
objective function is C = (c + OU)X 22 , while in (4.3) it is C 	(c 
+ T) X22 . Since, these two models are the same (for some values 
of +T determined by AU), it, therefore, follows that OU = +T. And 
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a comparison of the structural similarities between the models in 
(4.3) and (4.4) shows that +AU can be interpreted as the values of 
taxes and subsidies (changes in the costs of different activities) 
imposed by the policy makers along a ray determined by +U. There-
fore, the parametric programme can define S 2 by relating +AU and 
X 	or X ' 22 	11 . 
In the MLP stated in (4.3), the programming 'problem is to 
find a point in S2 (which 1.6 S 1 ) or the 'values of +T and X22 or 
X11 
policy objective function. The programming problem as in (4.4) can 
be solved to find the values of +AU and X 22 or X11 (a point in S 2 
(which is also in S 1 )) (within a range of A:Al < Q < Op ) that 
optimizes the policy objective function. Since the PPS algorithm 
can find ±A iU and X22 (or X11 ), which are the optimum values 
values of taxes and subsidies, and the activities of the lower . 
level problem (the optimum values of X i' can be obtained from the 
relationship X11 " I*X22 ),  the PPS algorithm can solve an MLP. 
The structural similarities between (4.3) and (4.4) help to 
formulate the following theorem: 
Theorem: 
An MLP can be solved by solving the lower level sub-model as 
a parametric prbgramming problem and by choosing the level of 
parametric variation (the level of policy instruments: +T) that 
optimizes the policy objective function, and satisfies the con-
straints in the upper level problem. 
Proof: 
Mathematical requirements of an MLP solution are satisfied by 
the solution obtained by the PPS algorithm. At this solution 
(within a certain range of +T) that optimize the value of the 
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point, the lower level problem has an optimum solution, that 
solution satisfies the upper level constraints and also that 
solution provides optimum value for the policy objective function. 
Therefore, the PPS algorithm can find a solution of an MLP (a 
policy optimum). 
To illustrate the above points, an MLP is stated as: 
Min WL = wX 
s.t. 
= (X11 , X22 ) E S 2 
	 (4.9) 
where: 
S2 = {X ES ]. I C =. Min {(c + T)X22 : (X22 1 +T), 
Ti < +T < Tp , {(+T)X22 - (- T)X22 ) > 0)) 
and Si = {X 1 A X22 > R; X11 = 1*X22; X11°(22 	0). 
It was assumed that S i is a closed and bounded opportunity set of 
the lower level problem while the characteristics of S 2 cannot 
determined.' 
The elements of the MLP solution may now be analysed with 
the framework of the MLP stated in (4.9). Condition (i) (Section 
4.2.c) means that the solution to the lower level problem will be 
in S1. Condition (ii) implies that a solution will be at an 
extreme point of S i . Condition (iii) requires that the extreme 
point in Si will also be in the policy-behavioural opportunity set 
S 2 . Condition (iv) implies that the extreme point in S i that 
optimizes the upper level objective function is the optimum 
solution to MLP. Therefore, the optimum solution to an MLP is at 
an extreme point in Si that optimizes the objective functions of 
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the lower and upper level problems. This extreme point is the 
saddle point of ML?. 
The implications 	for the solution of an MLP can now be 
analysed as follows: Since the lower level constraints are linear, 
S i is a convex set, and optimum solutions of the lower level 
problem will occur as one of the extreme points of S i . The search 
for the optimum solution to an MLP can be directed and limited to 
the extreme points of S i . Thus, to solve an MLP we need only make 
a . search in S i to find out the extreme point in S i which will be 
in S 2 (the saddle point) that optimizes simultaneously the objec-
tive functions" of the optimization problems at both levels. Para-
metric programme can uncover extreme points in S i (given QU) and 
the PPS algorithm can find the extreme point in S i which satisfies 
the upper level constraints and provide optimum value for the 
upper level objective function. 
To show how a parametric search can solve ML?, a compressed 
MLP model with parametric programming at the lower level is 
formulated as: 
Min WL WX 
s.t. 	 (4.10) 
X - (X11' X22 ) E S2 
where: 
S 2 = {X E S1 I C = Min {(c + QU)X22 : (X22 1 +GU ), 
Ai < Q < Go p , {(+QU)X22 -.(-QU)X22 ) > 0)) 
and Si = {X 1 A X22 > R; Xi 	I*X22; X11 , X22 	()) 
• The PPS algorithm (a) parametrically perturbs the objective 
function of the lower level problem (C = c + OU) and .uncovers 
extreme points of S i as AU ranges from 0 1 to Qp (satisfies ML? 
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solution elements i and ii), and (b) searches these extreme points 
to find the extreme point in S 1 that yields the optimum value for 
the upper level objective function (elements iv), and that also 
meets the policy, and budgetary constraints 4.3.c and 4.3.d: 
(01 < 0 < Op ); ((+0U)X22 - ( -0U)X22 1 > 0 (element iii)(ie, the 
extreme point be in S 2 ). 
The theorem is proved. It, therefore, follows that the. PPS 
algorithm can find an MLP optimum solution. 
A parametric programming solution approach to a dual beha-
vioural problem has been developed by Candler and Townsley [19821, 
a study that supports the present algorithm. 
4.4.2 Economic Interpretations of ML? Solution by the PPS  
Algorithm. 
Economically, an MLP solution involves the finding of the 
values of +T and activities X22 that satisfy the policy con-
straints and provide optimum value for the policy objective func-
tion. The policy makers have the choice of varying the value of +T 
within a certain range (subject to some constraints) until a set 
of activities X22 is found which can generate an optimum value of 
the policy objective function. 
The mathematical process of the PPS algorithm used to find 
the MLP solution is exactly the same as the economic principle 
discussed above. The parametric programme generates all the possi-
ble values of +AU (+T) and the corresponding optimum solutions 
X22s (on the ray determined by AU). These optimum solutions are 
the ones which can be obtained by the policy makers by adopting 
different values of +T. In other words, these alternative paramet-
ric' solutions show the alternative outcomes of pursuing different 
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levels of +T. The PPS algorithm searches these optimum solutions 
for choosing the level of +T and finding the corresponding optimum 
solution X22 which generate the optimum value for the upper level 
objective function (satisfying constraints in the upper level). 
The PPS algorithm ensures the interdependence between the two  
sub-optimization problems (the upper and lower level problems) in 
the following way: +T (+QU) introduced by policy makers inter-
venes in the decision making of economic agents the result of 
which is a set of alternative parametric solutions to the lower 
level problem (X 22 ). Therefore decisions of economic agents X 22 
are subject to interventions from the upper level (+0). These 
alternative optimum decisions of economic agents are judged . in 
terms of the criteria embedded in the policy objective function 
and that decision of economic agents would be desirable to policy 
makers which will generate an optimum value of the policy objec-
tive function. Therefore, policy makers'choice of +T (+AU) as the 
optimum policy is constrained by economic agents' reactions (X22 ) 
to +GU. Thus, the choice of +T (+AU) by policy makers is con-
strained by the upper level constraints and the reactions of 
economic agents.(X 22 ) to such interventions and the decisions of 
economic agents (X 22 ) are also constrained by +T . (+0) and other 
behavioural constraints. Therefore, in the PPS algorithmic repre-
sentation of MLP, interdependence between two level decision 
makers is established. In other words, in the PPS algorithm, an 
MLP is solved interdependently (any sub-optimization problem is 
not solved independently). 
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4.4.3 Mathematical Properties of the MLP Solution. 
(a) Existence, Uniqueness, and Global Optimality of HIP Solution: 
The properties of the PPS algorithm solution need to be 
discussed at this point. Generally, the problems of existence, 
uniqueness and global optimality of MLP are still not resolved. 
For a discussion of the properties of an MLP model . solution, we 
refer to the MLP representation given above. 
The properties of S 2 are not known since it is not explicit 
(algebraically or numerically). S 2 will only be known when S i is 
known, which in turn will depend on the optimum decision of the 
lower level decision makers (economic agents). The undesirable 
possibilities are: S 2 may be empty, disjoint, and even non-convex. 
In the first two cases, there will be a solution existence prob-
lem; and in the third case, there is the problem of the determina-
tion of uniqueness and global optimum (Appendix D contains a 
demonstyation of this problem). 
Accepted views regarding these problems of policy existence, 
uniqueness and global optimality are as follows (Candler and 
Norton [1977]): 
(a) in a large-scale real world problem, the problem of 
policy existence may not be encountered; and 
. (b) appropriate algorithms can be adopted to overcome the 
policy uniqueness problem and to find the global optimum of an MLP 
policy model. 
(b) Existence, Uniqueness, and Global Optimality of MLP Solution 
In the Case of the PPS Algorithm: 
The PPS algorithm can find an optimum on the ray determined 
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by AU if S 1 is bounded, closed and convex (i.e., if a solution to 
the lower level problem exist). 
It should be mentioned that the existence of an ML? solution 
(the validity of the theorem) depends on how the parametric pro-
gramming of the lower level problem is terminated. There are 
three ways (Murtagh, [1981]) for parametric programming to be 
terminated and there are three alternative conditions of existence 
in the above theorem. In the first case, 0 will increase 
until the MLP problem becomes infeasible (for the values of 0 
above a certain value, the linear programming solution goes un-
bounded). The optimum solution to MLP in this case may be within 
the range of 0 1 to A f of the value of 0, where O f is the upper 
value of 0 beyond which the solution to the problem becomes infea-
sible. If that is the case, then there will be no MLP solution 
existence problem. The second case is where Q increases infinite-
ly without changing the most recently found optimum solution to 
the parametric programming. Here, a solution to an MU will exist 
but imposing an upper limit on 0 will be necessary. In the third 
case, 0 increases up to its pre-specified upper limit, if any, 
and an optimum solution will be found within the range A l to 01) of 
the value of 0 where Q 1 and 0p are the lower and upper limits and 
determined exogenously. In the present form of specification of 
MLP as in (4.4), the existence problem which can be caused by 
different forms of termination of the parametric search does not 
arise since a range of the variation of 0 has been incorporated in 
the =del. And the optimum solution will be within that range. 
Therefore, in all these situations, the PPS algorithm will not 
encounter the solution existence problem. 
However, as the algorithm only searches along the ray deter- 
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mined by +QU and finds an optimum in this ray, there is no guaran-
tee that the PPS algorithm can find a global optimum. 
The parametric search can be extended by changing 	the . 
units, directions and range of the parametric variation and many 
alternative optima (on the rays determined by the parametric 
variations) can be examined to form an idea about the plausibility 
of the MLP solution obtained. Of course, it may be suggested to 
continue the search until further improvement in the policy objec-
tive function is not possible, but it may not be practical in real 
. situations due to time and resource constraints. However, the non-
determination of a global optimum may not be a very serious limi-
tation of an algorithm if the algorithm finds some improved re-
sults since (Candler and Norton [1977],p. 37) 1 : 
'(a) there is question whether real world market 
equilibrium sometimes leads to local optimum, 
(b) these results provide an improved plan over the 
base or original plan, 
(c) improvement rather than optimality is sometimes 
considered as an objective of policy analysis (Kornai 
[1969].' 
4.5 AN ALTERNATIVE SPECIFICATION OF AN MLP MODEL 
To make an MLP problem economically more meaningful and non-. 
trivial, the MLP in (4.4) can be specified again including + T in 
the policy objective function as 2 follows (next page): 
1. Views of others on the usefulness of search methods, specially 
of the ones that cannot provide a guarantee for finding the global 
optimum, will be stated in the Conclusion Section (4.12). 
2. A similar version of AEPSOM was specified in Chapter Three and 
will be reproduced in Chapter Five, model (5.2). 
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{+T} 
Min WL = awX11 + b(+T)X22 1 
s.t. 
 
 
X11 I*X22 
T1 < ±T < Tp 
Min C = (c + T)X22 
{X22 1 +T) 
(4.11) 
s.t. 
AX <  22 R  — 
T,X11 ,X22 > 0 
This model is different from the original formulation in 
(4.4) because of a different specification of the policy objec-
tive function in this model. 
The PPS algorithm can be applied to this specification of MLP 
as well. The same algorithmic principle applies, however, in model 
(4.11) alternative parametric solutions will be searched to find 
the optimum value of the new policy objective function. 
4.6 SOME ISSUES IN USING THE PPS ALGORITHM: 
The PPS algorithm searches the policy-behavioural, region 
along a line determined by (1) the units, (2) the signs and (3) 
the direction and ranges of the parametric variation. 
Therefore, discussions on the determination of the units, 
signs, and direction and range of the parametric variation is 
1. This alternative policy objective function is similar to the 
ones in Equations (3.6) in Chapter Three and (5.2.a) in Chapter 
Five. 
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necessary. 
(1) Units of Parametric Variation: 
The determination of the appropriate units of parametric 
variations (including its sign): +U is important in the PPS algo-
rithm. +OU makes a search along a line in n-space. Therefore one 
particular +U uncovers all the extreme point optima along the line 
determined by +AU. The application of the PPS algorithm with a 
particular set of +U can find global optima on a thin line. And by 
choosing another set of +U another global optima on another line 
can be generated. Therefore, generation of the MLP optimum solu-
tion depends on the determination of the appropriate unit of 
parametric variation (+U). Therefore considerable attention needs 
to be given to the question of the choice of the units of para-
metric variation in the PPS algorithm since the units . determine 
the range and direction of the search done by the PPS algorithm. 
The question remains : How to find the appropriate +U ? In 
single level parametric programming, the units of parametric 
variation are generally obtained from the information of the 
system/environment under study. For example, if a - production 
cost of a product at the base period, and Q time, then the cost 
equation for any - future period can be presented as c = a + uQ. 	A 
numerical example of the cost equation is as follows: c 	5 + 
0.40. 	The unit of parametric variation u = 0.4 can be obtained 
from market surveys, econometric estimates, trend analysis etc. 
Therefore, in many single level parametric programming stud-
ies, finding the units of parametric variations may not be a 
problem. But that is not the case in parametric programs in MLP 
in the PPS algorithm. 
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In the present formulation of MLP, the following +u j is 
appropriate since this vector provides a direction of search  
towards the preference direction of the upper level objective  
function': 
±uj F ±11j = 	± %gip j = 1,2 	n ( •I j = jth elements of 
the matrix I. The elements of this matrix are either 1 or O.) 
The selection of +u• in the above procedures does not give — J 
any guarantee for the generation of global or even local MLP 
solution, since, the search is along a line. There is a need, 
therefore, for trying other alternative units to make search along 
other lines in S 2 . 
Generally, it will be prudent to vary the units (U) as much 
as possible Starting with the units +u j = +hj . The following 
alternatives were tried in the present study : 
(1) To choose U so that its elements are either +1, 0, Or -1. 
MTochoosetheunitstoequal+c•
J 
 orO 	c j cost coeffi- 
cients; j = 1,2 , 	n). 
There is, of course, a general problem of multiple optima in 
the case of small variations in U. The problem can be illustrated 
in Figure 4.3 and is further discussed in Appendix D. 
Figure 4.3 shows that changing the units of parametric 
variations of the behavioural objective function coefficients, 
which will move 11 as shown by c(U 1 ), c(U2 ), c(U3 ), and c(U4 ), may 
not change the optimum solution to the lower level problem. There-
fore, the optimum solution to the upper level problem will not 
change. So, in this case, we will find a ranga of values of the 
policy instruments (different values of parametric variations), 
1. Suggested by an anonymous examiner.. 
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FIGURE 4•3 
CHANGES IN ME UNITS OF PARAMETRIC VARIATIONS 
X I 
   
  
  
X2 
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not a set of unique values of the policy instruments, that will 
provide the same value for the policy objective function. 
(2) Signs of the Direction of the Coefficients Subject to  
Parametric Variations  
The signs of the parametric variation of different 	cost 
coefficients (+) depend on the choice of taxes or subsidies ap-
plicable to different activities. If a tax is imposed on an 
activity, then the sign of the parametric variation of its cost 
coefficients will be +, in the case of a subsidy ityill-be 
It may, however, be mentioned that the signs of parametric 
variations will be different in two types of policy studies: 
(a) the policy study involving the determination of the 
optimum levels of existing taxes and subsidies and prices (if any 
price is under control), and 
(b) the policy study that involves the determination of the 
optimum mix and levels of taxes and subsidies and prices. 
(a) Existing Taxes and Subsidies:  
In the first case, the lower level problem is solved by 
making the coefficients of the lower level objective function 
which are subject, to existing taxes and subsidies, to vary para-
metrically (ie. the lower level problem is solved as a parametric 
programming problem). The optimum solution to the complete multi-
level programme progra me provides a set of optimum values for existing 
taxes and subsidies. 
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(b) Optimum Mix of Taxes and Subsidies:  
In this case, at first the lower level sub-model should be 
solved as a linear programming problem with the lower level objec-
tive function contained within it (as a normal behavioural model): 
Min C = cX22 
(X22 ) 
s.t. 	 (4.12) 
A2 X22  > R — 
	
X11' X22 	0 
The vector of the level of optimum activities is defined as 
X22' 	Then the lower level sub-model should be solved with the 
policy objective function in it as follows: 
Min WL = wX11 
(X11 ) 
s.t. 	 (4.13) 
X11 = I*X22 
A2X22 R 
X11' X22 	0 
This model is termed a central control policy model. 	The 
solution to the central control policy model determines the 
optimum value of the policy objective function and the optimum set 
of activities. Let us define this vector of the activities as 
XP22' 
The next'step involves a comparison between the two sets of 
activities to identify the differences between the choices of the 
individual economic agents and the choices of the policy makers. 
So, the differences can be used as an indication for the mix and 
the direction of.the policy instruments, taxes and subsidies, 
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necessary to influence the activities of individual economic 
agents. So the vector: 
±uj 	-x22(j) 	x22(j) 
or, +u. 	_X 22(j) J -22(j) 	x22(j) . 
can be used to determine, signs and mix of the parametric varia-
tions in the following way: • 
	
< 0 if x 	x 	• uj 	22(j). >  22(j)' 
.>0 if x 	x 	• uj 	22(j) < 22(j)' 
uj 	0 if x22 	- x22(j); 
j1, 2,..,n 
.(4.14) 
Table 4.1 contains an example of this method: 
• 	Table 4.1 
Determination of Optimum Mix of Taxes and Subsidies 
Activities 	X22 	X22 
X22(1) 	20 	10 	10 
X22(2) 	15 	26 	11 
X22(3) 	21 	21 	0 	0 
For applying the PPS algorithm, cost coefficients c l and c 2 
should be subject to parametric variations and the signs should be 
- and + respectively. 
The numbers in Table 4.1 imply that a mix of tax on x 22(2) , 
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subsidy on x22(1) , and nothing on x22(3) is the optimum mix of tax 
and subsidy in this example. 
(3) Direction and Range of Parametric Variation 
The direction of the parametric variation depends on the 
units and signs of the parametric variation which have been dis-
cussed above. There are other factors that will also have effects 
on the direction of the parametric variation: In an MLP model, if 
+T 	is entered in the upper level objective function, this will 
provide the desired direction for the parametric variation. 	The 
policy 	constraint, determined on the basis of the underlying 
government policy environment, Will determine the range of para-
metric variation. For example, if the policy feasible region is 
specified as T l < +T < Tp , then the desired parametric variation 
will be restricted only within this specified region. 
4.7. A SUMMARY OF THE ALGORITHMIC STEPS: 
(1) Choose a set of the units (U) of the parametric varia-
tions (A). There are several alternatives for that: 
(a) Units equal to ±.9, (j = 1,2,....,n) or 0; 
(b) Units equal to +1, 0, •or -1; 
(c) Units . (up as close as possible to (-9 + w2Ii ), 
j = 1,2,....,n. 
(2) Determine which units will be equal to 0 and the direc-
tions (+) of the variations of the remaining parameters. The fol-
lowing are the alternatives: 
(a) Existing tax and subsidy regime: Identify the existing 
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taxes and subsidies. If a tax is imposed on a particular 
activity (fuel or energy), then the direction of the paramet-
ric variation of that activity should be positive; and if 
subsidy is given then it should be negative (for example if 
tax is imposed on x22j, then the coefficient of the lower 
level objective function, c j , should be subject to paramet-
ric variation in the positive direction +u j , otherwise (for 
subsidy) in the negative direction, -u). The activities on 
which taxes and subsidies are imposed are the ones of which 
the cost coefficients are subject to parametric variation. 
(b) Optimum tax and subsidy choice: Solve the lower 
level sub-model in model (4.4) twice : 
(i)As a linear . programme, as in (4.12) and 
(ii)again with the upper level objective function in it 
as in model (4.13) to find 	two alternative sets of 
optimum activities: X 22 and X22 . 
(iii)Find the differences between these two sets of activi- 
ties as 	X22 - X22 and choose the signs of the units (+U) to 
equal the sign of ±(X22 - X22) or set U 0 if the difference 
is equal to O. 
(iv)Choose'the signs according to +U. 
(3) Determine the range of the parametric variation by study-
ing the underlying policy system. 
(4) Solve the lower level problem of an MLP as the parametric 
programing problem specified following Steps 1 and 3. 
(5) Search the alternative (parametric) solutions to the 
lower level problem generated in Steps 1 to 4 to find out the 
150 
solution which provides the optimum value for the upper level 
•objective function and satisfy the policy and budgetary con-
straints. 
(6) Continue Steps 1 to 5 until no further improvement in the 
upper level objective function is possible. 
(7) In the case that all the possible combinations of the 
units and directions of parametric variations can not be tried to 
solve an ML?, any solution to an MLP will be a reasonable approx-
imate solution to an ML? (i) if it generates a value of the upper 
level objective function fairly close (as close as possible) to 
the value of the policy objective function of the central control 
model specified from an ML? (in the same way as in model (4.13)), 
and (ii) if the value of the policy objective function of MLP is 
lower then the value of the policy objective function calculated 
from the values of X B22 determined •by the behavioural model 
(4.12). In this case, the MLP solution provides an improved plan 
over the original plan or no plan. 
4.8 SOFTWARE , 
The main software for implementing the PPS algorithm in this 
study was the linear programming package (with parametric program-
ming facility) of Pearse and Hardaker [1984]. The software can 
solve the lower level problem as a . parametric programming problem. 
Two alternatives for searching these parametric solutions to find 
an optimum MLP solution are discussed below: 
(a) For an MLP as in (4.3) without (4.3.c) and (4.3.d), two sub- 
programmes were developed by.Gatenby [1986] in consultation with 
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the present author to find the ML? solution. 	The first sub: 
programme (Appendix E) searches the alternative parametric solu-
tions to find the MLP solution. The second sub-programme changes 
the units of parametric variations (Appendix D, Section D.3). The 
• 
combined package, consisting .of the above three programmes and 
named POLICY PROGRAMME:can be used to solve an ML?. 
(b) In the case of MLP as in (4.3) including (4.3.c) and 
(4.3.d) and as in the alternative specification in Section 4.5, 
the Policy Search Programme as in (ii) below is to be replaced by 
Lotus 1-2-3. Lotus 1-2-3 can . be used to calculate the values of 
the. policy objective function in (4.11) and the constraints 
(4.3.c) and (4.3.d) to find the optimum value (maximum or minimum) 
through an iterative procedure from the results of the parametric 
solutions to the lower level problem. 
The POLICY PROGRAMME has the following operation sequence: 
(i) Parametric Linear Programming package yields 
X22(1) , X22(2) ,   X22(n) 
and 01U, 02U, 	 0nU 
(ii) Policy Search Programme (two sub-programmes)/ Lotus 1-2-3 
• searches the outputs of. (i) and finds W = w(X22" 
• _ 
X22 and OU, the optimum values of the upper level objective- 
function, 'activities, and taxes and subsidies 
(iii) Output of (i) should be checked on whether 0 1U, 02U,.. 
OnU are within the range 0 1 < 0 < Op 
(iv) Lotus 1-2-3 can calculate the values of the budgetary con-
straints from the output of (i) to determine the solutions 
X22(1). x22(2) 	 X22(n) which satisfy these constraints. 
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4.9 USE OF THE PPS ALGORITHM IN DIFFERENT TYPES OF POLICY 
STUDIES  
The PPS algorithm can be used in two types of policy studies, 
which is already evident from the previous discussion on the units 
of parametric variations' (a) the policy study involving the deter-
mination of the optimum values of existing taxes and subsidies 
(and prices if any price is under control) along with other energy 
policies, and (b) the policy study that involves the determination 
of the optimum mix and level of taxes and subsidies and prices 
along with other energy policies l . 
4.10 ADVANTAGES AND LIMITATIONS OF THE PPS ALGORITHM 
4.10.1 Advantages  
(1) To solve MLP with the PPS algorithm, it is not necessary 
to make a transformation in the original MLP. The size of the 
transformed MLP in some existing algorithms may become a problem, 
as discussed previously. 
(2) Parametric programming software is commercially available 
(Pearse and Hardikar [1984]). Lotus 1-2-3 is also commercially 
available. The additional sub-programmes required to solve an MLP 
can easily be developed. 
(3) The PPS algorithm can be used to solve large scale ML? 
1. In Chapter Five,.further discussion on these two types of 
policy studies will be provided. 
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models. 
(4) ' The algorithm has favourable operational characteris-
tics. These relate to the accuracy and efficiency of the algo-
rithm, and to the cost and efficiency in extending and transfer-
ring it. 
(a) Accuracy : As no other algorithms or models were avail-
able to test the accuracy of the results provided by the PPS 
algorithm, 	results obtained in this study were used to make a 
judgment.. It can be seen in Chapter Five (p.176, 210) that the 
value of the policy objective function in MLP solution is (a) 8.2% 
different from that of a central control policy model l , and (b) an 
improvement by 44.46% over the behavioural model. 
(b) Efficiency: Since different models were solved by the PPS 
algorithm, there were different CPU times in cases of different 
models. 	However, the CPU time needed for solving AEPSOM (with 
existing taxes and subsidies) was: 40 seconds. 
(c) 'Cost and Efficiency in Extension and Transfer 	For 
implementing the PPS algorithm the major computer programme 
needed 	is parametric programming software. 	The other two sub- 
programmes are relatively smaller. The alternative programme 
Lotus 1-2-3 is commercially available. The whole computer pro-
gramme can easily be transferred. If parametric programming 
software is available then the other two sub-programmes can be 
1. 	If it is accepted that thee central control policy model 
solution is an ideal basis, for the determination of policy direc-
tions, then a solution which is only 8.2% different from the 
• ideal situation may be considered reasonably accurate. By increas-
ing the range of search it would be possible to obtain better 
results. 
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Written by somebody having reasonable knowledge of computer pro-
gramming or Lotus 1-2-3 can be used. Therefore, the complete 
computer software for solving an MLP model, is relatively simple 
to obtain, develop, or transfer. 
4.10.2 Limitations  
(1) One limitation of the PPS algorithm discussed above is 
that the parametric search is limited to a single line, determined 
by the units and signs of the parametric variations (+U). There-
fore, it is not possible to guarantee that the algorithm can find 
a global optimum. But, as it was stated before, the units of the 
parametric variations can be changed to extend the search in the 
policy-behavioural set. 
(2) An important methodological issue is whether or not 
macro-economic constraints can be included in an MLP model, if a 
solution is sought by the PPS algorithm. For analyzing the issue, 
let us give a condensed statement of an MLP model with macro-
economic constraints as: 
Min W1 = w1X11 + w2X22 
P1X11. 4. P2X22 - R1 
Min C = (c + OU)X22 
{X22 I +OU = +1} 
s.t. 
A X > R 2 22 — 2 
X11' X22 	0 
where: 
X11 	a vector of macroeconomic variables (m x 1), 
(4.15) 
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X22 = a vector of energy variables (n x 1), 
w1 ,w2 = vectors of the policy objective function 
coefficients, 
c a vector of the behavioural objective function 
coefficients, 
R1 ,R2 = vectors of the RES constants. 
A statement of the above problem with macroeconomic con-
straints in the lower level of the MLP problem is as follows: 
Min W1 =wX +wX 1 11 	2 22 
Min C = (c + OU)X22 
{X22I -1-QU = "FT} 
s.t. 	 (4.16) 
A X > R 2 22 — 1 
P1X11 P2X22 = R2 
X X > 0 21' 22 — 
The question is whether both the above problems are similar. 
If they are similar, then Model (4.15) can be solved by the PPS 
algorithm. Experiments may be undertaken to test the problem in 
future work. However, the author's view is that the above two 
specifications will give the same values as the optimum solution, 
even though these.two specifications are structurally distinct. 
4.11 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
In the PPS algorithm, the lower level problem of a complete 
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MLP problem is solved as a parametric programming problem. . Alter-
native optimum (basic) solutions to the lower level problem are 
searched to find the one which is optimum for the upper 	level 
problem. 	The algorithm can be used to solve different types of 
MLP problems including a dynamic ML?. There are some unresolved 
methodological issues which may be investigated in further stud-
ies. 
The PPS algorithm is a heuristic search method. Like any 
other heuristic method for solving an ML?, it has the disadvantage 
that it can not be guaranteed that a global optimum is found. The 
real .evaluation of the usefulness of an iterative procedure, 
specially in the context of the problems of solving ML? 	(see 
Candler, Fortuny-Amat and McCarl, [1981]), has been stated as 
follows (Hazell and Norton [1986], p.323): 
"Conceptually the main drawback of the iterative 
procedure is that the determination of the true 
optimum solution can not be guaranteed. However, in 
practice, large numbers of solutions may provide the 
analyst with reasonable confidence that the true 
optimum solution is found." 
McCarl and Spreen [1980] have also emphasized the usefulness  
of search methods as: 
.."these algorithms l are rather cumbersome and de-
manding in terms of computer capacity. Informal 
iterative or search methods also may be used in the 
quest for optimum policy." 
Having developed an algorithm to solve an ML?, the next task 
is to apply this algorithm for solving AEPSOM to undertake the 
desired Australian policy studies. This will be done in the next 
two chapters. 
1.The MLP non-search algorithms discussed in Chapter Two (the 
present author's note). 
CHAPTER FIVE 
THE RESULTS OF THE AUSTRALIAN ENERGY PLANNING MODEL' 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
The numerical implementation of .AEPSOM is 	supposed to 
provide information useful and adequate for the formulation of 
multi-level energy plan. In this chapter, the AEPSOM 	results, 
which indicate the model's capability in producing useful numeri-
cal output, will be reported and discussed. The chapter is struc-
tured as follows: How AEPSOM was solved, what type of output it 
produced, the policy uses of these results and the al ternative 
AEPSOM solutions - these topics are reported in Section 5.2. 	A 
general discussion of all the relevant results produced by AEPSOM 
is provided in Section 5.3 while the sensitivity analysis is 
reported in Secttion 5.4. 	Validation tests on the results of 	- 
AEPSOM are stated in Section 5.5 to determine the reliability of 
these results for policy prescription. This discussion of the 
validation of results will prepare the background for the use of 
these results in policy formulation in the next chapter. 
5.2 AEPSOM SOLUTIONS AND OUTPUT 
5.2.1 Model  
An abstract representation of the two types of the specifi-
cations of AEPSOM from Chapter Three is reported here to facili-
tate the understanding of the outputs of AEPSOM and their policy 
uses. 
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Specification 1 1 . 
Min WL = wG 	(a) Policy objective 
(+T) function (P.O.F(1)) 
s.t. 
G = I lY + I 2X + I3 Z 	(b) Definitional equations 
T <+T < T 
	
1 — — — p 	(c) 	Policy constraints 
{(+Ti)Y + (+T2 )X + (+T 3 )2) - ((-T 1 )Y + (-T 2 )X . + (-T 3 )Z} > 0 
(d) Budget constraints 
(5.1) 
Min C = (c 1 + T i )Y +. (c 2 + T2 )X + (c 3 + T3 )Z 
{Y,X,2 I +T} . 	(e) Behavioural objective 
function 
s.t. 
Z > D { (f) Demand constraints 
Z = aX 	{6} 	(g) Intermediate energy balance 
constraints 
X = bY 	{11} 	(h) Energy supply balance 
constraints 
Y < Y 	{r} 	(i) Resource constraints 
X < (j) Capacity constraints 
G,Y,X,Z > 0 	(k) Non-negativity constraints 
where: WL = . value of P.O.F. 
w = vector of coefficient.of the policy objective 
function (i x e); 
G = vector of energy target variables (e x 1); 
Y = a vector of primary energy (p x 1); 
1. This model is a reproduction of the model (3.1) in Chapter 
Three. Symbols used in both models are the same. 
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X - a vector of energy products (n x 1); 
Z = a vector of end-uses of the energy products 
(M x 1); 
D 	a vector of end-uses in different sectors (q x 1); 
c l , c 2 , c 3 = costs of supplying, converting 
and using energy {(p x 1),(n x 1),(m x 1)); 
+Ti , +T2 , +T3 = vectors of different taxes 
and subsidies {(p x 1),(n x 1),(m . x 1)) 
(lower case t's are the elements); 
a, b - matrices of technological coefficients 
{(m x n),(n x p)); 
I's - matrices elements of which are either 1 or 0; 
Y = a vector of the fixed amount of available 
primary energy (p x 1); 
X - a vector of the fixed level of capacities 
(n x 1); 
M = (a,6,p,r,13) - shadow prices related to different 
constraints (these shadow prices are specified 
in model (8.1) in Appendix B). 
Specification 2. 
Min WL = wG - . 
+ (+T2 )X + (+T 3 )2) - {(-T1 )Y + (-T2 )X + (-T3)Z}] 
{+T} 	 (a) Policy objective 
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functionl (P.O.F.2) 
s .t. 
G = 1 1Y + I 2X + I 3 2 
T < + T < T 1 _ _ _ p 
(b) Definitional equations 
(c) Policy constraints 
(5.2) 
Min C = (c 1 + Tl )Y + (c 2 + T2 )X + (c 3 + T3 )2 
(Y,X,2 1 +T) 	(d) Behavioural objective function 
s.t. 
Z >D 
Z = aX 
X - bY 
Y < y 
x < x 
G,Y,X,Z > 0 
(e) Demand constraints 
(f) Intermediate energy balance 
constraints 
(g) Energy supply balance 
constraints 
(h) Resource constraints 
(i) Capacity constraints 
(j) Non-negativity constraints 
5.2.2 Solution 
The optimum 'solution of AEPSOM was obtained by applying the 
PPS algorithm developed in the previous chapter. The reader can 
recall that, an optimal solution to an MLP involves finding the 
optimum basic solution to the behaviour model of AEPSOM. A solu-
tion of the above type that satisfies the constraints on the 
policy instruments and provides the optimum value for the policy 
objective function is the optimum solution for an ML?. To be able 
1. This alternative specification of the policy objective func-
tion was introduced in Chapter Three, Equation (3.6). 
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to apply the PPS algorithm, the following issues related to the 
techniques of solving AEPSOM as a price control MLP needed to be 
resolved: 
i) Development of a formula to find the units of parametric' 
variation to solve AEPSOM; and 
ii) Development of a procedure for applying AEPSOM to two types 
of . policy studies i.e., (a) for finding the optimum values of 
the existing taxes and subsidies and (b) for finding the 
optimum mix and optimum values of taxes and subsidies. 
Since these were discussed in detail in Chapter Four, only 
their applications to AEPSOM will be discussed in Sections 5.2.7 
and 5.2.8 below. 
5.2.3 Optimum Solution  
As AEPSOM was solved by the PPS algorithm, there was no 
guarantee that the global optimum was found. However, the AEPSOM 
results can be considered optimum for the reasons discussed in 
Chapter Four. 
(i) Identification of Optimum Solution l 
Conventionally, the following two criteria are adopted to 
determine the optimum policy : Pareto optimality and the optimum 
value of the policy objective function. These two criteria were 
applied to identify the optimum solution of AEPSOM. The optimum 
solution' was determined by the lowest value of the policy objec-
tive function, which is the normal mathematical criterion used • for 
1. The identification and interpretation of the AEPSOM optimum 
solution should be made within the context of the MLP solution 
• discussed in Chapter Four: The AEPSOM optimum is an optimum along 
a ray determined by parametric variations. 
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determining a minimum. The AEPSOM optimum also has economic impli-
cations. The AEPSOM optimum solution corresponds to the Pareto 
optimum in the energy sector in the sense that at the optimum the 
value of no target variable can be reduced further without in-
creasing the values of one or more target variables in the Austra-
lian energy sector l . 
5.2.4 Output  
In the case of AEPSOM being solved using the PPS algorithm, 
its optimum solution generates the following results 2 : 
(a) the optimum value of the policy objective function (WL), 
(b) the optimum value of the behavioural objectives function (C), 
(c) the optimum values of taxes and subsidies (+T 	+GU) 
(d) the optimum values of the activities (X, Y, 
(e) a set of shadow prices or dual variables (defined below) M - 
( a, 6,-11,r ,p) 3 corresponding to the energy demand, conversion, 
1. For an analysis of the Pareto optimum implication of an MLP 
model solution, see Hazell and Norton ([1986], p.323). 
2. The unit of real and monetary variables are petajoules (PJ) and 
million Australian dollars. 
3. The shadow prices are the dual variables of a linear pro-
gramme. For example if the general linear programming (primal) 
problem is as follows : 
Min C = cX22 
(X22 ) 
s .t. 
A22X22 R 
X22 	0 
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supply balance, and supply and capacity constraints of the primal 
problem (5.1 and 5.2), and 
(f) Reduced costs (Rc) (defined below) showing the amount 	of 
required cost reduction in the energy activities which will cause 
that activity to appear in the optimum solution. 
5.2.5 Uses of Results for Multi-Level Energy Planning l . 
In the previous MLP studies, model results have been used 
mainly to (a) determine the optimum values of existing taxes and 
subsidies (b) make explicit the policy - behavioural feasible 
region and (c) to formulate technology policies (Candler and 
Norton [1977], Bisschop et al. (1982), Ballenger [1984], Sparrow 
et al. [1979]). The present MLP study has extended the scope of 
...Continued... 
The dual problem to the above primal problem is: 
Max Z = MR 	{M is a row vector) 
(14} 
S.t. 
MA22  
M> 0 
There are some important primal-dual relationships (see Intriliga-
tor [1971]) However, the shadow prices are the dual variables M 
such that cX4'22 = M*R. 
1. From the outset of the study, policy formulation problems in 
market economies have been discussed with different levels of 
economic controls. Therefore, it is obvious that the model will 
be applicable to both developed and underdeveloped market and 
mixed economies. 
An MLO model can also be applied to fully controlled econo-
mies. In these economies most of the resources are controlled and 
distributed by the government, but the objectives of the central 
policy makers and the operation level policy makers may be 
different. The nature of control of the activities of the opera-
tion level decision makers by the central level policy makers 
• may also range from some tax and subsidy measures to the direct 
controls of price and resources. This type of policy system can 
also be modelled by an MLO model. 
164 
applications of MLP model results by undertaking the types of 
policy studies (specially by adopting +T in conjunction with 
shadow prices and reduced cost in policy studies) discussed in 
this section. 
The uses of the AEPSOM results are discussed below. 
(a)Policy Systems Analysis:  
The values of the policy objective function and behavioural 
objective function and also the values of +T provide insights into 
the characteristics of the underlying policy system. 
(b)A Multi-Level Energy Plan:  
(i) An Optimum Energy System: The optimum values of X, Y, 
constitute the elements of the optimum energy system. 
(ii)An Optimum Energy Policy Plan: The results of the model . 
can be used to formulate a comprehensive set of energy policies. 
The behavioural objective function does not have any policy uses, 
but it 	is 	informative 	in 	the sense that the aggregate 
reactions of the individual economic agents to government policies 
can be studied from various values of the behavioural objective 
function. 
AEPSOM results can be used for formulating the following poll-.: 
cies: 
(a) + T for Tax and Subsidy Policy: The value of the taxes 
and subsidies selected by the model will be the optimum values of 
the tax and subsidy instruments. If an MLO model is solved by the 
PPS algorithm (discussed in Chapter Four), the values of the 
parametric variations (AU) of the coefficients of the lower level 
objective function become the values of taxes and subsidies. 
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Therefore , the optimum value of +T is determined in the present 
- study by +AU since the PPS algorithm has been used to solve 
AEPSOM. Details of the meaning and the mechanism of determina-
tion of +OU have been discussed in Chapter Four. 1 
(b) P for Pricing Policy: For the purpose of government 
pricing policy formulation (when prices are fixed by the govern-
ment), the opportunity cost approach to pricing is adopted. In 
this approach, the price of energy should be equal to the value 
of the cost of the next best alternative available. In a mathe-
matical programming energy model, shadow prices calculated by the 
model reflect the scarcity costs or opportunity costs of activi-
ties, and these shadow prices are adopted to formulate energy 
prices. 
It may however be mentioned that, although the above is the 
normal practice, in an environment where prices are not directly 
fixed by the government, but are controlled by taxes or subsidies 
or other regulations (as in price control ML?), prices can be 
calculated by the formula (5.3) or (5.4) below, since these prices 
will be the market prices which are equal to production costs plus 
government taxes or minus government subsidies. Prices in this 
study were determined by using the following formula (shown by 
(5.1.e)): 
P =  c1± T 	P2 = c 2 ± T 2' P3 - c 3 ± T 3 
where 	P1 ,P2 ,P3 = prices of different forms of energy 
(5.3) 
   
1. If a resource control MLP model is solved by the PPS algori- 
• thim, the model solution will also provide the optimum values of 
activities which are under direct government control. These 
optimum values can be used to identify government investment 
policies in the energy sector. 
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c 1 ,c 2 ,c 3 - average cost of the activities 
+ T1 , + T2 , + T3 = taxes or subsidies 
If the PPS algorithm is applied to solve an MLP model, prices 
can be calculated as follows: 
P1 '=, c l ± GUl , P2 - c 2 ± GU2 , P 3 = c 3 ± AU3 	. (5.4) 
where 
	
	Pl , P2 , P 3 = prices of different forms of energy 
- level of parametric variation 
• 	U1 , U2 , U3 = unit of the parametric variations of 
c l , c 2 and c 3 . 
However, shadow prices were used in this study to formulate 
other forms of energy policies (discussed below). 
(c) X, Y, Z for Technology Policy: The optimum values of the 
activities in the energy model (energy supplies, products and end-
uses) determine what may be called.the optimum energy system. The 
optimum energy system indicates the efficient resource allocation, 
i.e. the optimum pattern of activities in the energy sector. A 
comparison of the optimum energy system with the existing energy 
system Can provide guidelines for the formulation of energy tech-
nology policies. In an economy where government investment in the 
energy sector exists, these values of the activities also show the 
desired pattern of public sector investment. In a market economy, 
the values of activities are used only to formulate energy tech-
nology policies as guidelines for government energy department ' 
operations and to provide information to the private. sector to 
help in making investment decisions. 
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(d) X,Y,Z for Investment Policy l : The optimum set of energy 
activities shows the optimum pattern of output of energy in the 
economy. Incremental capital-output ratios related to energy 
activities 	can be used to calculate the levels and structure of 
investments necessary to attain all of these energy outputs. 
(e) a , o, u ,r ,0 for Conservation Policy, Education and  
Information Policy; and Research and Development Policy: 
Shadow prices can be used to determine priorities for the 
allocation of government funds for policy actions in such areas as 
conservation, research and development, and . education and 
information. As shadow prices of end-use constraints indicate the 
effects of reduction in unit per energy consumption, these shadow 
prices are useful for the formulation of energy conservation 
policies. a (= al, a2,   ,cc ri ) shows the relative priority 
areas for energy conservation. 
The relative 	shares of each type of constraints of the 
total values of the shadow prices indicate the priorities in 
the allocation of funds for research and development, and educa-
tion and information. 
(f) Rc for Research and Development Policy: If one energy 
supply or technology is not viable in the market at the moment, 
that 	activity will not be in the simplex tableau of the optimum 
solution. The reduced cost of that activity indicates the cost 
reduction which will result in the penetration of the market by 
1. In Australia, the state governments invest in the electricity 
sector. • Since there is no need for a national investment policy, 
and as AEPSOM is not regionally segregated, no investment policy 
for the Australian energy sector has been formulated •in this 
study. 
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that activity ( Bradley, Hox and Magnanti [1977)). On the basis of 
this information government can undertake research and develop-
ment policies or develop a more efficient technology or find 
cost-saving methods in that energy operation. 
5.2.6 Two Types of Model Specifications  
The two types of AEPSOM were solved separately. 
5.2.7 Three Types of Units of Parametric Variations  
In Chapter Fodr, three types of units of parametric varia-
tions were proposed which were applied to solve AEPSOM : These 
three types of units are: 
(1) U 	C = elements are selected to either equal c j or 0; 
(2) U 	K = elements are either +1, 0 or -1; 
(3) +u : = H-c 	+ 	o 	t 	r 	t wI 	• j = 1 	2 ... 	n. J 	_j  
In alternative cases, AEPSOM was solved by adopting those 
three units of parametric variation. 
5.2.8 Two Types of Policy Studies  
It was stated in Chapter Four (pp. 145-146) that an MLP model 
(AEPSOM) can be used to undertake two distinctively separate 
policy studies if it is solved by the PPS algorithm: 
(1) to find the 'Optimum values of the existing taxes and subsi-
dies in an economy (existing +T) and 
(2) to find the optimum combination of taxes and subsidies and 
their optimum values (optimum +T). 
Methods for solving an MLP model by the PPS algorithm for 
these two types of policy studies were stated in Chapter Four. 
These methods were applied to solve AEPSOM, and to obtain results 
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suitable for the two types of policy studies. In the next sec-
tion, AEPSOM results will be reported separately for these two 
policy regimes. In each of the policy studies, the above mentioned 
three units of parametric variation were adopted to solve 
AEPSOM. 
5.3  PRESENTATION AND DISCUSSION OF THE AEPSIDM RESULTS 
This section will report the major results of AEPSOM and will 
discuss the results l . 
The important results produced by AEPSOM which were stated 
before are the (optimum) values of (a) the policy objective func-
tion, (b) the behavioural policy objective function (c) the taxes 
and subsidies (d) prices (e) activities (energy supply, production 
and end-uses), (f).shadow prices and (g) reduced costs Sensi-
tivity studies with AEPSOM also show the 'effects of changes in the 
energy sectoral variables and coefficients on the above mentioned 
results, especially on the policy objective function, and thus 
provides a comparative static framework for policy analysis. 
The optimum AEPSOM solution with descriptions of the main 
characteristics of the model solution is given in Table 5.1. A 
listing of the various AEPSOM solutions is given in Appendix F. 
1. In MLP studies, numerical findings are generally used for two 
purposes (i) to study the characteristics of the multi-level 
decision making, and (ii) to analyse and/or formulate policies 
(for example, Candler and Norton, [1977]). The same approach has 
been adopted in this study. Comparative accounts of the findings 
of the present study, and previous MLP and other studies will be 
provided throughout the whole chapter for an relative evaluation 
of the findings of the present study. 
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Table 5.1 
OPTIMUM MODEL SOLUTIONS:  
AEPSOM with Policy Constraints  
(Feasible Optimum Solutions). 
RESULT 
Brief 
Description 
Policy 
Constraints 
Type of . 
Policy Optimum value 
P.O.F (1) * 
(PJ) 
Model 
No. 
U = C AEPSOM 
1979-80 
• data 
Optimum set . 0 < +T < 20% 
B=3777.91 > 0 
6,733.70 
(+T 	0) 
Model 
No. 5 
*P.O. F (1) W = Ie l + CNo + TCo, with the policy constraints: 
(1) 0 < tj < 20% of j 	j = 1,2, ....37 (For 1989-90, 
j = 1,2, ...,43) 
32 	32 (2) B = L (+tj)xj.- L(-tj)xj > 0 i=1 j=1 
This model corresponds to AEPSOM in (5.1), Specification 1. 
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Detailed results of all these solutions are not reported here. 
Only those which are significant for the present study will be 
reported in the tables in the next sub-sections.  In those tables,  
several model results are reported in addition to the optimum 
AEPSOM solution (model solution no. 5) for comparison purposes.. 
5.3.1 Some Elements of the Numerical Policy System 
5.3.1.1 The Policy Objective Function  
The optimum values of the policy objective function in the 
cases of two model specifications are reported in Table 5.1. 
In the case of specification 1, only Model' No.5 produced 
results satisfying the initial policy constraints 0 < +T < 
20% The optimum values of the policy objective function (1) are 
the same in the case of model solution 5 and 6 (Appendix F), al-
though these have different upper level constraints on the policy 
range, while model solution 13 produces a very much lower value of 
the policy objective function. 
To trace the relationships between the values of the policy 
objective function and the variations in +T (or +00), Table 5.2 
was prepared containing the values of the policy objective func-
tion and levels of Q under both specifications of the policy 
objective functidh. It is evident from Table 5.2 that with the 
different levels of parametric variation, the values of the 
policy objective functions do not show any increasing or decreas-
ing trend. This implies that the problem of finding the optimum 
value of +T can not be solved by simply increasing or decreasing 
+T steadily. Therefore, careful study is needed to find the opti-
mum values of +T. 
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Table 5.2 
Levels of Parametric Variations and the 
Values of the Policy Objective Functions 
Model No. 4  
W1* W2** W3 *** 
0.0000 7031.66 0.00 7031.66 
0.1300 7032.16 8142.39 -1110.23 
0.5012 6734.20 24455.52 -17721.32 
0.5900 6734.20 9202.55 -2468.35 
2.2486 7037.22 26514.73 -19477.51 
2.6850 7037.22 21432.75 -14395.53 
Model No. 5  
W1* W2** w3*** 
0.0000 7031.66 0.00 7031.66 
0.0771 6733.70 3777.91 2955.79 
0.1158 6897.83 5226.25 1671.58 
0.2899 6897.83 3460.04 3437.79 
0.2918 7036.72 3798.89 3237.83 
0.3137 7036.72 2889.04 4147.68 
0.3149 7037.22 2863.57 4173.65 
'Model No. 	6 
W1* W2** w3*** 
0.0000 7031.66 0.00 7031.66 
0.0791 6733.70 3859.65 2874.05 
0.1042 7110.58 4702.72 2407.86 
0.1150 6898.33 5190.08 1708.25 
0.2222 7773.20 2717.27 5055.93 
0.2937 7912.09 3476.58 4435.51 
0.3164 7912.09 2540.03 5372.06 
*W1 = P.0.F.(1) 
**W2 = The second part of P.O.F.(2) 
***W3 = P.O.F.(2) 
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5.3.1.2 The Values of the Behavioural Objective Function  
The optimum solutions to some behavioural models of AEPSOM 
(the single level linear programming model of the energy sector 
without +T in it or when +T 0) are reported in Table 5.3. 
Optimum solutions to the same behavioural Models when these models 
are solved as the lower level of an MLP (AEPSOM) (i.e., optimum 
value for the behavioural problem determined by the MLP solution) 
are also reported in the Table. 
It appears from Table 5.3 that optimum solutions to the 
single level behavioural model are not the same as the optimum MLP 
solutions to the behavioural model. In other words, the optimum 
value of the behavioural objective function without government 
intervention is different from when there is government interven-
tion. In most of the solutions of which six are reported in 
Table 5.3 the former value' has been lower than the latter. 
Different values of the behavioural and policy objective 
functions are also reported in Table 5.3. It is apparent from the 
Table that in the cases where optimum model solutions involve 
+T = 0, the value of the behavioural objective function of AEPSOM 
is higher than the value of the behavioural objective function of 
the cost-minimizing linear programming model of the energy sector 
(single level behavioural model, in Model 7). This implies that to 
achieve the optiontim value of policy objectives, the energy sector-
• al total costs have to increase. Alternatively, AEPSOM does not 
choose the energy sector behavioural optimum solution (without 
government intervention) as optimum solution for the ML? 
These results clearly demonstrate the different/conElicting 
interests of the private and public sector.The public sector deci-
sion criteria select that private sector performance which is 
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Table 5.3. 
Optimum Values of the Behavioural and Policy Objective Functions 
Model B.O.F. B.O.F. P.O.F. +T 
number (1) * (2) ** (1) 
1 229336.34 229336.34 7031.68 +T=0 
2 229336.34 229336.34 7031.66 
3 229336.34 229336.34 7031.40 
4 229336.34 230668.43 6734.20 +T*0 
5 229336.34 245047.03 6733.70 +T#0 
6 229336.34 251442.69 6733.70 +T$0 
*The value of the objective function of the 'single level linear 
programming model. 
**The value of the objective funCtion of the behavioural 
model of AEPSOM. It does not include taxes or subsidies. 
different from the private sector's own chosen optimum perform-
ance. . 
This does not, however, mean that policy intervention will 
always raise the level of energy sector costs, as can be seen 
from Table 5.4. In Model Solution 13, increased value of the 
parametric variation has actually at some time reduced the value 
of the behavioural objective function. - For example at 0 - 9.112, 
the value of the behavioural objective function of AEPSOM is 
255748.56 which is less than the value generated by the single 
level linear programming model. 
One important aspect of the AEPSOM optimum solution should be 
discussed here. If the optimum values of P.O.F(1) in Model Nos 7 
and 5 are compared (Table F.1 . in Appendix F), it will reveal that 
the optimum value determined by the single level behavioral model 
(Model No.7) : 7031.68 is higher than that of the MLP model - 
AEPSOM (Model No. 5). 
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Table 5.4 
Different Values of 0 and Three Objective 
Functions 
Model No.5 
B.O.F.(1) B.O.F.(2) P.O.F.(1) 
0.0000 229336.34 229336.34 7031.66 
0.0771 245047.03 6733.70 
0.1158 252385.15 6897.83 
0.2899 284808.63 6897.83 
0.2918 285150.94 7036.72 
0.3137 289020.25 7036.72 
0.3149 289237.88 7037.22 
Model No.13 
B.O.F.(1) B.O.F.(2) P.0.F.(1) 
0.0000 275179.50 275179.50 8427.01 
0.1000 275412.38 4680.03 
0.1625 275361.06 9476.85 
0.1867 275341.19 9476.85 
0.5413 275048.94 9477.45 
1.0000 274505.13 9477.45 
1.7092 273371.75 9476.14 
1.9159 272993.06 9494.46 
1.9442 273940.12 9494.46 
2.2645 272224.38 9494.46 
9.1118 255748.56 9494.46 
B.O.F.(1) and B.O.F. (2) as defined before. 
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In Figure 5.1, optimum values of different target variables 
generated by Model No. 5 and the single level behavioural model 
are shown. The bar diagrams of Iel(B), CNo.(B) and TCe(B) show 
the values of target variables (Tel, CNo and TCe) generated by the 
behavioural model which are higher than their values generated by 
the MLP model (Ie(M), (No(M), and TCe(M)). 
5.3.1.3 A Multi-level Policy System Analysis  
In Appendix B, some analytical characteristics of multi-level 
decision making are stated. The AEPSOM results can be used to 
highlight some numerical characteristics of the multi-level policy 
system, the characteristics which exist analytically in model 
(B.1) in Appendix B. The AEPSOM results demonstrate the following 
numerical characteristics of the policy system in the Australian 
energy. sector. 
(a) Goal Interdependence: 
The first characteristic is goal inter-dependence: an indi-
rect goal inter-dependence exists in the energy sector (i.e., 
objectives of the policy makers are dependent on the •objective of 
economic agents as well as on the energy system (which are repre-
sented by the behaxiioural objective function and the energy sector 
constraints)). The optimum value of the policy objective function 
is the value of the (multi) goals that the policy makers sought to 
achieve by making a rational decision. The optimum value of 
economic agents' goals is reflected in the value of the behaviour-
al objective function (Table 5.3). It is evident from Tables 5.3 
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Figure 5.1 
Values of the Target Variables 
lel (B) lel (M) 
	
CNo(B) CNo(M) 
	
TCe(B) TCe(M) 
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and 5.4 that the achievement of goals at each level of decision 
making is interdependent (indirect goal inter-dependence): the 
optimum values of the policy and behavioural objective functions 
are interdependent. It was also found that the two level decision 
makers have conflicting interests (Table 5.4), and the optimum 
solution to the system results is a compromise situation providing 
the attainment of optimum goals for the decision makers at each 
level (saddle point, optimum solutfon in Table 5.4 (model No. 5) 
at Q = 0.771). 
(b)  Intervention:  
In the above mentioned policy system context, the adaptation 
of policies (+T intervention) by the policy makers results in 
improved performance of the policy system (lower level of social 
energy goals). This is evident from Table 5.1 since the optimum 
solution to AEPSOM (Model No. 5) is in the case where +T * 0 1 . 
In other. studies, Candler and Norton ([1977], p. 27) and 
Ballenger [1984]) also found that the behavioural optimum is 
1. In the terminology of game theory (for a discussion of game 
theory, see Intriligator [1971], Fortuny-Amat [1979]), AEPSOM 
results show that the policy system in the Australian energy 
sector is characterized by a two-person, nonzero-sum, cooperative 
game situation. In this situation the policy makers and economic 
agents (two persons) are engaged in their own decision making, but 
the outcome of one's decision (the value of the policy objective 
function or behavioural objective function) does not depend only 
on his decision or strategy but also on the other person's deci-
sion (i.e, the optimum value of the policy objective function is 
dependent on the optimum value of the behavioural objective func-
tion and vice versa, Table 5.3 and 5.4). Both type of decision 
makers mutually gain from their decisions of the game (nonzero-sum 
game) in the sense that the optimum solution to the game results 
in a lower value of the policy objective function (Table 5.1). 
' There is also the possibility of mutual cooperation. The optimum 
policy outcome is attained at the saddle point in the policy-
behavioural feasible region (g(G, +T, X, Y, Z) = 0) in the cases 
of models (5.1) and (5.2). 
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inefficient compared with the multi-level programming optimum in 
the sense that "the behavioural optimum lies . . . further inside 
the policy-behavioural frontier" in a policy maximization case. 
This brings in the issue of the desirability of the govern-
ment intervention in achieving the objectives of the society. 
AEPSOM results indicate the possibility for attaining a lower  
level of policy goals by the government policy intervention in  
the energy sector.  
5.3.2 Appropriatenes.s of the AEPSOM Results  
It was argued in Chapter Two (Section 2.4.3) that the single 
level (both positive/behavioural and normative/central control 
policy) models- misrepresent the underlying multi-level decision 
making process. Therefore, their numerical results may generate 
wrong prediction or optimum policies. AEPSOM results can be used 
to evaluate these arguments regarding the appropriateness of 
single level mathematical programming models. 
For that purpose, these two types of models are specified 
from AEPSOM as follows: 
(a) Single-Level Positive/Behavioural Model 
'Min C = (c 1 +71 )Y + (c 2 + T 2 )X + (c 3 + T3 )2 
(Y,X,2) 	• (a) Behavioural objective function 
s.t. 
Z > D 	(b) Demand constraint 
Z = aX (c) Intermediate energy balance 
constraints 
X = bY 	(d) Energy supply balance 
constraints 
Y < Y 	(e) Resource constraints 
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X < X 	(f) Capacity constraints 
G,Y,X,Z > 0 	(g) Non-negativity constraints 
(b) Single-Level Normative/Central Control Model 
Min WL wG 	(a) Policy objective function 
(Z,Y,X) (P.O.F.(1)) 
s.t. 
(b) Demand constraint 
(c) Intermediate energy balance 
constraints 
X bY 
Y < Y 
X < X 
G,Y,X,Z > 0 
(d) Energy supply balance 
constraints 
• (e) Resource constraints 
(f) Capacity constraints 
(g) Non-negativity constraints 
Definitions of the symbols are the same as in model (5.1). 
In Table F.1 (Appendix F), Model No. 7 and Model No. 9 are the 
single level energy sector positive and normative models. Model 
No.7 has determined a lower level of policy goals compared to an 
MLO model, Model No.5. On the other hand, Model No. 9'has deter-
mined a lower optimum policy goal level, but that can only be 
attained by central controls of the energy sector (not by indi-
rect controls as in the market economy). Therefore, both the 
single level mathematical models (Model Nos 7 and 9) produce 
erroneous results for the energy sector (the optimum value of the 
policy objective function as well as the optimum values of other 
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model results: prices, taxes and subsidies, shadow prices and 
reduced costs). Consequently, it may be argued that an accurately 
specified and implemented  MLO model (Model No 5) can generate  
appropriate numerical results for optimum energy policy planning 
in a market economy. 
From the evidence of past studies (Candler and Norton (1977]) 
stated in the previous sub-section and also from the present work, 
it can now be concluded that an MLP model can represent the multi-
level decision making system appropriately, and therefore, gener- , 
ates accurate energy model results (forecasts or policies). 
5.3.3 Taxes and Subsidies  
As it was stated before, within the structure of existing +T, 
improvement in policy goals is not possible compared to a situa-
tion of market performance. Therefore, optimum values of +T, in 
the cases of existing +T, are O. 
If the policy system is allowed to choose the optimum mix and 
values of +T, then the model solution finds +T 0 optimum solu-
tion to AEPSOM. These values of optimum mix and optimum values of 
+T are reported in Table 5.5.A. 
A comparison of the optimum mix of +T and the existing .+T 
reveals that the optimum mix of +T suggested by AEPSOM is differ-
ent from existing +T •(see Table 5.5.B.). 
5.3.4 Prices  
The calculated prices of different energy supplies, products 
and end-uses are reported in Tables 5.6.A. and 5.6.B. Although 
all these prices are reported here, not all energy prices are 
under government control in Australia. 
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Table 5.5.A. 
Optimum Mix and Levels of Taxes and Subsidies: 1979-80 
($M/PJ) 
Energy 
Type 
(1) 
Model 	No. 5 Model No. 6 Model No.13 
+T 	on 
energy 
T •es 2 
Z 	(3) 
+T on 
energy 
T es 
(3) 
+T on 
energy 
T es 
(3) 
R1 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000, 0.0000 0.0280 3.8889 R2 0.2313 4.6260 0.2373 4.7460 0.3000 6.0000 1e 1 0.1272 2.4003 0.1305 2.4625 0.0000 0.0000 R3 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0120 1.5385 R4 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1000 0.5189 R5 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 •0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 R6 -0.0871 -67.0177 -0.0894 -68.7562 0.0000 0.0000 R7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 E1 1.0779 7.7100 1.1058 •7.9100 0.0000 0.0000 E3 -1.7209 -7.7100 -1.7655 -7.9100 0.0000 0.0000 
E 4 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
xl -0.0794 -7.7100 -0.0815 -7.9100 0.0000 0.0000 
x2 0.1773 12.7576 0.1819 13.0885 0.0000 0.0000 E2 -1.4410 -7.7100 -1.4784 -7.9100 0.0000 0.0000 x3 0.1033 7.7100 0.1060 7.9100 0.0000 0.0000 
x4 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
x5 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
x6 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
x7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 . 0.0000. 0.0000 
d1 0.2120 7.7100 • 0.2175 7.9100 -0.2750 -10.0000 d2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 d3 0.0948 7.7100 0.0973 • 7.9100 -0.1230 -10.0000 d4 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 d5 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0250 -10.0000 
d6 0.0000 0.0000 • 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 d7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
d8 18.27270 7.6918 18.7467 7.8914 0.0000 0.0000 d9 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 d10 0.1002 7.5932 0.1028 7.7902 -0.1320 -10.0000 d11 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.3390 -34.5918 d12 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 d13 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 d14 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 d15 -0.5612 -7.4910 -0.5142 -7.6854 -0.9450 -14.1256 Ee 1 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Ee2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 • 0.0000 Ee3 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
(1) Definitions of these energy types (both for 1979-80 and 1989-90) are  
given in Table 5.5.A. (Appendix) below.  
(2) +T is a column of taxes and subsidies suggested by AEPSOM. The second 
entry in the column is tax on the second t ype of energy (oil). That i 
how T column relates to different energy forms. 
(3) (i) Taxes and subsidies as percentages of costs: (T • C) X 100. 
(ii) Taxes subsidies, and costs are measured in million Australian 
dollars per petajoules (SM/PJ). 
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Table 5.5.B . 
Existing and Optimum Set of +T 1979-80 
Model No.5 
           
  
Energy 
Type 
  
Set of 
Existing 
+T' 
  
Optimum 
Mix of . 
+T 
  
           
  
R1 R2 1e 1 R3 R4 R5 R6 
R7 E1 E3 
  
• 
     
  
E4 
xi 
x2 
E 2 
x3 
x4 
x5 x6 
X7 
     
0 
  
  
d1 d2 
d3 
d4 
d5 
d6 
d 7 
d8 
d9 
d10 
dll 
d12 d13 
d14 d15 Ee 1 Ee 2 Ee 3 
  
0 
0 
0 
0 
  
0 
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Table 5.5.A. (Appendix) 
List of the Activities of the Behavioural Model: 
Energy Supplies, Production and End-uses 
AEPSOM: 1979-1980 Activities-
/Energy Type 
AEPSOM: 1989-1990 Activities of 
/Energy Type 
A. Primary Energy Resources 
R1  = coal R2 = crude oil 
le l= imported crude oil 
R3 = natural gas 
R4 = hydro electricity 
R5 = biomass 
R6 = solar 
R7 = uranium 
B. Intermediate Energy 
El = electricity from coal 
E3 = electricity from natural 
gas 
E4 = hydro-electricity 
xl = coal 
x2 = petroleum products 
E2 = electricity from petroleum 
products 
x3 -natural gas 
x4 = total electricity 
production 
x5 = biomass 
x6 = solar 
x7 = uranium 
C. Energy End-uses 
i. Manufacturing Industry Sector: 
d1 = coal 
d2 = petroleum products 
d3 = natural gas 	. 
d4 = electricity 
d5 = biomass 
ii. Agricultural Sector: 
d6 = petroleum products 
d7 7 electricity 
A. Primary Energy Resources 
Ri = coal 
R2 = crude oil 
lel= imported crude oil 
R3 = natural gas 
R4 - hydro electricity 
R5 - biomass 
R6 = solar 
R7 = uranium 
B. Intermediate Energy 
RR1= synthetic oil from coal 
El = electricity from coal 
E3 = electricity from natural gas 
E4 = hydro-electricity 
xl = coal 
x2 = petroleum products 
E2 = electricity from 
petroleum products 
x3 = natural gas 
x4 - total electricity production 
x5 = biomass 
x6 = methanol 
x7 = solar 
x8 = uranium 
C. Energy End-uses 
i. Manufacturing Industry 
d1 = coal 
d2 = petroleum products 
d3 = natural gas . 
d4 = electricity 
d5 - biomass 
ii. Agricultural Sector: 
d6 = petroleum products 
d7 = electricity 
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Table 5.5.A. (Appendix) (Continued) 
List of the Behavioural Model Activities/Energy Types 
AEPSOM: 1979-1980 Activities of 
the Behavioural Model/Energy Type 
AEPSOM: 1989-1990 Activities of 
the Behavioural Model/Energy Type 
iii. Transport Sector 
d8 = petroleum products 
t19 	electricity 
iv. Domestic and Other Sectors 
- d10 .- coal 
dn. - petroleum products 
d12 - natural gas 
d13 = electricity d14 - biomass d15 = solar 
v. Exports 
Ee l - coal 
Ee2 = petroleum products 
Ee 3 uranium  
iii. Transport Sector 
d8 = coal 
.= petroleum products 
d10 
• 
natural gas 
electricity dll 
d12 
iv. Domestic and Other Sectors 
d13 -coal 
d14 - petroleum products d15 ■ natural gas 
d16 .. electricity 
d17 ... biomass 
d18 - solar 
v. Exports 
Ee l - coal 
Ee2 - petroleum products 
Ee 3 - natural gas 
Ee 4 = uranium 
- methanol 
Energy Type 	+T 	C 	P (MVPJ)* 
R1 0.0000 0.72 0.7200 R2 0.2313 5.00 5.2313 Ie1 0.1272 5.30 5.4272 R3 0.0000 0.78 0.7800 R4 0.0000 19.27 19.2700 R5 0.0000 1.18 1.1800 R6 -0.0871 0.13 0.0429 
R7 0.0000 0.13 0.1300 El 1.0779 13.98 15.0579 
E3 -1.7209 22.32 20.5991 
E4 0.0000 0.00 0.0000 
xi -0.0794 1.03 0.9506 
x2 0.1773 1.39 1.5673 
E2 -1.4410 18.69 17.2490 x3 0.1033 1.34 1.4433 
x4 0.0000 6.00 6.0000 
x5 0.0000 0.00 0.0000 
x6 0.0000 0.00 0.0000 
x7 0.0000 0.00 0.0000 
di 0.2120 2.75 2.9620 
d2 0.0000 1.42 1.4200 
d3 0.0948 1.23 1.3248 
d4 0.0000 2.30 2.3000 
d5 0.0000 0.25 0.2500  
d6 0.0000 2.00 2.0000 
d7 0.0000 0.20 0.2000 
d6 18.2727 237.56 255.8327 
d9 0.0000 228.40 228.4060 
d10 0.1002 1.32 1.4202 
dll 0.0000 0.98 0.9800 
d12 0.0000 3.39 3.3900 d13 0.0000 6.17 6.1700 
d14 0.0000 0.00 0.0000 d15 -0.5012 6.69 6.1889 
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Table 5.6.A 
Optimum Energy Pricers in 1979-80 
Model No. 5  
*P =c+ T 
C 	= Cost coefficient vector (cost of different forms 
of energy) 
+T - Tax or subsidy vector (taxes or subsidies on different 
forms of energy) 
P 	Price vector (prices of different forms of energy) 
Taxes, subsidies, costs and prices are measured in million 
Australian dollars per petajoules. 
Energy Type 
R1 R2 
Iei 
R3 
R4 
R5 
R6 
R7 
El E3 E4 
xl 
x2 
x4 
x5 
x6 
x7 
d1 d2 
d3 
d4 
d5 
d6 
d7 
d8 
d8 
dlo 
du 
d12 
d13 
d14 d15 
P (11$/PJ)* 
	
0.0000 	0.72 	0.7200 
0.2373 	5.00 5.2373 
0.1305 	5.30 	5.4305 
0.0000 	0.78 0.7800 
0.0000 	19.27 	19.2700 
0.0000 	1.18 1.1800 
-0.0894 	0.13 	0.0406 
0.0000 	0.13 0.1300 
1.1058 	13.98 	15.0858 
-1.7655 	22.32 20.5545 
0.0000 	0.00 	0.0000 
-0.0815 	1.03 0.9485 
0.1819 	1.39 	1.5719 
-1.4784 	18.69 17.2116 
0.1060 	1.34 	1.4460 
0.0000 	6.00 6.0000 
0.0000 	0.00 	0.0000 
0.0000 	0.00 0.0000 
0.0000 	0.00 	0.0000 
0.2175 	2.75 2.9675 
0.0000 	1.42 	1.4200 
0.0973 	1.23 1.3273 
0.0000 	2.30 	2.3000 
0.0000 	0.25 0.2500 
0.0000 	2.00 	2.0000 
0.0000 	0.20 0.2000 
18.7467 	237.56 	256.3067 
0.0000 	228.40 228.4000 
0.1028 	' 1.32 	1.4228 
0.0000 	0.98 0.9800 
0.0000 	3.39 	3.3900 
0.0000 	6.17 6.1700 
0.0000 	0.00 	0.0000 
-0.5142 	6.69 6.1759 
+T 
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Table 5.6.B 
Optimum Energy Prices in 1979-80 
Model No. 6 
*P=c+ T 
= Cost coefficient vector 
+T = Tax or subsidy vector 
P = Price vector 
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5.3.5 Shadow Prices  
It was mentioned before that in this study shadow prices will 
not be used for pricing policy purposes, but to determine the 
priorities in conservation programmes, research and development, 
and education and information policy. Shadow prices have been 
reported here for these uses. The proportions (%) of the shadow 
prices related to different types of constraints have also been 
reported here since these proportions indicate the relative prior-
ities for various policy measures. Two types of shadow price 
proportions are calculated: (1) shadow price proportions of dif-
ferent sectoral end-use constraints and (2) shadow price propor-
tions • f all types of constraints in the model: energy end- uses, 
intermediate balance, supply balance, resource constraints 
and capacity constraints. 
These two types of shadow prices and their proportions are 
reported in Tables 5.7.A and 5.7.B for Model No.5. Proportions 
of sectoral end-use constraints reflect the priorities for conser-
vation programmes, while the proportions of shadow prices related 
to all the constraints reflect priorities for government expendi-
ture for research and development, and education and information 
policies. 
5.3.6 Optimum Activities  
One important result. of AEPSOM is a set of optimum values of 
the activities in the Australian energy sector.. This set of 
optimum activities (numerical values of the flows of primary 
energy, secondary energy and end-uses of energy as well as various 
technologies) constitutes the optimum energy system for Australia. 
Constraints! Symbols* 
Shadow Prices 
BM/PJ Proportions(Z) 
1. Demand Constraints (a) 521.4165 0.6947 
(5.1.f) 
2. Intermediate Balance (6) 177.1009 0.2359 
(5.1.g) 
3. Supply Balance 	(p) . 31.9612 0.0426 
(5.1.h) 
4. Resources Constraints 	( r) 6.5168 0.0087 
(5.1.i) 
5. Capacity Constraints 	(13) 3.6875 0.0049 
(5.1.j) 
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Table 5.7.A 
Proportion of Shadow Prices, 1979 - 1980 
Model No. 5  
* These constraints were specified in Model 5.1 or 5.2 
Table 5.7.B 
Shadow Prices Related to Different Demand Constraints (r) 
Model No. 5  
Demand 
Constraints 	(5.1.f) 
Shadow Prices 
$14/PJ Proportions 
Manufacturing Industry 5.1628 0.0098 
Agriculture/Primary Industry 9.2059 0.0177 
Transport 236.0849 0.5046 
Domestic and Commercial 4.0107 0.0077 
Electricity Manufacturing 80.3937 0.1542 
Electricity Primary Industry 74.2146 0.1423 
Electricity Domestic Sector 85.3799 0.1637 
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In Table 5.8.A. the optimum set of activities suggested by 
three model solutions along with the 1979-80 actual energy produc-
tion and uses is shown. In Table 5.8.B. a similar set of figures 
for 1989-90 is shown. When the demand and supply of energy are 
constrained to their actual values in 1979-80 (as in Model 5 and 
6) the optimum set of activities is somehow close to their actual 
values. However, when the constraints were relaxed by 20Z., the 
structure of the optimum set of activities changes due to greater 
flexibility and substitutability among different fuels. In both 
cases, model results indicate different structures and values of 
energy activities than the 1979-80 actual figures. 
In the 1989-90 energy system, the model solution suggests a 
set of optimum activities which is different from the 1989-90 
actual figures and government projections. The differences be-
tween the 1989-90 actual energy activities and the model results 
•(produced by an MLP model specified to determine an optimum energy 
policy system for Australia) clearly indicate a different profile 
for the energy sector growth. Some new developments in the 1989- 
90 AES are the uses of town gas in the domestic sector, and natu-
ral gas and coal in the mining sector (Jones et. al., [1991]). 
' Therefore, both the 1979-80 and 1989-90 model results suggest 
optimum energy *system for Australia different from those that 
have been considered to be ideal and possible by the government 
and the private sector. 
5.3.7 Reduced Costs  
The reduced costs of the 1979-80 and 1989-90 AEPSOM are 
reported in Table 5.9.A and 5.9.8. Although different model solu- 
,71 
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Table 5.8.A 
Optimum Activities, 1979 - 1980 
(PJ)* 
Energy 
1979 - 80 
Actual . ** 
Model 	Results 
Type Model No.5 Model No.6 Model No.13 
R1 2448.81 2448.8101 2448.8101 2938.5703 R2 874.87 874.8701 874.8701 0.0000 
1e3 435.34 453.3918 453.3918 1709.4453 
R3 364.18 364.1799 364.1799 437.0100 
R4 50.23 86.6099 86.6099 103.9300 
R5 138.14 138.1399 138.1399 165.7600 
R6 0.50 •0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
R7 586.04 586.0400 586.0400 703.2400 
E1 845.57 351.6301 351.6301 864.0101 E3 87.91 364.1799 •364.1799 0.0000 E4 50.23 86.6103 86.6103 103.9304 
xl 493.95 2097.1797 2097.1797 2074.5601 
x2 1188.82 1063.2300 1063.2300 1275.9099 
E2 50.23 265.0317 265.0317 433.5352 x3 251.16 0.0000 0.0000 437.0100 
x4 293.02 288.8400 • 288.8400 346.6000 
x5 138.14 138.1399 138.1399 165.7600 
•x6 x7 
0.50 
586.04 
0.0000 
586.0400 
0.0000 
586.0400 
0.0000 
703.2400 
d1 83.72 590.2200 590.2200 271.2700 d2 192.56 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
d3 175.81 0.0000 0.0000 437.0100 
d4 108.84 108.8400 108.8400 130.6000 
d5 71.16 138.1399 138.1399 165.7600 
d6 96.28 117.2000 • 117.2000 140.6800 
d7 25.12 25.1200 25.1200 30.1000 
d8 807.90 812.0798 812.0798 974.4897 
d 9 4.19 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
d10 4.19 234.4200 234.4200 281.2600 d11 87.91 0.0000 • 0.0000 0.0000 d12 58.60 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
d13 154.88 154.8800 154.8800 185.9000 
• d14 66.98 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
d15 0.50 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Eel 1272.54 1272.5400 1272.5400 1522.0300 
Ee2 133.95 133.9500 133.9500 160.7400 
Ee3 581.85 586.0400 586.0400 703.2400 
* Energy is measured in Petajoules (PJ) in Table 5.8.A and 5.8.B. 
** Source: Department of National Development and Energy [1983). 
Model Solution 
Energy 
Type 
1989-90 
Actual* 
Forecast** 
Existing + T 
Model Solution 
No. 	19 
Optimum + T 
Model Solution 
No. 	23 
Ri 4688.0 • 4198.56 4198.5596 4198.5596 .R2 1182.6 1159.52 0.0000 649.5796 
'el 449.0 326.51 648.8518 •0.0000 R3 797.7 933.48 933.4800 933.4800 
R4 53.2 58.60 86.6100 86.6100 
R5 176.3 - 	171.63 171.6301 171.6301 
R6 3.0 1.00 1.0000 0.0000 
R7 4291.4 4299.02 • 4299.0195 4299.0195 
0.0 0.00 0.0000 0.0000 E1 1291.8 1272.54 769.2666 768.2666 E3 160.0 133.95 0.0000 0.0000 
E 4 53.2 58.60 86.6100 86.6100 
xl 193.0 594.42 3429.2935 3430.2935 
x2 1316.3 1172.08 360.0001 360.0002 
E2 37.0 8.37 288.8523 289.5797 
x3 497.0 523.25 933.4800 933.4800 
x4. 475.0 447.90 330.2300 330.2300 
x5 176.3 171.63 171.6301 129.7701 
x6 0.0 0.00 0.0000 41.8600 
x7 3.0 1.00 1.0000 •0.0000 
x8 1921.4 4299.02 4299.0195 4299.0195 d1 175.3 125.61 909.3228 910.3228 d2 150.9 96.28 0.0000 0.0000 d3 296.8 318.14 698.5671 697.5671 
d4 182.6 171.63 100.0000 100.0000 
d5 101.5 104.65 0.0000 0.0000 
d6 89.6 123.58 255.3500 255.3500 
d7 42.0 41.86 0.0000 0.0000 
d8 3.5 4.19 0.0000 0.0000 
d8 995.3 891.62 0.0000 0.0000 
d10 0.4 0.00 41.8599 0.0000 
dll 6.6 4.19 0.0000 0.0000 
d12 0.0 0.00 0.0000 41.8600 d13 4.0 4.19 0.0000 0.0000 
d14 27.0 66.98 0.0000 0.0000 d15 97.0 125.58 95.4399 138.2999 
d16 233.7 230.23 230.2300 230.2300 d17 77.0 66.98 171.6301 129.7701 
d18 3.0 0.00 1.0000 0.0000 Ee l 2982.5 2519.97 2519.9702 2519.9702 Ee2 159.0 104.65 104.6500 104.6500 Ee 3 109.6 246.97 246.9700 246.9700 Ee 4 1749.8 4299.02 4299.0200 • 4299.0200 
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Table 5.8.B 
Optimum Activities: 1•89-90 
(PJ) 
*Source: Jones et al. [1991] 
**Source: Department of National Development and Energy [1983] 
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Table 5.9.A 
Reduced Costs 1979-80 
($11) 
Energy 
Type 
Model No. 
5 
• (Rc) 
Model No. 	1 Model No. 	1 
6 	• 13 
(Rc) 	(Rc) 
Ri 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
R2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Te l 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
R3 0.0000 •0.0000 0.0000 
R4 	- 0.0000 •0.0000 0.0000 
R5 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
R6 0.1200 0.0406 0.1300 
R7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
El 0.0000 0.0000 2.8553 
E 3 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
E4 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
xi 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
x2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
E2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
x3 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
x4 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
x5 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
x6 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 x7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
x8 3.4991 3.3794 1.1377 a, 
d2 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
d3 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 d4 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
d5 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
d6 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
d7 48.5300 47.3786 70.8436 
d8 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
d9. 4.1752 4.0473 1.9847 d10 3.1813 3.1706 3.2310 
dll 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
d12 0.8661 0.8579 0.9620 d13 2.1635 2.4224 0.3357 
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• Table 5.9.B 
Reduced Costs 1989-90 
($M) 
Energy 	1 Model No. 1 Model No. 
Type 	1 	19 	1 	23 
l(Rc) (Rc) - 
Ri • 0.0000 0.0000 R2 981.8057 0.0000 
1e1 0.0000 0.6192 R3 0.0000 0.0000 R4 0.0000 0.0000 
R5 0.0000 0.0000 R6 0.0000 0.0802 •R7 0.0000 0.0000 RR]. 13.3173 10.9377 
El 0.0000 0.0000 E3 3.1608 3.1876 
E4 0.0000 0.0000 xi 0.0000 0.0000 
x2 0.0000 0.0000 
E2 0.0000 0.0000 
X3 0.0000 0.0000 
x4 0.0000 0.0000 x5 0.0000 0.0000 
x6 11.0793 0.0000 x 7 0.0000 0.0000 
x8 0.0000 0.0000 
d1 o.0000 0.0000 
d2 2.1473 2.7005 d3 0.0000 0.0000 
d4 0.0000 0.0000 d5 0.3742 0.4948 
d6  0.0000 0.0000 d7 82.5036 78.0598 
d8 51.7197 42.2602 •d9 37.6223 29.4883 d10 0.0000 2.9175 d11 109.0059 96.4279 
c1.12 0.0000 0.0000 d13 55.3883 11.0223 d14 0.00000 0.0000 
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tions suggest different magnitudes of reduced costs for these 
activities, the values of reduced costs are fairly similar in the 
cases of Model Nos 5 and 6. This is plausible since Model 5 and 6 
were specified within a given structure of the energy sector. This 
certainly provided a possibility for a different technological 
pattern and thus calculated different reduced costs which indicate 
that different cost savings are required for market penetration of 
those activities. 
5.4 SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS  
test the robustness of the results of AEPSOM, the sensi-
tivities of model solutions to changes in some crucial 'variables, 
parameters and policies were tested. These variables, parameters 
and policies were chosen for sensitivity analysis because of 
either their strategic importance in the energy sector or uncer-
tainty regarding them. 
A complete list of the model solutions reflecting the changes 
in the policies and parameters of the Australian energy sector, 
effects of which have been studied, is given in Table F.1. More or 
less the same changes are assumed in the models in the cases of 
existing taxes and subsidies and optimum mix of taxes and subsi-
dies. These changes and the models in which these changes were 
incorporated are as follows: 
(1) introduction of taxes on imported oil (Model No.12), 
(2) relaxation of constraints (demand and supply) by 20% and 1002 
respectively (Model No's.13, and 14), 
(3) limiting petroleum import (import quota) (Model No.15), 
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(4) introduction of some new technologies in the 1979-80 Austra-
lian energy system (1979-80 AEPSOM) (coal conversion technolo-
gies, methanol production, electric railway etc. (Model 
No.16)), 
(5) administering import parity prices of all domestic crude oil 
(Model No.17), 
(6) a doubling of the 1979-80 supply of energy resources while the 
demand level of 1979-80 remains the same (Model No.18), 
(7) development and solution of AEPSOM for 1989-90 (Model no.19 
and 23), and Appendix G), 1 
(8) and different weights attached to the two components of 
policy objective functions (P.O.F. (2)) (Table 5.10), 
(9) Different weights attached to the three policy target var-
iables in policy objective function P.0.F.(1) (Table 5.11). It 
should be noted here that none of the sensitivity studies has 
generated an optimum solution satisfying policy constraints. 
However, these sensitivity studies are reported here to study 
the effects of these changes on the policy objectives. 
(i) Sensitivity Study (1) and (3): 
The 	issue of energy security has dominated policy discus- 
sions in Australia"for a decade. Consequently, one of the energy 
policy objectives has been the security of energy supply. It was 
stated in Chapter Three that because of the heavy dependence of 
Australia on imported oil, security of energy supply has synony-
mously been used with self sufficiency in oil. In Australia, the 
1. Appendix G contains a description of the specification of and 
the data used in the 1989-90 AEPSOM. 
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objective of the security of energy supply or self-sufficiency of 
oil has been pursued by adopting policies such as diversification 
of energy supplies and energy conservation, specially oil (Depart-
ment of Primary Industries and Energy [1988]). 
However, the diversification of energy sources . and energy 
conservation are only two policy options from a host of other 
policy strategies. These are: direct control of oil imports, 
suitable oil contracts, reserve standby capacity, international 
sharing arrangements among friendly countries, oil storage and 
fiscal and monetary policies designed for overall restructuring of 
the economy (Griffin and Steele, [1980]. Considerable contro-
versies have developed .regarding the relative efficacy and desira-
bility of import controls and import tariffs l . Because of the 
superior allocaeive effects of import tariffs over import con-
trols, tariffs on imported oil have been considered to be an 
effective policy instrument for achieving oil self-sufficiency. 
Therefore, tax on the importation of oil has been introduced 
into the set of policy options to study the effects of this policy 
instrument (Sensitivity Study (1)). It may be mentioned that in 
Australia, tax is not imposed on the importation of oil. So this 
sensitivity study was considered as crucial since it should 
reveal the implications of introducing a tax on the importation of 
petroleum. 
1. A discussion on the alternative instruments of commercial 
policy and their relative effects in the domestic economy is 
covered in Ethier [1988]. A political economic perspective on this 
topic is provided in Ethier [1988] and in Todaro [1981]. In this 
study, only two instruments, import control and import tariff are 
covered since these are the widely used instruments applied to the 
importation of energy in the developed market economics. 
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The alternative policy instrument, direct control of oil 
• 
imports, was also introduced into the Australian optimum policy 
system to compare the effects of this instrument (Sensitivity 
Study 3). 
Effect: In the case of sensitivity study (1), the model 
solution suggests +T * 0 (Model solution 12). Compared to the 
base 	solution, this sensitivity study also shows an improvement 
in the 	optimum level. The policy objective function (2) had a 
lower value compared to the policy objective function (1). Howev-
er, when a limit of the 1979-80 import level was imposed on the 
energy system (Sensitivity study (3)), a feasible solution to 
AEPSOM did not exist: 
(ii) Sensitivity Study (2) and (6): 
As optimum energy system and policy are clearly dependent on 
the relative and absolute scarcity of different energy resources 
(reflected in AEPSOM in the resource constraints), relaxation of 
the constraints of AEPSOM were introduced in various solutions. 
This was aimed at studying the effects of the constraints on both 
optimum •energy system and policy. In one type of sensitivity 
studies, the demand and supply constraints were relaxed by 20% and 
100% of the 1979-80 supplies respectively (Sensitivity Study 2). 
In another study, the demand RHS's were at the 1979-80 level, and 
supplies were increased by 100% of the 1979-80 level (Sensitivity 
Study 6). 
Effects: In 	the case of sensitivity study 	(2), 	the 
optimum + T 0, while + T = 0 in the case of sensitivity 
study (6). This implies that a goal improvement is possible in 
the situations reflected.in sensitivity study (2), but:not in the 
case of sensitivity study (6). It is worth mentioning that out of 
199 
all the model solutions, model solution 13 which is a study of 
sensitivity study (2) generated the lowest value for the policy 
objective function. 
(iii) Sensitivity Study (4): 
DeVeldpments in energy technologies, particularly in new and 
renewable technologies, which will result in reduced energy costs 
and increased energy supplies, make the energy industry competi-
tive, diversify the sources of supplies, while increased technolog-
ical efficiencies are considered to be an effective way to achieve 
the energy policy objectives, i.e., to solve energy problems. In 
view of this, some new technologies (stated before) were intro-
duced in the 1979-80 AEPSOM to study .- how these new technologies 
affect the Australian energy system and policies. 
Effects: The introduction of new technologies in the 1979-80 
energy system has predicted an improved level of social goals. 
The optimum +T *. 0 implies the desirability of government 
intervention in the economy. 
(iv) Sensitivity Study (5): 
Controversies have circulated regarding the introduction of 
import parity pricing of domestic crude oil in Australia, particu-
larly in its scope and time phasing. As efficient resource allo-
cation is considered to be a problem of efficient pricing of 
resources (Griffin and Steele [1980] Chapter 2 and 3), should it 
be either in terms of domestic market mechanism or measured in 
international prices (a controversy to be discussed shortly), the 
effects of import parity pricing of domestic crude oil need to be 
understood. The Australian government had followed a policy of 
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phasing the introduction of import parity pricing by segregating 
off-shore and onshore oil. The study■ of the energy system and 
policy implications of the import parity pricing of all domestic 
oil has been the objective of this sensitivity analysis. 
Effect: The introduction of the import parity pricing of 
crude oil did not provide any improvement in the optimum solution; 
the optimum +T = 0. 
Actually the values of the policy objective functions (1) and 
(2) in this case were higher than the base model solution under 
existing +T. 
(v) Sensitivity Study (7): 
The base Year AEPSOM was specified for 1979-80 (i.e, 1979-80 
data were used). Since AEPSOM is a static model, AEPSOM was also 
specified for 1989-90 (for existing +T, Model No. 19; for optimum 
+T, Model No.23). The algebraic description of the 1989-90 AEPSOM 
and the data used in it are reported in Appendix G. 
The purpose of developing the 1989-90 AEPSOM was to study 
the future directions of the Australian energy sector and poli-
cies, and to compare the implications and prescriptions of the 
1979-80-AEPSOM results with it's results. This would, of course, 
provide some time dimensions in the analysis and formulations of 
optimum energy policies and can be regarded as safeguard against 
myopic suggestions of a static model. 
Effects: The 1989-90 specification of AEPSOM shows also an 
improvement in the optimum solution through government interven-
tion: +T (i.e. optimum +T * 0). 
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(vi) Sensitivity Study (8)  
Different weights were given to the two components of policy 
objective function (2). 
It was stated in Chapter Three that one of the alternatives 
for attaching weights to different components of a multi-criteria 
objective function is to make the sum of the weights equal to 1 
and to vary the weights within this restriction. In this study 
this approach was used. In the initial specification as well as 
in the results reported so far in Table 5.1 for policy objective 
function (2), the weights of the two components of the policy 
objective 'function were 1 and 1 (see note (ii) in Table 5.1). 
However, in sensitivity study (8) the weights were changed keeping 
the sum of weights equal to 1 and results were calculated for the 
policy objective function (2) (Table 5.10); solution Nos 2 to 6). 
Effects: The results of these models including different 
weights 	showed that these alternative weights did not change the 
optimum solution to AEPSOM. 
Table 5.10 
Different Weights to the Two Parts of P.O.F.(2). 
Model No. 5  
Solution Weights Optimum Solution 
NO. Part 1 Part 2 0 Level P.O.F.(2) 
1 1.00 1.00 0.115 1671.58 
2 0.20 0.80 0.115 4473.01 
3 0.30 0.70 0.115 3260.61 
4 0.40 0.60 0.115 2048.20 
5 0.60 0.40 0.115 -376.62 
6 0.70 0.30 0.115 -1589.03 
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(vii) Sensitivity Study (9): 
In this study different weights were attached to the three 
policy target variables in policy objective function (1). Initial 
weights were 1,1, and 1 for three variables of the policy objec-
tive function: import of energy (Iel), consumption of oil (CNo) 
and total consumption of energy (TCe). Two other sets of weights 
were also specified (2,1, and 1 ; 3,2, and 1) for determining the 
sensitivity of the model solution to the weights of the policy 
objective function. The results are reported in table 5.11. It is 
evident from the table that for all these types of weights, opti-
mum solution was found at the same level of the parametric varia-
tion. In other words, different weights did not change the optimum 
solution to AEPSOM (optimum values of taxes, subsidies, prices, 
activities, etc). However, the optimum value of the policy objec-
tive function has changed in different cases because of different 
weights given to different variables. This leads us to conclude 
that the optimum solution to AEPSOM is not sensitive to 
Table 5.11 
Sensitivity of the Optimum Solution to Different 
Weights in the Policy Objective Function 
Model No. 5  
Solution 1 Weights - (P.O.F.(1)) I 	Optimum Solution 	I 
II 1 
NO. 	1 	Iel I CNo I TCe I  Level of 1 	Values of 1 1 I 	I 	IGo 	1P.0.F.(1) (PJ)1 
1 	I 	1 	1 	1 	I 	0.077 	1 	6733.70 2 I 	2 1 1 	I 	0.077 	1 	7187.09 3 	I 	3 	2 	1 0.077 	1 	8968.74 
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different weights specified in AEPSOM and therefore the initially 
specified weight set can be considered acceptable. 
5.5 RELIABILITY OF THE RESULTS: MODEL VALIDATION 
this section, the reliability of the results of the 
AEPSOM, and thus the reliability of the policies will be tested. 
For this purpose, the usual model validation criteria will be 
adopted. 
It was stated in Chapter Two that model validation is one of 
the important steps of an optimization study. It refers to the 
correspondence of the model to the underlying processes/systems 
that are being modelled (Labys [1982]) or to the reliability of 
the model. 
Hazell and Norton ([1986], p.269) have described model vali-
dation and its purposes as : 
" Validation of model is a process that leads to (1) a 
numerical report of the models fidelity to the histori-
cal data, (2) improvements of the model as a conse-
quence of imperfect validation, (3) a qualitative 
judgment on how reliable the model is for its stated 
purposes, and (4) a conclusion (preferably explicit) 
for the kinds of uses it should not be used for." 
Several criteria are used to test the validation of a model 
(Labys [1982], Taha [1976] Hazell and Norton [1986]). In Chapter 
Two it was stated that there are three levels of validation tests: 
descriptive, analytical and experimental and there are three types 
of validation criteria which are applied to these three levels of 
validation tests (Kresge [1980]). The first type of criteria 
includes: (A.1) the attainment of the objectives of the model 
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(A.2) the appropriateness of the model structure (relates the - 
first model evaluation criteria discussed in Chapter Two); (A.3) 
the plausibility of results ( corresponds to criterion 3 in Chap-
ter Two). The second type of criteria applied to the analytical 
level includes (8.1) the characteristics of the model solution, 
(B.2) the robustness of the results. 	The third type of criteria 
is related to the usability of the model and includes the follow-
ing: (C.1) methodological tests related to: (C.1.a) model documen-
tation, (C.1.b) cost and efficiency in model transfer and exten- 
sion, 	and (C.2) tests related to model execution such as 
(C.2.a) accuracy and efficiency of the execution, (C.2.b) cost of 
and efficiency in the software transfer and extension. 
The above list contains almost a complete set of model vali-
dation criteria which can be used in modelling studies. It may, 
however, be mentioned that hardly ever all these criteria are used 
in a modelling study. Hazell and Norton ([1986], p.269) have 
stated the range of applications of these tests in the following 
form: 
"Validation begins with a series of comparisons of 
model results with the reported actual values of the 
variables. Most often, simple comparisons are made  
However, more complete tests are possible and have been 
done ". 
It should, however be noted that the validation tests, spe-
cially the statistical tests, of macro-econometric systems models 
(for examples of such models see Powell [1980]) and mathematical 
programming systems models are not exactly same (Labys [1982]). 
In this study, a set of tests will be done, though not the 
complete set of tests. 
A discussion on the applications of these model validation 
criteria to AEPSOM is provided below. 
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(A.1) Attainment of the Objectives of the Model: Greenberger and 
Richels ([1979], p.486) state: 
"The validity of a model is most meaningfully examined 
in the context of purpose for which the model was 
constructed or to be used." 
A judgment about the uses (of the results) of the model 
obtain enough information) to attain the stated modelling objec-
tives is, therefore, necessary. AEPSOM has provided the informa-
tion (Chapters Five and Six), necessary for studying the charac-
teristics of the underlying policy and energy systems, and the 
formulation of a comprehensive multi-level energy plan. 
(A.2) Appropriateness of Model Structure: Priori Justification 
About the Model Structure: By this criterion, a judgment is made 
on how good the model is in representing the underlying system to 
solve a problem or to meet the purposes for which the model is 
developed. In Chapter Two, it was argued that an MLP energy 
planning model is appropriate for multi-level energy planning . 
AEPSOM is formulated within the desired framework. Therefore, the 
results of the AEPSOM could be considered appropriate on a priori 
grounds. 
(A.3) Plausibility of Results: The accuracy of the results of a 
model need to be checked. In this. process, the relevance of the 
optimal solution provided by the model to the expected results or 
the reported actual values or the historical data set is verified. 
Several methods can be used for this purpose; (a) intuitive judg-
ment, (b) comparison of results (i) with some past data or (ii) 
the ability to predict the future performance of the system or 
(iii) with similar studies; (c) statistical tests such as the mean 
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absolute percentage error or the mean squared error (Labys [1982], 
p.165); and (d) self auditing, third party auditing etc. 
The statistical methods of auditing were not applied in this 
study. The tests A.3.b i and A.3.b.iii were not considered suit-
able for this study since these tests are not appropriate for 
normative models (like AEPSOM) of 'new' or significantly altered 
systems and major structural changes (Greenberger and Richels 
[1979], p. 486). A third party auditing could not be undertaken 
since only the author (first party) was involved in this study : 
The statistical tests (A.3.c) were not conducted as the differ-
ences between the actual and optimum values were not judged to be 
useful for validating AEPSOM for the reasons stated above. Howev-
er, Criteria A.3.a and A.3.b were applied. 
(a) Intuitive Judgment: The results of AEPSOM reported in this 
chapter seem to be in the expected directions. What AEPSOM has 
suggested is an ideal/optimum system/result. Policies are formu-
lated to move the existing system as close as possible to the 
ideal system. From that point of view, AEPSOM results reflect the 
optimum situation in the energy sector which can only be attained 
by full implementation of the policies suggested by the model and 
to the extent that the real life energy sector characteristics are 
close to the ones assumed in AEPSOM and they remain unchanged as 
they were assumed in AEPSOM. 
A note on the results of optimum activities is specially 
needed here which will put the AEPSOM results in proper perspec-
tive for energy planning studies:  AEPSOM has selected some tech-
nologies from the available alternatives on the basis of the rela  
tive costs and prices of different technologies within the frame- 
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work as determined by (a) the technical characteristics and con-
straints of the energy sector, and (b) the underlying policy 
system in the energy sector as reflected in the energy policy 
objectives and instruments. The forms of these elements of energy 
sector technical and policy systems have influenced the AEPSOM 
solution. 
The reasons for which some end-uses appeared to be zero are 
(a) the aggregated character of the model (see Appendix C), and 
(b) the non-inclusion of the non-zero lower bounds (Z > Z) on most 
of the end-uses of fuels in various sectors. It was discussed in 
Chapter Three that in linear programming energy sector models, 
some user defined constraints of the above form are specified to 
impose lower limits below which end-uses are restricted not to 
drop in the optimum solution. These limits reflect the underlying 
technical non-substitutability among different fuels at the end-
use level (Julius, [1981]; Hall, [1983]) (some fuels in 	some 
sectors cannot be completely substituted by alternative fuels). 
This was done in MARKAL. The present author was informed by a 
MARKAL author (Musgrove,[1987]) that many user defined con-
straints, specifically fuel margins were specified in MARKAL to 
reduce this type of zero corner solutions to the end-uses. 
In AEPSQM, constraints on the electricity uses in the differ-
ent sectors to meet certain minimum electricity demands were 
specified (Chapter Three, Section 3.4.2). But inter-fuel substi-
tution up to a high degree among other fuels (perfect substituta-
bility in the neo-classical form) was allowed to meet the total 
energy demand in each sector. This, might have produced a zero-
corner type of optimum solution results for end-uses. This type 
of zero-corner solutions could be reduced by imposing more lower 
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bounds on the end-uses of fuels in various sectors. 	Greater 
possibility of inter-fuel substitution was allowed in AEPSOM to 
determine the eventual optimum end-use pattern indicating the 
directions of increases or decreases in the uses of energy re-
sources compared to their present pattern in the economy, should 
sufficient time and perfect technical substitutability be allowed 
and exist. Again, this was for evolving an ideal (optimum) tech- ' 
nological pattern, probably at the cost of some realism. Justi-
fication for this effort was discussed in Chapter Three, Section 
3.4.2. It was also stated there that an energy model output should 
specially be discussed keeping the user-defined constraints in 
mind. 
Since a compromise between the immediate/existing technical 
non-substitutability and the long run potential of inter-fuel 
substitutability was made in AEPSOM, the AEPSOM optimum end-use 
pattern should be viewed as the long term desired broad directions  
in the allocation of resources and technological developments in 
the energy sector. 
Therefore, a normative view of the reported model results 
will be taken to formulate energy technology policies, as the 
optimum values and other AEPSOM results were generated for norma- 
tive uses rather than positive/forecasting purposes. * 
(b) Comparison of Results: The criterion 3.b.iii is stated by 
Kresge ([1980],p. 185) as : 
"... the plausibility of the results will be judged 
through comparison with the results produced by other 
related pieces of analysis". 
The 'problem in applying this criterion in the present study 
is that no other MLP energy model exists in Australia. 	There- 
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fore, comparison of the results of the present model with the 
results of another similar model is not possible. But it can be 
stated that the results in this study are not unrealistic or non-
operational in the context of the Australian energy sector. Since 
AEPSOM is a systems optimization study, the AEPSOM results indi-
cate optimum systems (energy and energy policy systems). These 
optimum systems have been found to be different, at least partly, 
from the existing systems. This does not imply that model results 
are not plausible. It means that existing systems . are not the 
optimum systems due to the market imperfections which prevent the 
existing system to attain the optimum system specified in the 
model (Norton and Schiefer [1980]). 
However, the following test of the accuracy of results was 
undertaken in the present study. Accuracy of an MLP model can be 
tested by comparing the values of policy objective functions of 
the following three models: 
(A) A Central Control Policy (Model Nos 9 (and 10)) 
(B) A behavioural model of the energy sector (Model 
Nos 7 and 8) 
(C) An MLO model of the energy sector (Model Nos 5 
and 27), 
The closer the results of (B) and (C) are to the result of 
(A), the more accurate the results of (B) and (C) can be consid-
ered to be. 
To demonstrate the efficiency of MLP results in the 	present 
study, the optimum values of the policy objective function of 
AEPSOM (opt. +T) in the above three formulations have been report-
ed in Table 5.12. 
Model Type > A 
No. > (9) (7) (5) 
Value of 
P.O.F(1) 5101.51 7031.68 6733.20 
difference 
between A 
and B in Z 
of A 
37.80 
difference 
between A 
and C in 
of A 
31.90 
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Table 5.12 
Comparison of Different Model Solutions 
The values of the policy objective functions in Table 5.12 
clearly demonstrate a higher value of the policy objective function 
suggested by the behavioural model. Compared with the central 
control (single level) policy model (Solution A) the multi-level 
programming and single level behavioural model solutions (Model C 
and Model B) show a deviation of 31.9% and 37.80% respectively. 
Other MLP models results (for example Model No.13) are even less 
deviated. The P.O.F.(1) value of Model No.13 is 4,680.03 which gives 
a deviation of only 8.2% from Model A(9). Therefore, the multi-
level programming (C) model provides accurate (close to solution 
(A)) results l . 
An existing multi-level programming publication (Candler & 
Townsley (1982], p. 27) shows that a multi-level programming policy 
model provides better results than a single level mathematical 
programming *model. It was found in that study that the value of 
the policy objective function calculated in the above procedure 
is deviated 31% from the expected 'optimum value'. 
The true vlue of the policy objective function in a decentral-
ized market economy with indirect government control provided by 
1. By increasing the number of iteration, it is possible to find a 
solution very close to the global/true optimum solution (See the 
Conclusion Section, Chapter Four). 
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model C will be between the levels of value determined by models (A) 
and (B). As this is the case in the present study and since the 
optimum of the policy objective function of AEPSOM (Model No.5/Model 
C) is deviated by 31.9 Z from the Central Control Policy Model, it 
may be concluded that AEPSOM has produced (approximate) optimum 
results for the Australian energy sector. 
(B.1) Mathematical Properties of the Model Solutions  
In Chapter Four it was stated that the PPS algorithm would 
provide an optimum solution to an MLP, although there would be no 
guarantee that the solution would be a unique global optimum. It 
was also mentioned that any plan (solution) improvements over base 
or original plan can be considered acceptable. As it has been ob-
served that AEPSOM (+T) has generated results/plans which are im-
provement over the single-level model results or existing +T case 
results, we may be content with the AEPSOM results (see Candler and 
Norton [1977] for justifications for such an argument). 
In heuristic search methods like the PPS algorithm, the possi-
bility of finding a global optimum increases if the number of 
searches is increased. Three units of parametric variations used in 
solving AEPSOM extended the search by the algorithm. More units 
could be tried. Since AEPSOM optimum results were foupd satisfacto-
ry, as discussed in the previous section, and further searches would 
have proved to be expensive (in terms of time and resources) without 
any definite possibility of obtaining better results (closer to the 
central control policy model results), no more searches were under-
taken. 
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(B.2). Robustness of the Results  
Results of the sensitivity analysis of AEPSOM (the optimum mix 
of +T case ) were reported in Table F.1. From Table F.1, it is re-
vealed that the model solutions were not very sensitive to small 
changes such as the changes in the form of the introduction of tax 
on imported oil (Model No. 12), import parity pricing (Model No. 18) 
and in the coefficient of the policy objective function (Table 5.10 
and 5.11). 
(C.1).Methodological Tests: 
With regard to the criteria (C.1), the relevant information 
about AEPSOM has been reported in Chapter Three. From the presen-
tation of the AEPSOM set there, it can be argued that AEPSOM can 
easily be transferred and extended. 
(C.2).Model Execution Related Tests: 
The 	criteria (C.2) were discussed in Chapter Four. 	It was 
found that the PPS algorithm satisfied the relevant criteria. 
To summarise, the tests A.3.b i and A.3.b.ii were not consid-
ered suitable for this study 1 since such tests were not appropriate 
for normative.models, like AEPSOM, of 'new' or significantly altered 
systems (Greenberger and Richels [1979], P. 486). Since these tests 
were not suitable for the present study, more emphasis was given to 
other criteria such as A.1, A.2, A.3.a. Justification for an 
emphasis on these tests have been stated as (Greenberger and Richels 
1. Non-availability of historical data and time constraints 
sometimes prohibit undrtaking any validation tests of models (for 
example, Jaforullah [1988])  
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[1979], P. 486 - 487) follows: 
"In general, historical validation is inappropriate 
for models of 'new' or significantly altered sys-
tems, or for proposed major structural changes. A 
more suitable form of validation in these cases is 
face (or content) validation', where the assessors 
subjectively evaluate the degree to which the 
models elements and structure correspond to their 
perceptions about the actual phenomena that the 
model is meant to represent." 
All other criteria: B.1, 8.2, C.1 and C.2 were, however, applied. 
5.6 CONCLUSION 
This Chapter has presented the results of AEPSOM. The major 
reported results include optimum values of the policy and behaviour-
al objective functions, Some elements of the energy policy system 
and energy system, taxes and subsidies, market prices, shadow prices 
and reduced costs. 
These results have established some analytical aspects of the 
multi-level decision making process at the sectoral level . ,in a 
market economy such as the need for the determination of the 
optimum level of policy intervention (+T), the possibility of the 
formulation of an improved plan by the government, and the con-
flicting interest i of the government and private sector economic 
'agents. 
This Chapter has also examined the credibility of the sector 
programming model by applying a standard set of model validation 
criteria. In spite of the difficulties in applying these validation 
tests to an applied model and although no consensus on the exact 
procedures for validating has yet been reached in the profession 
(Hazell and Norton, [1986], p. 266), a wide range of tests were 
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performed to validate AEPSOM. 
CHAPTER SIX 
AN AUSTRALIAN OPTIMUM MULTI-LEVEL ENERGY PLAN 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
Effects of the events in the international energy market have 
been considerable in Australia. Consequently, several energy 
policy problem areas have generated in the Australian economy. 
Some of these energy problem areas are: self-sufficiency in 
energy, appropriate pricing of energy, choice of a set of fiscal 
instruments, equitable distribution of the benefits created in the 
energy sector, conservation of energy, specially fossil fuels, 
finding measures appropriate for dealing with. supply disturbances, 
optimum depletion of fossil fuels, determination of the exact 
boundary of energy policies etc. 
To deal with these energy policy issues, there are several 
options available to the government for each type of issue. This 
necessitates the formulation of an energy plan by the Australian 
government so that the relevant issues and options are considered 
simultaneously and a resolution of these issues and options is 
possible. Formulation and implementation of such an energy plan 
will help solve energy problems of Australia. 
These factors had provided the motivation of this study: the 
formulation of a comprehensive multi-level energy plan l consist- 
1. Solution to AEPSOM has provided values of energy policy instru-
ments as taxes and subsidies, prices, expenditure priorities for 
conservation, research and development, and education and informa-
tion. The results also included values of the "activities and 
CS? 
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ing of (a) an optimum energy system, and (b) a set of energy 
policy instruments. This chapter deals with that essential task 
of the study, although within a framework which has the following 
limitations. 
As the work for the study started in the early 1980s, the 
AEPSOM base year model was specified for the year 1979-80 using 
1979-80 actual energy statistics. AEPSOM has, however, been 
developed for the year 1989- 90 for projection purposes - incorpo-
rating 1989-90 projection data. As the 1989-90 data are available 
now, they have been incorporated in Table 5.8 and their energy 
system and policy implications are discussed below. 
Because of the emphasis of the study on the specification of an 
MLP energy sector model and the application of the model results 
to formulate a set of energy policies for Australia, a comprehen-
sive treatment on the numerous developments in the energy market 
and policy initiatives, during the period of 1980-1990 and beyond 
has not been provided in the thesis. The above limitation of the 
. study could. have been avoided if the thesis was dealing with a 
single or a small number of energy policy issue(s) (not all the 
energy sectoral issues and options) in which case a systematic and 
comprehensive account of the historical and analytical aspects of 
an energy policy issue could have been provided. 
However, thd post-1980 developments and changes in the Aus-
tkalian energy system (Sections 5.2.6. and 6.2.), taxation poli- 
...Continued... 
reduced costs which gave the necessary information to formulate 
energy depletion, exploration and development, and technology 
policies. In this chapter, the policy implications of the AEPSOM 
results will be studied to suggest a multi-level energy plan for 
Australia. Various energy policy problem areas will be discussed 
separately. Issues and options in each problem area will be high-
lighted and how AEPSOM results can resolve those issues will be 
discussed. 
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cies (Section 6.3.1), pricing policies (Section 6.3.2), energy 
conservation strategies (Section 6.3.5), energy technology 
strategies (Section 6.3.8), and the achievement of energy policy 
objectives (Section 6.4) are discussed below and have been relat-
ed to the policy implications and conclusions drawn from the 
results. 
It has been stated at several places in the thesis ( Chapter 
Two, Chapter Three (pp. 66-67), and Appendix B) that the effects 
of relative prices on the allocation of resources and adjustments 
in the energy market can be specified in a mathematical program-
ming model (Musgrove et al. [1983], p. 15). An integrated ap-
proach to the factors influencing the formulation of energy poli-
cies to achieve energy policy objectives will be given in Section 
6.4.3. In addition, Sections 6.3.5, 6.3.6, 6.3.7 discusses the 
influences of relative prices in the implied energy policies. 
However, the effects of relative prices are not as promi-
nent in the structure of a mathematical programming model as it is 
in an econometric model (as in a CGE model with CES or translog 
functions (Chapter Two)). The effects of relative prices are not 
generally specified in a sophisticated and more realistic way in 
mathematical programming models (specially in MLP) due to computa-
tional problems associated with such models. 
In addition to prices, there are many other factors (Musgrove 
et •al. op. cit., p. 15) which influence the energy market and 
policy. Other factors which have influenced the choice of solu-
tions in the study are discussed in Chapter Three (pp. •66-67), 
Chapter Five (pp. 206-208) and Chapter Six (pp; 218-219). The 
roles of relative prices and other non-price factors in the choice 
of technology have been stated by Musgrave et al. (1983, p.15] as 
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follows: 
"The nature of a linear programming solution is such that 
when using minimum cost as the objective function, the 
'cheapest' technology will be implemented until some con-
straint is reached. This may not accurately reflect the 
real world• situation where relative prices will play an 
important role in the choice of competing technologies, but 
other factors may also be important. Consumers, for 
example, may choose a particular device for reasons of 
convenience, safety, or preference for some type of fuel. 
A new process entering the market-place will be unlikely to 
take over the entire available market before it has been 
fully proven. Moreover, lack of knowledge concerning the 
alternatives can be an important factor in limiting the 
market growth of technologies." 
Therefore, in discussing the policy implications of the AEPSOM 
results, some of these factors will be considered along with 
relative prices in desirable proportions required for the develop 
ments of the policy implications. AEPSOM's choice of activities 
is dependent on the following factors, among others: price, 
technology, resource constraints, substitutability of inputs in 
energy production, distribution and end-uses, efficiency, budge-
tary considerations, and government policy objectives, instruments 
and Constraints. 
The structure of this chapter is as follows: The optimum 
Australian energy system specified by the AEPSOM results is re-
ported and discussed in Section 6.2. The policy implications of 
the AEPSOM results are discussed in Section 6.3. An integration of 
the various types "of policies is needed to formulate a comprehen-
sive set of policies for the energy sector. An integrated compre-
hensive set of Australian energy policies is formulated in Section 
6.4 while the conclusions are stated in Section 6.5: 
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6.2 AN OPTIMUM ENERGY SYSTEM PLAN 
Different model solutions provided various numerical optimum 
energy systems for Australia. Numerical values of the flows of 
primary energy, secondary energy and end-uses of energy as well as 
various technologies, which are the components of the optimum 
energy systems, are shown in Table 5.8. The major • characteristics 
of the technological pattern of AES implied by the AEPSOM results 
are discussed below. Intuitive justifications of these results 
were discussed in Chapter Five, Section 5.5. 
On the energy supply side, imported crude oil (le l ) appears 
more attractive than domestic crude oil (R 2 ). Solar energy (R7 ) 
was not found viable in 1979-80 although it appears viable in 
1989-90. 
In the area of energy conversion technologies, natural gas 
(x3 ) for end-uses was not found viable in Model Solution 5 and 6 
although its use for electricity production (E 1 ) was justified. 
Natural gas appears in Model No.13. For 1989-90, natural gas (x 3 ) 
use increased substantially to an amount of PJ 933.48 - which is 
much higher than the actual (PJ 437.0) for 1989-90. 
The follOwineend-uses were not chosen by AEPSOM Solution 5 • 
for 1979-80: petroleum products (d 2 ) and natural gas (d3 ) in the 
manufacturing industry sector, electricity (d 9 ) in the transport 
sector, and petroleum products (d 11 ), natural gas (d12 ), biomass 
and solar energy (d 13 ) in the domestic and commercial sector. 
Results are the same in Model No.6 while in Model No.13 natural 
gas use in the manufacturing industry sector appears viable. 
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For 1989-90, the situation changes substantially. Some of the 
technologies which were not viable in the 1979-80 model solutions 
appear viable in the 1989-90 models, while some other 1979-80 
viable technologies were not found viable in the 1989-90 models. 
For example, solar energy was not viable in 1979-80, however It 
was viable in 1989-90. In 1989-90, relatively, more use of natural 
gas was suggested by the Model unlike for 1979-80 when more coal 
use was evident. Biomass was not in the 1979-80 Model Solution, 
while it appeared in the 1989-90 solution. 
Different combinations of end-uses of energy have been select-
ed by different models depending on the assumptions made about the 
policy interventions, costs, technological and resources condi-
tions and availability, time horizon etc. Table 5.8.A and 5.8.B 
for the years 1979-80 and 1989-90 reveal that the following end-
uses were not selected by any of the five models: 
(i) petroleum products in the manufacturing industry sector, 
(ii) electricity in the transport sector, 
(iii)petroleum products in the 'domestic and other sectors.' 
For the intuitive justifications of these end-use results of 
AEPSOM the following points may be noted (other points were dis-
cussed in Chapter Five): 
(i) Regarding end-uses in the manufacturing sector, as 
progressive reduciaon of the use of oil has been a major objective 
of Australian energy policy, substitution of petroleum products in 
different sectors by alternative fuels is a desirable policy 
outcome. These findings have also been established by the MARKAL 
model (Musgrove et al. [1983] pp. 82-83). A cost saving of 3.49 
M$/PJ through any improvement in technical efficiency can make the 
use of petroleum in the manufacturing sector viable. The major 
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competing fuels in the manufacturing sector will be different 
forms of coal (fludised bed and conventional boilers), natural gas 
(conventional boiler) and wood and bagasse (boiler). 
(ii) Electricity use in the transport sector has not been 
chosen by AEPSOM. One possible justification is that the relative 
technical convenience and economy of alternative fuels such as 
methanol and coal (Musgrove et al. [1983), pp. 82-83) have 
made electricity use in the transport sector a non-viable technol-
ogy. 
This result is consistent with MARKAL (Musgrove et . al. 
[1983], pp. 82 - 83) forecasts for 'electricity use in the trans-
port sector. The following transport sector's electricity uses 
(in peta joules) were predicted by MARKAL: 2.6 in 1980, and 3.5 in 
1990. These figures were quite insignificant compared to the 
total ener0-uses in the transport sector which were (in peta-
joules) 799.1 in 1980 and 894.4 in 1990. If the transport sector 
was disaggregated in different transport modes (such as road, rail 
etc) in AEPSOM then the model would probably have selected some 
use of electricity (for further discussion on the aggregation 
issue in this study, see Section C.3. in Appendix C). 
Technical improvements in the transport sector, specially in 
rail transports, which can reduce cost 48.53 M$/PJ (Table 5.9.A) 
will make the . use'Of electricity in the transport sector viable. 
(iii)MARKAL predicted an oil-use of 55.5 (PJ) in the domestic 
and commercial sector in 1980, while this figure was predicted by 
MARKAL to be reduced to only 8.00 (PJ) in 1990. 
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6.3 OPTIMUM ENERGY POLICIES 1 
Although the implications of all the reported model solu-
tions were considered while formulating the set of policies, the 
results of Model No.5.were mainly adopted and analysed for the 
following policy studies. 
6.3.1 Taxes and Subsidies  
In a market economy like that of Australia the major forms of 
government instruments to control the energy sector are the fiscal 
instruments (taxes and subsidies). Per unit taxes and subsidies 
may be imposed to correct market failures due to external effects 
in production, conversion and end-uses and the presence of monopo-
ly, so that the economic agents observe the desired marginal 
conditions for the efficient allocation of resources. Lump sum 
taxes and subsidies are effective in bringing about a desired 
income distribution (Musgrave [1959], Henderson and Quandt 
[1980]). 
The specific objectives for which taxes and subsidies have 
been applied in the Australian energy sector are : conservation of 
energy, promotion of exploration, optimum depletion of energy, 
inter-fuel substitution and equity in income (Smith (ed.), [1979], 
Groenewegen [].984]5. 
Various forms of taxes which are generally used are ad valorem 
taxes, severance taxes, property taxes, company resource rent tax 
and capital gain tax (Webb and Ricketts [1980]). In Australia, a 
combination of these taxes in various degrees is in existence. 
1.This section demonstrates the policy steering aspect of AEPSOM.. 
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Several forms of subsidies either to the producers or to the 
consumers are also in existence : considering capital cost as a 
current cost for tax purposes, accelerated depreciation allowance, 
depletion allowance, exploration expenditure allowance and ad 
valorem sales subsidy (Webb and Ricketts [1980], Groenewegen 
[1984]). 
The issues that have been discussed to formulate an efficient 
set of fiscal instruments in the Australian energy sector (Smith 
(ed.) [1979], Lloyd (ed.) [1984], Branon (ed.) [1975], Gruen and 
Hillman [1981]) are (A) the determination of the appropriate mix 
and rates of different taxes and subsidies, and (B) the suitabili-
ty of the resource rent tax (defined below). The last issue has 
received serious academic and government considerations (Groenewe-
gen [1984]) for several reasons: the need for the diffusion of 
windfall gains from energy explorations over the whole community, 
existence of several types of taxes and charges imposed by both 
commonwealth and state governments creating fiscal system manage-
ment problems, and probably, over-taxation of mining energy. While 
the first issue is still being discussed, the government intro-
duced resource rent tax, first by introducing it only to the off-
shore oil industry in 1983, then progressively to the whole oil 
industry. 
Implications 'Of the AEPSOM results in the context of these 
issues are discussed below. 
(A) . Regarding the first issue, AEPSOM results can be used to 
adequately address the issue. The optimum mix of taxes and subsi- 
224 
dies' suggested by AEPSOM2 is reported in Table 5.5.A Table 5.5.B 
shows a comparison of the existing taxes and subsidies and the 
• optimum mix of taxes and subsidies. 
The supply side intervention by taxation is usually used as an 
instrument to change market prices so that they reflect the oppor-
tunity costs of various energy forms (for example, by internaliz-
ing external costs), and to bring about an efficient allocation 
of primary energy resources, and optimum intertemporal allocations 
of energy resources (optimum depletion of exhaustible resources) 
and encouragement for exploration activities. As noted before 
AEPSOM results have suggested the following supply side taxes and 
subsidies: taxes on domestic crude oil, imported crude oil, and 
subsidy on solar energy. 
Demand side taxes (excise taxes) and subsidies are justified 
because of the existence of merit-want market failures (Musgrave 
[1959]). This type of market failure is caused by the 'irration-
al' or short sighted preference of consumers. In the energy 
market, merit want appears since it is argued that consumers are 
variational because they waste this scarce resource. Also, in 
the situation that a possibility of a trade embargo exists, 
excise taxes on various forms of energy, which are subject to a 
1. It should be mentioned that the choice of +T in this study has 
been determined bi the criteria of attainment of the energy policy 
objectives and efficient allocation of (minimum cost) energy 
resources. 	Other criteria for determining a "good" tax system 
were not applied. Such criteria include equity in the distribu-
tion of income and tax burden, suitability for achieving economic 
stabilization objectives, easy administrability and understand-
ability, imposition of minimum excess burden (Musgrave and Mus-
grave [1984], p. 225). 
2. The plausibility of the suggested taxes and subsidies in the 
context of energy policy objective will be discussed in Section 
6.4. 
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potential trade embargo can accommodate contingencies of such an 
embargo in the consumers' behaviour. Moreover, excise taxes on 
energy end-uses may cause inter-fuel substitution, and thus may 
help the development of cheap new and renewable energy. 
AEPSOM results have suggested the following excise taxes or 
subsidies :. taxes on coal and electricity in the manufacturing 
industry sector, on electricity in the transport sector, and on 
coal in the domestic and commercial sector; subsidies on none. 
In addition, the model results have implied the following 
taxes or subsidies on energy conversion technologies: taxes on 
coal-burnt electricity, petroleum products and natural gas; 
subsidies 	on. petroleum products 	and natural 	gas-burnt 
electricity', and coal (distribution). 
(B) An important issue in energy economics is the determination 
of an appropriate taxation scheme for taxing economic rent (re-
source rent) generated in the energy sector because of the limited 
supplies of fossil fuels (excluding normal profit). 
There are several alternative measures for taxing economic 
rent in the energy sector, such as company income taxes, competi-
tive bidding and royalties, and progressive resource rent tax. 
1. In 1989-90, a subsidy on electricity production from petrole-
um is suggested by the model. This result is the outcome of the 
existence of many'factors in the energy sector (pp. 205-208). To 
meet the demand for electricity there was a need for more elec-
tricity production from oil compared to 1979-80 production, since 
the uses of coal in the manufacturing and domestic sectors were 
comparatively more attractive than the use of coal in electricity 
production (Table 5.6.A and 5.6.B). The supply of the increased 
electricity in the market would have been possible only through a 
subsidization of petroleum in electricity production. However, 
model results suggest that the amount of subsidy to petroleum in 
electricity production is smaller than the government revenue from 
the possible tax (suggested by the model). on the use of coal in 
the domestic sector, a technological alternative which required 
the subsidization of electricity from oil. 
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Every taxing scheme has its merits and demerits and in many cases 
a combination of some, of them is suggested for taxing economic 
rent (Webb and Ricketts [.1980], Marks [1986]). 
However, resource rent tax (Smith [1979]) has very often been 
advocated because of its neutral effect on supply decisions and• 
its effects on equity. The possible problems of the determination 
of the exact economic rent or surplus, and the adverse effects of 
the resource rent tax on exploration activities, have limited its 
application. 
AEPSOM results have indicated taxes on various energy sup-
plies, without any indication of what type of tax would be appro-
priate in these cases. The issue remains what would be the appro-
priate form of tax in these cases. 
Since the selection of the right type of taxation to extract 
economic rent from producers depends on many economic and non-
economic considerations, a combination of several taxes, probably 
of severance taxes (specific or ad valorem), royalties and 
resource rent tax, that would move the post-tax energy prices to 
the levels demonstrated in Table 5.6.A is suggested. 
6.3.2 Pricing Policy  
Price is used here as the quantity of money to be paid for 
exchanging one unit (PJ) of energy l . 
Determination of energy prices has been a crucial issue in 
1. There are, however, other connotations of price such as an 
accounting unit and a measure of absolute value (Blaug [1985]). 
Price has been interpreted here as relative price, and therefore, 
other issues related to the definition and function of price have 
not been considered in formulating pricing policies. 
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energy policy analysis because of the influence of prices in 
efficient allocation of energy resources, public ownership of many 
energy industries, and the effect of prices on the depletion rate 
of exhaustible energy resources. 
A general rule which is followed in the determination of the 
price of a particular good is that the price will cover (or will 
be based on) cost. But controversies exist regarding the concept 
of cost that should be used for pricing purposes. The two con-
cepts of cost are : opportunity cost (opportunities or alterna-
tives forgone in order to achieve something) and outlays (total 
money expenditure). 
An example for determining energy prices in Australia on the 
basis of opportunity cost is the import parity pricing of domestic 
crude oil (i.e. setting the price of domestic oil equal to its 
next alternative-the price of imported oil). Arguments for deter-
mining the energy price equal to its international price (import 
price or export price) follow from the economic principle that 
efficiency in domestic production will be achieved when marginal 
cost of domestic production equals its international price (Little 
and Mirrleei [1974]). In spite of doubt about the rationale of 
this principle on the ground that the economic structure of a 
foreign country is different from the domestic country (which 
implies different relative price structures in the two countries), 
setting the'price to its international price has been advocated in 
Australia not only for oil, but also for other forms of energy 
including coal, natural gas, and even electricity (Saddler [1981], 
Treasury [1984]). 
Pricing of energy on the basis of outlays has two main princi-
ples: 	average cost pricing and marginal cost pricing. 	In the 
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average cost pricing method, which is primarily an accounting 
method, the price is set equal to the average cost of production. 
The marginal cost pricing method, although the most powerful 
method and increasingly being practiced,, yet the most often criti-
cized one, can be formalised by adopting the following welfare 
maximizing model: 
Max  fr NB . exp(-rt) . dt 0 
	
s.t. 	 (6.1) 
K(t) > q (t) > 0 
I(t) > i (t) > 0 
and 	i(t) = K (t) + sK(t) 
where 
NB = IQ p(q,t) . dq - c(q,k,t) - i(t) .0 
T = time 
p - consumers' willingness to pay for energy 
q = energy output 
c = production cost 
K = capacity level 
r = discount rate 
i = investment rate 
I = rate of capital depreciation 
By applying 'Pontryagin's maximum principle, the following 
optimum price can, be determined (see Munasinghe and Schramm [1983) 
pp 142 - 143 for its derivation): 
P(t) = (dc/6q) - 	m2 
where ml and m2 are the new capacity and resources supply costs. 
It • is argued that marginal cost pricing can yield a welfare 
optimum since under this rule net social surplus will be maxi- 
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mized. Of course, this argument is valid in a perfectly competi-
tive market situation and in •the absence of significant externali-
ties (economies or diseconomies). 
The arguments against marginal cost pricing are also very 
powerful. The arguments are as follows: 
(1) In the case of increasing returns to scale, marginal cost 
pricing will result in loss to the firm or industry. 
(2) The marginal cost has no unique definition (Lewis, 
[1949]) since marginal cost will depend on the level of output. 
Therefore it cannot be used as a basis for pricing. 
(3) Administration of marginal cost pricing rule is compara-
tively difficult (compared to accounting cost method). 
(4) * There may be multiple energy pricing policy objectives 
such 	as equity (interpersonal and interregional), and industrial 
development, in addition to the objective of efficient allocation 
of energy resources. In that case, marginal cost pricing will not 
be appropriate. 
(5) If the marginal cost pricing principle is not met in all 
industries, practicing this rule in an industry may result in 
welfare loss rather than welfare gain (the second best theory l , 
Lipsey and Lancaster [1956-57]). 
Inspite of the above objections, the marginal cost pricing 
principle has giined wide acceptance. However a compromised 
principle is practiced in real life, which may be stated as fol-
lows: 
1. In spite of this objection from the theory of second best this 
study has adopted a partial equilibrium analysis of the energy 
sector for the reasons discussed in Chapter Two. Consequently, 
the principle of marginal cost pricing will be used for formulat-
ing energy pricing policy. 
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(a) set price equal to marginal cost 
(b) make adjustment for equity, industrial development and 
other social - political considerations. 
In Australia, the commonwealth government controls oil price. 
Electricity prices in the states are set by the state governments 
while prices of natural gas, and coal are determined by the pro-
viding industries. Several issues have dominated this area: 
whether the government should control energy prices in Australia 
or not; if government control is permitted what are the prices 
which should be controlled by the government and what principles 
would be followed in determining energy prices. 
Several justifications have been put forward for government 
control of energy prices, particularly of oil prices, such as: 
prices can be used to take advantage of any monopoly position in 
the world energy market, prices should be fixed so that they will 
earn revenue for the government, the users will pay for the infra-
structure development and ensure self-sufficiency in energy, 
specially in oil (Edwards [1983], Marks [1986]). 
While the marginal cost principle is adopted in determining 
electricity prices by the state governments ., setting energy prices 
(oil, natural gas, electricity, coal) at their world levels has 
been advocated (Treasury [1984]) and implemented (for example 
import parity piices of domestic crude oil (Marks [1986])). 
.Pricing on the basis of the shadow prices of an energy sector 
programming model has also been advocated and illustrated (Mus-
grove et al. [1983]). Therefore, different approaches to energy 
pricing are adopted for pricing different types of energy in 
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Australia l . 
The guidelines AEPSOM results provide in resolving the 
above three energy pricing issues are discussed below: 
(a) The present study has demonstrated the desirability of 
government intervention in the energy sector to achieve the energy 
policy objectives. These interventions include the Imposition of 
taxes and subsidies implying the indirect control of energy 
prices. 
(b)As taxes and subsidies influence price, the energy prices 
which should be under government influence have been shown in 
Table 5.6. The model results suggest that, at the supply level, 
the pricee of crude oil and imported oil, at the secondary energy 
level, those of coal burnt electricity, petroleum products, and 
natural gas, and at the end-use level, those of coal and.electric-
ity in the manufacturing sector, electricity in the transport 
sector, coal in the domestic and commercial sector, should in-
crease in the market. The model results also suggest that the 
prices of solar energy, natural gas burnt electricity, coal, and 
electricity from petroleum products should decrease. 
(c) Following the dominating view that the energy price 
should reflect the opportunity cost to ensure efficient allocation 
of energy resources in an economy, it can be argued that prices of 
domestic energy,*. specially the energy forms which are 	traded, 
should be equal to their international prices. This suggests that 
the energy prices should be controlled or influenced by the gov-
ernment to move these prices to their international levels, in 
1. The same practice will be followed in this study. 
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the case that domestic market prices are different from the inter-
national prices - (either by direct price control or by imposing 
taxes or subsidies). 
The model results, however, support indirect control of energy 
prices through taxes and subsidies (deregulation of prices) rather 
than direct control of them. This is preferred, even above the 
administration of import parity pricing of crude oil by the govern- 
ment. This is evident from the sensitivity study (5), which demon- 
strated that the introduction of import parity price in the model 
did not improve the value of the policy objective function, in-
stead it diminished that level. But, if energy price is deregulat-
ed there may be a reduction in government revenue (Marks, op. 
cit.) and it would be difficult to ensure that resource _rents 
accrue to Australians which is an important motivation for price 
control in Australia as government may have to resort to some type 
of crude oil levy. What is needed is a policy package which would 
result in deregulation and at the same time ensure accruing re-
source rents to Australians. 
It is important to note that the optimum market price for 
domestic crude oil (1979-80), suggested by the model, is $M 5.231PJ 
which is close to its import parity price of $M 5.30/PJ. 	These 
results suggest that the energy policy objectives including effi- 
ciency in the energy resource allocation in Australia can be 
achieved by choosing an appropriate or politically acceptable form 
of energy taxation (alternatives are discussed above). This also 
implies that the administration of an import parity pricing policy 
by the government may not be necessary.. A relevant tax can be 
imposed on the domestic crude oil and the*market be left to adjust 
its price to somewhere close or equal to its import parity price. 
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The outcomes of this strategy would be the determination of the 
price of domestic crude oil equal or close to its import -parity 
price (through the market by imposing tax without direct control 
by the government), and the guarantee that all resources rents 
accrue to Australians. This strategy has the advantage that this 
would help achieve the objectives of price control such as the 
earning of government revenue etc. mentioned above, in addition to 
the equity effects of such a policy ). 
The possible justification for this approach to oil pricing 
may be derived from the arguments that when there is the possibil-
ity of an oil embargo or supply uncertainty, this external cost is 
not internalized in the discretionary behaviour of economic 
agents. In the situation of such a trade embargo, there will be 
costs contingent in the supplies of energy. And the policy impli-
cation of this situation has been stated by Gruen and Hillman 
([1981], P 114) as : 
" As the adjustment costs are associated with the 
need to change the composition of domestic output, 
the theory. of optimal policy indicates the form of 
intervention should aim directly at product, that is, 
a producer tax or subsidy". 
Also as one of the energy policy objectives in Australia has 
been the reduction of the use of oil (due to any anticipated trade 
embargo), raising the price of domestic crude oil somewhere close 
to its international level through intervention in the product 
market by taxation can be the optimal policy for Australia. 
For similar reasons (i.e., in the context of energy problems 
and energy policy objectives) electricity prices in 1979-80 sug-
gested by the model solution (6.00,WPJ) can be considered 
optimum prices for electricity. 
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6.3.3 Depletion Policy  
Depletion policy relates to the issue of optimum resource use 
over time (the rate at which resources should be depleted). 	This 
is a problem of intertemporal allocation of exhaustible resources. 
This policy issue is very important in view of the finite 
stock of exhaustible energy resources and because of the fact that 
any use today will leave less for future generations (the question 
of equity in intergenerational distribution of natural resources). 
In Australia, this issue of optimum depletion policy has been 
discussed (Saddler [1981], Gruen and Hillman [1981]). However, no 
definite optimum depletion rate has been prescribed, neither has 
the present depletion rate(s) - been evaluated. 
Desirability of a depletion policy in the Australian context 
has been discussed by referring to the existing market form in the 
energy supply sector (Gruen and Hillman [1981]) i.e. by relating 
to the question whether the Australian energy suppliers are com-
petitive or monopolistic. The argument is that if the energy . 
supply market is monopolistic, then government policy is desira-
ble, since a monopolistic market does not deplete resources at a 
social optimum rate. It may, of course, be necessary to mention 
that such a straight forward generalization of monopolistic ele-
ments in the market and depletion policy intervention is not 
possible, since dompetitive and monopolistic firms appear to be 
over conservationist or under conservationist depletors, depending 
on demand, price, and supply related conditions (Howe [1979]). 
The 'AEPSOM does not directly address the issue of optimum 
depletion rate, but the result of the model can be used to provide 
some guidelines for an energy depletion policy in Australia. 	A 
comparison of the required energy supplies in 1979-80 and 1989-90 
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suggested by the model can be an indication of the 	rate of 
depletion of various types of energy. 
If the 1979-80 actual supplies of 'coal, crude oil and natural 
gas are compared with their optimum values chosen by Model Solu-
tion 13 (in this case there was the possibility of flexibility in 
the supply of these energy forms), then it appears that the opti-
mum result suggests more supplies (depletion) of coal and natural 
gas and less supplies of crude oil than their actual uses in 1979- 
80. These results are consistent with the reserve position of 
these fossil fuels in Australia. 
6.3.4 Exploration Policy.  
Exploration plays a significant role in the allocation of 
exhaustible resources over time. A finite stock of resources can 
be extended by supplementing the stock through exploration activi-
ties. 
AEPSOM structure implies that if the resource supply con-
straints in AEPSOM are binding, that will be an indication for 
positive shadow prices. And if these supply constraints are 
relaxed, it would result in reduced energy system cost. Numerical-
ly the Model Solution 13 where the supply constraints are relaxed 
by 20 2 has provided the minimum value of the policy objective 
function from all the solutions (Table 5.1.). The results show the 
importance of an increased energy supply in the Australian energy 
• system. Increased energy supply on a sustained basis is possible 
through further exploration activities. 
To accelerate exploration activities, a government can follow 
several strategies: 	• 
(a) subsidize exploration activities by accelerated tax 
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allowances for exploration expenditure, immediate or accelerated 
exploration expenditure write off etc., and 
(b) direct involvement in exploration, possibly through an 
exploration company. Because of moral issues related to providing 
subsidies to the private sector companies and because of the 
common property nature of exploration activities, sometimes gov-
ernment participation in the exploration activities is suggested 
(Saddler, [1981]. However, as such a policy is not consistent with 
the political strategies of current governments in power, the 
policy can not be implemented. 
Therefore, the encouragement of exploration activities of the 
private sector through various fiscal, pricing and legislative 
measures is recommended. 
6.3.5 Conservation Policy  
The objective of energy conservation has been a focal point 
of' discussion in recent political economics (Eichner, [1979]). 
Despite the political economic implications, energy conservation 
has some technical dimensions. 
A whole range of energy conservation instruments can be adopt-
ed to achieve the conservation objective of energy policies. The 
strategy of conservation programmes is to choose a level of con-
sumption of energy .and energy mixes to maximize social welfare by 
eliminating waste and low welfare uses. 
The pricing methods are adopted to influence the consumers' 
and producers: decisions to allocate funds for the energy budget. 
The pricing methods include price fixation and control, and taxes 
on fuels (Btu taxes) and energy using equipment. 
The non-price methods of conservation include direct quantity 
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rationing, instituting fuel efficiency standards such as setting 
minimum mileage standards for new vehicles and standards for 
residential insulation and energy-use efficiency, expenditure for 
research and development, and education and information. 
In Australia, an active energy conservation programme has 
been pursued since the beginning of energy policy initiatives. 
However, due considerations have not been given to the social 
desirability and welfare implications of these programmes (ESCAP 
[1979], Department of National Development [1979], Endersbee et 
al. [1980], Department of Primary Industries and Energy [1988]). 
The Australian government has adopted the following policies to 
ensure energy conservation: (1) control or influence energy prices 
to reflect their long run costs, (2) taxes and subsidies to 
increase efficient and non-oil energy use, (3) increase energy 
use efficiency in the industry, commerce and transport sectors by 
improved 'housekeeping', modifications to existing operations and 
improved maintenance of existing energy systems, and by research 
and development, demonstration, advisory and legislative measures 
for an increasing introduction of new efficient technologies. 
In this study, the proportions of shadow prices in Table 5.7.B. 
indicate the transport sector to be the major area for conserva-
tion, followed by electricity demands in different sectors. This 
result is consistent with the situation in the energy sector in 
Australia where the transport sector is the major user of liquid 
fuel which is the scarcest energy resource in the economy. 
This emphasis in the area of conservation indicated by shadow 
prices is - also supported by the other AEPSOM result: 	pricing or 
taxes and subsidies. The model results (Table 5.5.8) have suggested 
tax on the petroleum product use in the transport sector (tax on 
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d8 ). This is consistent with the present energy pricing policy , as 
stated above, in which energy price influence through taxes or 
subsidies is suggested to reduce oil use. 
Therefore, it can be argued that the conservation of oil in the 
transport sector by an excise tax (which will internalize the 
adjustment cost of oil disruption) and other technological changes 
and improvements (such as the use of methanol (suggested by the 
model)) is clearly the priority area in energy conservation in 
Australia. Since other shadow prices were not zero, the model 
results also suggested conservation programmes in other sectors of 
the economy. Endersbee et al. [1980] has identified the majo'r 
conservation measures and technologies in all sectors of the 
Australian economy. Measures suggested in Endersbee et al. [1980] 
can be adopted in Australia. 
Historically, 	conservation programmes in Australia have 
passed through various phases with initial emphasis on public 
awareness, subsequently by awareness of the industrial and com-
mercial users, and the transport sector (Marks, [1986]). The 
Government has realized that the conservation in the transport 
sector is a vital area for conservation of energy in Australia. 
. This is also a policy strategy suggested by AEPSOM. 
6.3.6 Education arid Information Policy  
In spite of the controversy on the effectiveness of public 
policies in the form of education and information in energy manage-
ment, historical experiences show that these policies can be quite 
effective. In many national emergencies, such as war, public 
policies in the form of education and information may be more 
effective than economic policies such as taxes, subsidies, control 
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of money supply etc. (Griffin and Steele (19801). 
In the energy sector, these policies are considered to be 
effective because of : 
(a) the popular appeals of energy problems, and 
(b) ignorance on the part of the general public about the role 
they can play in solving the energy problem through better man-
agement of energy. 
Education and information policies are designed to increase 
community-wide understanding of the energy problem so that the 
. general public will adopt methods for better management of the 
energy supply, its production and its end-uses and thus conserve 
energy. 
In Australia, an emphasis has been given to education and 
information policy. Programmes have been undertaken in the form of 
publicity campaigns, conferences, posters, et -c. 
AEPSOM priorities for education and information policies are 
indicated by the proportions of shadow prices in Table 5;7. For 
the obvious reason of liquid fuel security in the Australian 
context, the community should be made aware of. this problem, 
specially about the possibility and methods for conservation of 
liquid fuel in the different sectors of the economy. This empha-
sis is reflected by the highest proportion of shadow prices relat-
ed to the energy .demand constraints in Table 5.7.A. AEPSOM re-
sults also suggest education and information priorities in the 
conversion technology area (the second highest proportion of 
shadow prices for the intermediate balance constraint). 
This highest priority for education and information activities 
for energy conservation is consistent with the Australian energy 
policies. The relative priorities in education and information 
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policies as suggested by the AEPSOM results 	should also be 
incorporated in Australian energy policies. 
6.3.7 Research and Development Policy  
Both basic research (without commercial objective) and ap-
plied research and development (turning research into a practical 
output or process) are vital to modern industrial development 
because of their effects on innovation, an engine of industrial 
development (Schumpeter [1934]). 
The question has frequently been debated: why should the 
government undertake research and development work? Since re-
search and development work has substantial externalities i.e. one 
firm's findings will benefit other firms and the social rate of 
return for research and development is higher than its rate of 
return in the private sector, government undertaking of research 
and development is considered to be justified. 
Research and development in the energy sector have been 
geared in the past towards an increasing energy supply and inter 
fuel competitiveness through. reduction in the cost of production 
of energy. However, a recent shift in the emphasis is noticeable 
with more concentration of efforts in the areas of energy conser-
vation and increasing efficiency of new energy sources to substi-
tute fossil fuel. In other words, the energy research and devel-
opment programme is being designed to increase energy production 
(by finding more energy deposits and extracting existing reserves 
more efficiently), increase efficiency in the energy supply, its 
conversion and its end-uses and reduce energy use in the economy. 
In Australia, there has been doubt whether Australia will 
pursue an energy research and development programme, substantial 
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in size, on its own, or buy the results from other developed 
countries like the U.S.A. Japan and the U.K. However, the Austra-
lian governments had an active research and development programme 
to develop expertise in the important technologies, and to stimu-
late research in the technologies appropriate for Australia in 
terms of its resource base and export prospects. The government's 
research and development programme alsoemphasizes the involvement 
in international research programmes and the study of the social, 
legal, and institutional aspects of energy sector programmes to 
find the appropriate strategies to develop the energy sector 
(Department of National Development, [1979]). 
AEPSOM results suggest that priority for research and develop-
ment for energy conservation technologies and strategies, in 
comparison with other areas such as supply expansion and conver-
sion technologies, is desirable (highest shadow price proportion 
for the energy demand constraints in Table 5.7.A.). The base 
model solutions and sensitivity studies indicate this emphasis in 
policy. These results are also consistent with existing policy 
strategies in Australia. 
It has been mentioned above that althoughhigher emphasis in 
the research and development policy was generally given in the 
past to energy conversion technologies such as the technologies 
for synthetic'oil*Production. However, a shift in emphasis towards 
energy conservation as suggested by AEPSOM results is desirable. 
This is also officially being recognised. This will be evident 
from the shift in the government research and development policy 
emphasis towards conservation (Department of Resources and Energy, 
[1985], chapter 11). However, AEPSOM results also imply higher 
priorities for research and development in conversion technologies 
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(the second highest proportion of shadow prices for the intermedi-
ate balance equations). 
Research and development in the conservation area may be aimed 
at 
(a) finding new technologies i 
(b) institutional development for education and information 
to popularize conservation programmes. 
In the energy conversion area, research and development 
activities will be directed towards development of fuel-efficient 
and economic conversion technologies using less and less liquid 
fuels. 
6.3.8 Energy Technology Policy  
A choice of an appropriate energy technology policy has several 
dimensions: ' 
(a) 'determination of appropriate factor proportions in the 
energy supply, production and end-use techniques (Sen [1968]), 
(b) determination of the appropriate size and nature of 
forms of industry (centralized or decentralized/soft nature of the 
energy system) (Medows et al. [1972]), and 
(c) selection of an efficient energy system.i.e. choice of a 
mix of appropriate energy forms, processes or techniques (Griffin 
and Steele [1980]) that can supply the energy required in the 
economy at minimum cost. 
1. Some of the areas where research and development activities can 
be undertaken are : increasing efficiency of single energy proc-
esses, promotion of co-generation of electricity and heat, possi-
bility for improvement in energy husbandry, introduction of in-
creased industrial energy recovery etc. (Endesbee et al. [1980], - 
Harder [1982]). 
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Resolution of these issues, for the formulation of an appro-
priate energy technology policy is important. The approach adopted 
here to determine an optimum technology in the energy sector is 
that the market should determine such a system, which is of 
course, subject to government interventions. 
Resolution of these issues 	need deliberate government 
policy formulation, mainly to provide information to the private 
sector. The purpose of providing information about energy technol-
ogies to the private sector is to influence expectations in the 
energy market to achieve the socially desired allocation of re-
sources (static and intertemporal). This is so because the future 
energy market does not exist and the choice of appropriate energy 
technology policy involves the determination of adoption of some 
forms of energy technology which are not in the present market. 
For the future Sustainable energy system, the International 
Institute for Applied System Analysis has predicted a gradual 
transitionary process through various stages (Hdfele [1981]). 
First stage : from now up to 2030 - a transition from the present 
carbon-based energy system to a different carbon based energy 
system characterized by a short supply of fossil fuels but a 
gradual market penetration of coal gasification and liquefaction 
technologies and a considerable build-up of nuclear and solar 
power. Second stage : after 2030 - in this stage hydrogen will 
become the dominant energy form which will result in what is 
called the hydrogen economy. 
Although the future is not well known, it is for sure that the 
energy system is in transition. The whole inventory of new and 
renewable energy technologies are being considered for adoption in 
the near future. Some of these technologies are the following 
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:liquid and gaseous fuel conversion from coal and oil shale, 
nuclear energy (burner, breeder and fusion reactors), solar energy 
(direct use, solar cells and solar panel), wind energy, ocean 
energy (tidal and wave), biogas, geothermal energy, combined 
cycles in electric power generation (magnetohydrodynamics, ther-
mionics and potassium turbines), and hydrogen as source of energy. 
In Australia, public policy has clearly recognised the fact 
that new and renewable technologies will be making an• increasing 
contribution to the Australian energy sector. The government, in 
association with the private sector, is providing funds for re-
search and development, and for demonstration of new and renewable 
energy. Relative emphasis has been given to, and optimism has 
been expressed about the potential market penetration of solar 
energy and liquefaction and gasification of coal in the near 
future. 
In the previous chapter, the optimum technological pattern in 
the Australian energy sector as reflected by the optimum selection 
of activities, was shown in Table 5.8. Some of the energy 
technology policies implied by the optimum energy system deter-
mined by AEPSOM are as follows: 
(1) Increased market penetration of some renewable energy 
(solar energy, methanol and biomass) over time is desirable. 
AEPSOM resulte clearly support the Australian energy technologi-
cal strategy of increased market penetration of new and renewable 
energy (such as solar, biomass and methanol). Although the syn-
thetic fuel production is not suggested as viable, the policy 
implication of this result would be to direct more research and 
development in this area to reduce cost and develop more efficient 
techniques. The reduced cost (Table 5.9.B) of the activity repre- 
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senting synthetic oil production from coal indicates the magnitude 
of 'cost saving necessary, for penetration of the market by this 
technology (M$/PJ 11 to 13). Actions should be pursued to achieve 
this cost saving. 
(2) Regarding the issue of self-sufficiency in oil to-day or 
.tomorrow by suggesting a'gradual adjustment in the system through 
inter-fuel substitution, conservation etc. is required. -This will 
help AES for smooth transition to the post-oil era. 
(3) Progressively more uses of natural gas and coal, specially 
in the manufacturing industry, and domestic and commercial sec-
tors, in comparison with the use of other conventional energy are 
necessary. 
(4) Eventual complete import independence is possible and, 
therefore, should be identified as a target of energy policies. 
(5) Gradual reduction in the use of petroleum products, spe-
cially in the manufacturing industry sector is needed. 
(6) As the production of synthetic oil from coal was not found 
viable, efforts should be directed to reduce the cost of this 
process so that the technology penetrates the market. Some strate-
gies for cost saving would be to consider all the alternative coal 
liquefaction processes such as Fischer-Tropsch, SRC2, Flash Pyrol-
ysis, Exon Donor Solvent (Musgrove et al. [1981]). A reduction in 
coal price may also foster market viability of local liquefaction 
technologies. 
A comparison of the prices/costs (Table 5.6.A) of the fuels 
and technologies suggested by the model results will reveal that 
the model selection of fuels and technologies has been based on 
their relative prices (other factors were stated in Section 6.1). 
The selection of the technological policy implication No. (1) 
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above has been influenced in the model solution by the fact that 
prices of solar energy (0.04 m$/PJ) and biomass (1.18 mS/PJ) at 
the supply level are lower than other marginally competing .energy 
forms such as domestic crude oil (5.24 m$/PJ) and hydro-
electricity (19.27 m$/PJ). The policy suggestion No. (3) has been 
influenced by the fact that coal and natural gas are cheaper than 
petroleum products and electricity in the two sectors mentioned 
above. For justifying the policy strategy No. (5), it can be 
mentioned that petroleum products are certainly more expensive in 
the manufacturing industry, agricultural and domestic and commer-
cial sectors compared to other fuels used in these sectors. Re-
garding policy suggestion No. (6), it can be argued that coal 
conversion technologies are still expensive. The assumed cost for 
the conversion of coal to oil (see Table G.3) is 15.67 m$/PJ. If 
the costs at the end-users' level are considered, this technology 
would appear to be*more expensive compared to other alternatives. 
The energy sector, being a dynamic and innovative •sector in 
the economy, has experienced technological changes involving 
inter-fuel substitution, conservation and development of new and 
renewable energy. technologies during the modelling period. The 
1989-90 actual energy figures imply the following changes/develop-
ments (Jones et al. [1991]), among others, to the 1979-80 AES: 
increased use of solar energy and biomass, increased use of natu-
ral gas, reduced use of petroleum products in the manufacturing 
industry sector, and almost the same level of oil import. A 
similar technological pattern has also been implied by the AEPSOM 
'results (discussed above). The 1989-90 actual energy supply, 
production and end-uses figures shown in Table 5.8.B are, there-
fore, consistent with the technological pattern suggested by 
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AEPSOM. 
6.4 AN ENERGY POLICY PLAN FOR AUSTRALIA 
The discussion of each energy policy separately has prepared 
the background for presenting a comprehensive set of integrated 
energy policies. In this Section such a set of energy policies 
for Australia will be prescribed. 
6.4.1 Australian Energy Policy Objectives  
In spite of recent formalization of Australian energy policy 
activities, the objectives of Australian Energy policies have 
taken a distinct shape by this time. The energy policy objectives 
which are commonly found in most of the official government docu-
ments and academic work and the ones which were stated in Chapter 
Three are as follows: security of energy supply/import independ-
ence, conservation of energy, specially oil, efficient allocation 
of energy resources and equity in income and uses of resources in 
the energy sector. 
6.4.2 A Set of Optimum Energy Policy Instruments and Strategies  
Debate on the determination of a set of energy policies is 
getting serious, and the need for resolving the controversial 
issues in the Australian energy sector is becoming increasingly 
pressing. The following section summarizes the energy policy 
implications of the AEPSOM by providing some empirical evidence in 
resolving the existing controversies in the energy sector an 
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area characterized by the existence of conflicts and non-compata-
bilities in issues and options. 
(1) Pricing Policy: AEPSOM results have clearly demonstrated 
the need for changes in the relative price structure in the energy 
sector, although the model suggests deregulation of the energy 
market. 
(2) Taxes and Subsidies: AEPSOM results also indicated the need 
for rearrangement of fiscal instruments in the energy sector. 
Taxation of 4.63 	of cost of domestic crude oil is possible by 
pursuing a package of fiscal instruments consisting of resource rent 
tax, royalties and competitive bidding. Import duty on imported 
crude is necessary. Some other excise taxes and subsidies will 
complete the energy sector fiscal instruments. 
(3) Depletion Policy: Although AEPSOM results do not directly 
provide evidence to formulate an energy depletion policy according 
to the principle suggested by the optimum depletion model presented 
above, they do imply a higher rate of extraction of coal and natural 
gas and lower rate for crude oil compared to their present rates. 
(4) Exploration Policy: An active government exploration policy, 
be pursued through fiscal instruments, will help increase 
reserves of energy resources and thus will make the country more 
energy import independent. 
(5) Conservation Policy: In view of the scarcity of liquid fuels 
and the problems related to their import, highest priority to the 
conservation activities in the transport sector followed by the 
priorities in the agriculture •and manufacturing industry sectors 
will appear to be a rational prioritization of the conservation 
policy in Australia. 
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(6) Education and Information Policy: As the lack of information 
is a source of market failure in the energy sector, dissemination of 
information about energy problems, technologies and prospects, spe: 
cially about conservation measures, should be one of the strategies 
within the government energy policies. • 
(7) Research and Development Policy: As a market may fail to 
allocate socially desirable resources for research and development, 
government research and development activities directed towards 
energy conservation prospects can play an important role. 
(8) Energy Technology Policies: In addition the need for 
accelerated recovery from existing non-oil fossil fuel reserves, the 
prospects for progressive reduction of the use of petroleum products 
. and the market penetration of renewable energy should be stressed in 
government's energy policies. From the potential inventory of 
Australian energy resources and technologies, the exploration of the 
possibilities of cost savings in new technologies, specifically in 
producing liquid fuel from coal (and natural gas) should be given 
priority. 
6.4.3. The Post-1980 Developments and the Evaluation of the  
Suggested Policies  
The following discussion will conclude the presentation of the 
policy implic .atioris of AEPSOM by highlighting the effectiveness of 
the suggested policies to achieve the desired objectives in the 
context of historical developments in the energy sector. 
(1) Security of Energy Supply/Self-sufficiency in Liquid Fuels. 
Historical energy figures show that energy self-sufficiency 
has increased in Australia over the period of 1979-80 to 1989-90. 
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In 1979-80, oil import was 50% of the total domestic production of 
oil, while it is 38% in 1989-90, which is a 12% reduction in oil 
import. 
In spite of various interpretations .of the meaning and implica-
tions of security of energy supply, in the Australian context, it 
has the connotation of self-sufficiency in liquid fuels. An 
optimum set of policies to deal with this externality consists of: 
optimum pricing, taxes and subsidies, conservation of energy, 
specially liquid fuels, increasing the production of domestic 
crude oil, import. control adjustments in the economy through 
macro-economic policies to reduce dependence on the imported 
fuels, and emergency measures including reserve standby capacity, 
oil storage, international sharing agreement's and diversifica-
tion of import sources (Griffin and Steele, [1980]). 
The policy prescriptions of AEPSOM contain a selected.set of 
instruments and strategies, which are consistent with each other 
and that can achieve the objective of energy security/self-
sufficiency in liquid fuels. Raising the price of domestic crude 
oil equal or close to its import price has made the domestic oil 
price competitive and thus, has reduced unnecessary wastage and 
uses of oil. This can also be done by including a risk premium 
(due to the possibility of oil embargo) with the price of domestic 
crude oil. Since the imported price of oil as it is in the market 
does not include the externality of the social cost of an oil 
embargo, a tariff on the imported oil, as suggested by AEPSOM, can 
add an adequate security premium to the market price (Griffin and 
Steele, [1980], p. 346). AEPSOM has rejected direct import con-
trol as the sensitivity study with a constraint on the imported 
oil (sensitivity study no.3) produced a non-feasible solution. 
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Other taxes and subsidies are also directed towards a reallocation 
of energy resources to reduce import dependency. Relatively slow 
extraction of oil will provide its future security. Conservation 
of oil in the transport sector, encouragement of further explora-
tion of oil, publicity of energy information, research and devel-
opment activities for oil conservation and cost savings in new 
technologies, and methanol use - energy policy strategies suggest-
ed by AEPSOM - will also make the economy more self-reliant in 
liquid fuels. As AEPSOM does not address emergency energy policy 
issues, the emergency measures stated before may also be adopted 
in conjunction with other policies implied by AEPSOM. 
(2) Conservation of Energy, Specifically of Oil. 
From the observation of historical data it appears that al-
though energy intensity in the Australian economy had declined 
over the period of 1979-80 to 1985-86, it has remained almost 
constant for the period 1985-1986 (Jones et al. (1991]). From 
Table 5.8 it will also appear that the actual total energy con-
sumption in 1989-90 is more than its forecast made earlier. This 
means that energy has.not been conserved much in recent years. 
Jones et. al. (op. cit., p.37) have stated it as follows: 
'Australian energy consumption has grown strongly in 
recent years, and this trend is expected to continue in the 
medium term.' 
The possible reasons for this may be the developments in the 
international energy markets, especially a reduction in oil price 
and probably a slower response of the economy to energy conserva-
tion programmes and policies pursued by the Government during this 
period. 
Several policy alternatives are available to achieve this 
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energy policy objective, such as: fuel taxes and subsidies, taxes 
and subsidies on equipment, efficiency standard, development of 
fuel efficient energy supply, conversion and end-use technologies, 
public exhortation, influencing the rate of depletion of scarce 
fuels by taxes and subsidies, finding the appropriate substitutes 
of fuels of limited supply and direct quantity rationing (Griffin 
and Steele, [1980]). 
AEPSOM has selected a set of policies which' will help achieve 
the conservation objective in Australia. Taxes on the fuel sup-
plies and subsidies on non-oil equipment/end-uses are appropriate 
measures. The relative price structure of various fuels indicated 
by AEPSOM is favourable for conservation, since the model has 
predicted a rise in the prices of those fuels which should be con 
served. AEPSOM has also suggested a specific nature of other 
conservation policy measures such as: slower depletion of oil, 
education and information policies, specially for conservation 
programmes, development of new technologies (solar in'd substitute 
technologies (methanol)). The adjustments in Australian energy 
policies implied by the above strategies will help achieving 
energy conservation. 
(3) Efficient Allocation and Utilization of Energy Resources. 
It is often argued that the problem of efficient allocation of 
resources is essentially a rational pricing (static or dynamic) 
problem (Griffin and Steele [1980]). This argument seems to 'have 
'extreme neo-classical bias, and may not hold true in an economy 
with fixed or less flexible prices and wages (output and input 
prices). Therefore, supplementary policies to pricing policies 
are necessary. 
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AEPSOM has formulated a set of energy prices which will 
reallocate energy resources in the socially desirable directions. 
Other policies, such as the previously mentioned taxes and subsi-
dies, conservation programmes, and development of new technologies 
will also help to supplement and implement the pricing policies 
implied by the model. 
It may, however, be mentioned that the principles of pricing 
policy formulation in this study have been of the second-best
•' type. 	It means that instead of determining the best (pricing) 
policy in a single fuel market, the model has determined a set of 
second-best energy prices by considering the externalities in all 
the fuel markets. 
(4) Equity in the Ownership/Uses of Energy Resources. 
In Chapter Three, the position taken in this study regarding 
the equity objective was stated. Following the dominating view 
about the equity objective in the energy sector, this study adopt-
ed the approach that the equity policy should be studied separate-
ly from the efficiency related study after the efficiency consid-
erations have been dealt with l . Therefore, the main emphasis of 
this study has been on the efficient (socially desirable) alloca-
tion and utilization of energy resources. 
It may, however, be mentioned that the prices, taxes and subsi- 
1. Many government policy interventions, specially' taxes and 
subsidies, in the economy may affect existing pattern of ownership 
of wealth and factor endowments, and the supply of factors, and 
thus the existing pattern of distribution of wealth and income. 
Adjustments in the pattern of distribution of income is possible 
by suitably chosen tax, expenditure and income policies which may 
involve an efficiency loss. This fundamental contradiction in 
public policies in a market economy needs careful considerations 
' in formulating an equity policy in the Australian energy sector. 
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dies, depletion policy and technology policy formulated by 
AEPSOM will have equity implications. However the equity implica-
tions of the AEPSOM results may be analysed in further studies and 
appropriate policy instruments such as a system of income trans-
fers and taxes, social security or minimum income schemes, inheri- 
tance laws etc. (GrOenewegen (1984], Webb and Rickets, 	[1980], 
pp. 108-109) can be derived in that study. 	This approach is 
certainly different from that of Graaff who stated 'that tinkering 
with the price mechanism may be considered one of the more feasi-
ble and satisfactory ways of attaining what ever distribution of 
income and wealth is desired by the society' (Graaff [1957]). 
Recent developments in welfare economics in the determination of 
optimum equity in income and wealth (Blaug (1985)) may be helpful 
in formulating the equity policy in the energy sector. 
6.5 CONCLUSION 
The energy policy studies pursued in this chapter have 	demon- 
strated the application of an MLO model to formulate a mulii-level  
energy plan. AEPSOM has attempted to address the problem of the 
determination of the optimum energy policy in Australia. As the 
• developments in the energy sector in 1989-90 indicate that some 
energy policy objectives have not yet been achieved satisfactori-
ly (Jones et al. [1991]), a set of reformulated energy policies is 
needed. The set of optimum energy Policies suggested by AEPSOM 
indicates the directions for the reformulation of a comprehensive 
integrated set of energy policies for Australia. 
CHAPTER SEVEN 
MAJOR FINDINGS:  
SUMMARY, LIMITATIONS, AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH, AND CONCLUSIONS  . 
To end this multi-level energy planningstudy, this chapter 
provides a 	summary and overview of the study, points out its 
limitations, suggests agenda for further research and draws some 
conclusions. 
7.1 SUMMARY AND OVERVIEW 
7.1.1 Background: Problems, Issues and Policy Modelling. 
Energy has played a significant role in man's pursuit of a 
better standard of living. Events in the world energy market in 
1973, 1979-80 and 1990 have certainly created a wider understand-
ing and recognition of the problem: Achieving an efficient and 
socially desirable allocation of resources in the energy sector to 
solve the so-called energy problem. 	Identification of market 
failures leads to the prescription of government interventions and 
to the promoiion..of economic efficiency and development in ' the 
energy sector (issues). For the reasons stated previously, models 
are useful tools in energy planning. Therefore, a large number of 
energy models has been developed. Since the relevance and useful-
ness of energy plans depend on the appropriateness of the model 
used in the policy study, the quest for an appropriate energy 
planning model, or, in its wider sense, an appropriate energy 
planning approach, may be justifiable. 
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7.1.2 ML° Approach: Justification and Theoretical Formulation  
Since market failures justify energy planning by the govern-
ment, the energy policy system is characterized by the existence  
of two separate sub-problems: optimum policy formulation by the 
government (policy problem) and optimum production and end-use 
decisions of economic agents (behavioural problem). Although 
energy models have been developed to replicate the competitive 
market mechanism to reflect the decision making of individual 
economic agents, a clear and complete representation in these 
models of the policy interactions between the government and 
economic agents, resulting in what is called multi-level multi-
goal hierarchical policy systems, is lacking. Consequently, 
existing energy models cannot provide results pertaining to the 
decision making process, and may not be satisfactorily applied to 
formulate multi-level energy planning. In addition, necessary 
articulation of the policy planning problem in the form of classi-
fied model variables as the target and instrument variables has 
not been made. Also the existing energy models can produce re-
sults adequate only for a partial set of energy policies: the 
mathematical programming models provide mainly energy technologi-
cal policies and shadow prices, while the macro-econometric models 
can produce results for taxes, subsidies and other economic poli-
cies. No existing energy model can produce results adequate for 
the formulation of a comprehensive set of energy policies consist-
ing of those energy technological and economic policies. 
These deficiencies of existing energy models in their use in 
multi-level energy planning studies necessitate the adoption of an 
MLO approach to multi-level energy planning. In this approach, 
the energy planning problem is modelled to optimize a policy 
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objective function subject to (a) the constraints on the . policy 
options and their consequence, and on the ranges of choice and (b) 
the constraints imposed by the behavioural sub-model on the de-
grees of freedom of the policy makers. The operational technique 
for multi-level optimization is called multi-level programming 
(MLP). An MLP model has four main components: a) A weighted 
policy objective function containing the objectives of the policy 
makers, b) the constraints on the choice of policy instruments, c) 
the objective functions of economic agents, and d) the constraints 
on the behaviour of economic agents.. MLP is considered as a 
collection of nested optimization problems at different levels. 
The energy planning modelling approach developed in this 
study is also structured within the framework of Tinbergen's 
theory of economic policy planning since this theory of economic 
policy planning provides an operational framework suitable for 
policy planning. To understand and identify the exact character-
istics of the underlying pcilicy planning problem, an analysis of 
the underlying policy system and its incorporation in the 
policy planning model are also necessary. 
Any energy planning model developed within this approach will 
have several advantages: 
(a) It represents exactly and explicitly the underlying policy 
planning problem (i.e. hierarchical multi-level 	multi-goal 
policy 	system). Therefore, this approach (i) produces improved 
results/plans, (ii) genevates some analytical results related to 
the underlying policy system in the form of nature of intervention 
and interdependence, (iii) makes explicit the policy-behavioural 
feasible region which is implicit in other types of models and 
(iv) can be used to study some welfare economic implications of 
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government intervention. 
(b) It can provide a comprehensive set of energy 	poli- 
cies consisting of energy technological and economic policies. 
Considering the fact that multi-level energy planning in a 
market economy requires an MLO model and an integrated 
(technical and economic) comprehensive (as comprehensive as possi-
ble) set of energy policies, the present multi-level energy plan-
ning approach appears to be an improvement over the existing . 
single level optimization energy planning models/approaches. 
7.1.3 The Australian Model : AEPSOM. 
A journey from theory to practice is always fraught with 
problems and difficulties, and in many cases the rigour of a 
theoretical model is lost in its real life applications. 
To give an empirical content to the theoretical approach, an 
Australian energy planning model AEPSOM was developed. AEPSOM was 
developed on the basis of the following specification of the 
Australian energy policy planning problem. 
(1) Energy Policy Objectives  
The major objectives of the Australian energy policy are: 
reduction in oil imports, reduction in the use of oil, conserva-
tion of energy, and efficient allocation of resources. 
(2) Energy Policy Instruments  
The possible energy policy instrument alternatives in Austra-
lia are the following: (a) Indirect Control: (i) Taxes and subsi-
dies; (ii) Government expenditures for energy conservation, re-
search and development, and education and information. (b) Direct 
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Control: (i) Pricing of domestic crude oil. 
(3) Energy Policy Strategies/Policy Guidelines: (a) Techno-
logical strategy, (b) depletion policy, (c) exploration and devel-
opment strategy. 
AEPSOM is a price control MLP model based explicitly on the 
energy policy and energy systems in Australia. The policy objec-
tive function incorporates minimization of oil imports, total oil 
use and total energy use as well as minimization of the energy 
sectoral government budget deficit. The policy constraints of 
the model impose limits on the taxes and subsidies imposed by the 
government in the energy sector, and require the sectoral budget 
to be self-financing. The behavioural objective function of 
AEPSOM replicates the cost minimization behaviour of the energy 
producers and end-users. The constraints of the behavioural 
model represent the structure and operation of the Australian 
energy system/sector. 
AEPSOM is specified to capture the hierarchical multi-level 
(two-level) energy policy formulation process in Australia. In 
AEPSOM, decision making of the policy-makers and economic agents 
are integrated in a single model and hierarchically placed in the 
modelling structure. Solution to AEPSOM determines the optimum 
policy targets configuration in the energy sector attainable under 
the present political regime and the behavioural and technical 
constraints in the energy sector. 
The base year of AEPSOM was specified for the year 1979-80 
and for sensitivity studies another one for 1989-90. Some of the 
data were estimated by the author and others were obtained from 
published sources. 
An energy sector MLP model can have several applications. It 
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can be applied to a market economy, a mixed economy or a con-
trolled economy. It can be utilised to determine the optimum 
values of the existing taxes and subsidies or the optimum mix and 
values of taxes and subsidies necessary for attaining the sectoral 
energy policy objectives. In addition, it provides results needed 
for the determination of other energy policies such as pricing 
policy, conservation policy, research and development policy, 
education and propaganda policy and technological policy in both' 
the above cases. 
Although MLP models have potentials for wide and useful 
policy applications, MLP model specifications have so far been 
restrictive. AEPSOM is capable of including real life policy from 
a wider perspective and henCe is applicable to different types of 
policy studies. 
7.1.4 Solution Algorithm : The PPS Approach. 
The real test of an empirical model development is its numer-
ical implementation. AEPSOM was numerically implemented by the 
PPS algorithm. The main difficulty with an MLP model is its 
implementation by an algorithm. Algorithms either are not commer-
cially available or cannot solve large MLP models. Search for 
appropriate algorithms and software is still ongoing with an 
uncertain prospect. The present PPS algorithm solves an MLP model 
by solving first the behavioural model and then searching the 
behavioural model solution that optimizes the policy objective 
function and satisfies the policy constraints. Optimum results 
produced by the PPS algorithm are close to the expected optimum 
results. Other criteria such as efficiency in CPU time, and cost 
and efficiency in extension and transfer of the algorithm were 
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applied to test the algorithm. 
7.1.5 Results : Validation Tests and Policy Implications. 
The main outcome of a modelling work is a set of results  
which can be used to provide guidelines for the formulation of 
policies. AEPSOM results provided a set of information for an 
analysis and understanding of the Australian energy policy prob-
lems. The results were capable of addressing energy policy issues 
in the following areas: energy taxes and .subsidies, pricing, 
energy technology, conservation, education and propaganda, re-
search and development, optimum depletion of exhaustible re-
sources, and exploration and development, activities of the govern-
ment. 
To test the reliability of the AEPSOM results, some conven-
tional validation tests were performed. These tests included a 
priori justifications about the relevance of the model, the 
underlying problems or systems, usefulness of output for achieving 
the objectives of the modelling study, accuracy of results, 
comparison of the model results with results of other studies and 
intuitive judgments. 
AEPSOM generated a numerical policy system in the Australian 
energy sector which has provided some insights into the character-
istics of multi-level multi-goal hierarchical policy formulation 
in the energy sector. 
AEPSOM results have been used to formulate a multi-level 
optimum energy plan for Australia: (1) AEPSOM has determined an 
optimum energy system for Australia. The numerical optimum energy 
system has been reported in Table 5.8. (2) A set of optimum 
energy policy instruments and strategies for Australia has been 
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formulated. In addition to the required changes in the pricing and 
fiscal instruments areas, details of the desirable optimum pattern 
of energy supply, conversion, ad end-use technologies were shown 
by the energy flows produced by AEPSOM. Increased production and 
use of coal is necessary. Progressive reduction in the use of 
natural crude oil is desirable. The introduction of coal conver-
sion technologies will substitute naturally occurring crude oil, 
this requires improvement in its efficiency. Also, increased 
production and harnessing of hydro-electricity and solar energy ° 
are desirable and will reduce the use of fossil fuels, particular-
ly crude oil, for electricity generation. Other Australian 
energy policy studies have suggested similar technology policy 
(Endersbee et. al. [1980]). Increased supply of primary energy 
and expansion of capacities will have a significant effect on 
Australian energy systems in the future. But currently emphasis, 
needs to be given to other energy policies such as an appropriate 
a mix of +T, conservation programmes, and appropriate technology 
with a long-term strategy for increasing the supply of domestic 
energy resources. 
7.2 LIMITATIONS  
The limitations of this study have been discussed and 
presented at different places of the thesis. These include the 
assumption of linearity in most of the relationships in the model, 
the impossibility of capital and labour substitution, the 'limited 
framework in which the effects of relative prices on energy varia-
bles and polices are specified, the partial equilibrium character 
of the model, the unavailability of, thus non-incorporation of the 
1989-90 data in the forecast model, and the limited discussion of 
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the data used in the model l . 
But the major limitation that may be raised is the non-
incorporation of energy macro-economic interactions in AEPSOM. As 
discussed before, the present partial equilibrium approach has 
the advantage of giving emphasis on the energy sectoral technolog-
ical and economic issues and options more comprehensively and 
integrated compared to a . general equilibrium model where energy 
sectoral technological and system operation details are not ade-
quately captured. In addition to this, the emphasis of the 
present study has been on the multi-level policy interactions in 
the energy sector, rather than on the energy macro-economic inter-
actions. After multi-level policy interactions in the energy 
sector have properly been modelled and studied, energy macro-
economic interactions and multi-level policy interactions in the 
energy sector can be simultaneously studied. 
The other limitation of this study that was also pointed out 
previously is the solution of the model by an iterative algorithm. 
Because of the existing problems of solving an MLP model, develop-
ment of new algorithms is necessary. Inspite of the drawbacks of 
the PPS algorithm, it has some good features and the results of 
AEPSOM solved by this algorithm were found to be acceptable. 
7.3 AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
Further 	research 	should be directed at the 	following 
1. This was brought about by the main emphasis of the study (dis-
cussed in Chapter One). 
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areas: ' (i) The rigourous treatment of the theory of multi-level 
optimization of the energy sector (ii) The implementation of an 
MLP energy model ( static or dynamic ) with macro-economic and 
policy constraints (iii) Further experiments with the PPS algo-
rithm in the following directions: (a) Solution of a non-linear 
MLP model; (b) Comparison of the results of a model solved by the 
PPS algorithm with the results obtained by another algorithm; (c) 
Solution of an MLO energy planning model which includes macro-
economic and policy constraints by the PPS algorithm; (d) Speci-
fication of an MLP model involving two separate optimization 
problems - maximization or minimization - at two levels of the MLP 
problem; and (e) Further theoretical investigations of the 
properties of the results of an MLP model solved by the PPS algo-
rithm, in addition to the ones undertaken in Chapter Four, Section 
4.4, such as the existence, uniqueness, and global optimality of 
model solution. 
The first type of research will help to provide analytical 
insights into the interactions of the two-levels of decision 
making. The second type of research will help to investigate the 
characteristics and implications of energy-macroeconomic interac-
tions for optimum energy policies. The third type of research 
should make the PPS algorithm more useful, widely usable and 
acceptable. 
7.4 CONCLUSIONS 
Although various conclusions from this study were drawn at 
different parts of the thesis, they can be summarized here at 
the end of the study as follows (next page): 
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(a) Desirability of MLO Approach 
The energy planning model proposed and developed in this study 
can represent the energy policy system of a market economy accu-
rately. One characteristic of such a policy system revealed by the 
AEPSOM results ie., the conflicting interests of the government 
and economic agents, reinforces the need for an MLO approach to 
energy planning with explicit specification of the objective 
functions of these decision makers. 
AEPSOM has predicted an improved energy plan in the case of 
optimum +T compared to a single level behavioural model and to the 
case of existing +T (base or original plan i ). If energy policies 
were formulated on the basis of results of a single level energy 
sector model (the behavioural model) the policies would be errone-
ous. Therefore, the MLO model can determine the value of the 
policy objective function and select a set of optimum other re- 
1. This result would seem to be of some significance in applied 
welfare economic study, since it provides some empirical evidence 
in resolving the continued controversy over the determination of 
an appropriate government role in energy and resource management. 
In Chapter Six, it was stated that this result provided evidence 
in justifying a point in normative economics regarding the effi-
ciency of decentralized market behaviour in achieving societal 
objectives. 
Views of Candler [1991] on a finding of an improved plan in an 
MLP study was communicated to the present author in this form: 
"Provided that you have shown that you have found a 
better policy than the existing one, this may be enough 
to qualify as 'a contribution to knowledge', depending 
on (a) the size of improvement, and (b) a clear ac-
knowledgement that it cannot be proven to be global, 
and (c) some explanation that computational costs of 
finding the global optimum (or proving the present 
solution to in fact be optional) would be . .excessive." 
(The above issues: (a), (b), and (c) arising in the present study 
were discussed in Chapters Four, Five and Six). 
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suits which is different from the results of a single level model. 
In addition, this type of model can provide an integrated and 
comprehensive set of energy policies. 
Also an optimum multi-level energy plan formulated by adopt-
ing an MLO approach can generate an optimum energy system plan and 
an optimum energy policy plan simultaneously. 
In many cases, issues related to the desirability of govern-
ment intervention in the energy sector, import parity pricing of 
energy, resource rent taxation, conservation, exploration and 
development, and deregulation of the energy market are addressed 
theoretically by applying economic principles. This study has 
produced results which could be Used to address policy issues like 
those mentioned above by providing empirical evidence.' 
Therefore, the methodological conclusion of the study is that 
an MLO model can provide an alternative methodology and framework 
for optimum multi-level energy planning. 
(c) Optimistic Prospects of MLP  
Existing problems in MLP were highlighted at different parts 
of the thesis. In specifying AEPSOM, attempts were made to improve 
the state of the specification and use of an MLP model. The 
following points hdve emerged from this study: 
(i) An MLP can be used to undertake normative studies in the 
energy sector (desirability of energy policies). 
(ii) An MLP model can be adopted to undertake a policy 
system analysis to reveal numerically the characteristics of the 
underlying policy system. 
(iii) It is possible to solve a fairly large MLP model repre-
senting a sector in reasonable detail. 
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(iv) It can produce a comprehensive integrated set of energy 
policies; not +T or technology policies separately. 
(v) It also provides an appropriate policy modelling frame-
work since it can explicitly be based within the framework of the 
theory of economic policy planning. 
(vi) An MLP can be used to formulate an optimum mix of +T 
after investigating whether the existing set of +T is desirable or 
not. 
(vii)The PPS algorithm can be used to find an optimum solu-
tion to an MLP. Although the PPS algorithm is an iterative search 
method, the algorithm can find an improved energy plan. 
These extensions in the specification, implementation and 
applications of MLP models were made in the present study with the 
intention of generating the optimism •that meaningful MLP models 
can be specified, numerically implemented and adopted for policy 
studies. 
(d) Existence of Multi-level Hierarchical Policy System 
The numerical policy system analysis has demonstrated the 
existence of a multi-level, multi-goal, hierarchical policy 
system in the Australian energy sector. 
(e) Possibility of Changes in AES  
The Australian energy system is expected to undergo some 
significant changes in the long run, if the policies suggested in 
this study are implemented and the assumptions made remain valid. 
(f)Changes in Australian Energy Policies  
-AEPSOM has provided the following insights, guidelines and 
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directions in Australian energy policy planning and issues: the 
necessity for deregulation of energy prices, reorganization of the 
•existing taxes and subsidies in the energy sector, priority for 
conservation, 	education 	and propaganda, and 	research 	and . 
development policies, emphasis on the exploration and depletion 
policies, and the need for cost savings necessary for market 
penetration of new and renewable technologies. 
The formulation of a comprehensive energy policy plan would, 
perhaps, be of some interest in the Australian energy policy 
context, because of the country's on-going search for a set of 
integrated comprehensive energy policies (Saddler [1981], Hall 
[1985], Marks [1986]). There is a need for a comprehensive set 
of quantitative energy policies studied and formulated in an 
integrated, comprehensive, consistent and optimum set-up (by 
• 
applying an optimization model). It will, therefore, be of use if 
the suggested policies can open new perspectives for further 
dialogue on the Australian energy policy issues. 
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APPENDIX A 
A SURVEY OF THE DEVELOPMENTS IN MLP : DIRECTIONS  
FOR FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS  
A41 CURRENT STATE OF MLP DEVELOPMENTS  
Since the development of ML? in 1977 (Candler and Norton 
[1977]), there has been a considerable number of studies on MLP. 
These studies have been done in two areas of ML?: (1) model devel-
opment and application; and (2) solution algorithm, with the• main 
emphasis on the specification of an appropriate solution algo-
rithm. 
A.1.1 Model Development and Application  
MLP models have been developed to represent and study the • 
multi-level hierarchical decision making system, particularly at 
the sector levels. These model specification studies may be broad- 
ly grouped intetwo types: illustrative models and actual real 
world models. 
(a) Illustrative Models:  
These models are specified to demonstrate examples of MLP for 
developing algorithms to solve those types of models. Some of these 
models are very small, consisting of three or four variables. Other 
models have a dozen or so variables and equations. Although these 
• 
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models represent underlying systems, they are not large enough to 
capture the salient features of the underlying systems with their 
. necessary details (for example Fortuny-Amat and Mccarl, [1981]). 
(b) Real World Models:  
Some 'of the MLP studies have been undertaken to develop real 
world models of the underlying systems, for example Candler and 
Norton [1977], Bisschop et al. [1982], Sparrow et al. [1979], and 
Ballenger [1984]. 
Candler and Norton [1977] have specified a price control MLP 
model for the Mexican agricultural sector formed of 309 variables 
and 46 constraints. The policy target variables in the model are: 
employment, income, the levels of maize and wheat productions, and 
the size of the government budget. The policy instruments which are 
included in the model are water taxation, subsidy, government , ex-
penditure, prices and a share of crop purchased by the government. 
Ballenger's [1984] study is similar to that of Candler and Norton, 
since both of these models are used mainly for tracing out the 
policy feasible space. 
Bisschop et al.'s [1982] model is much larger than the Candler 
and Norton model. It is a price and resource control MLP model, 
with the maximization of net farm income being the objective of 
the government and the public sector, while taxes, subsidies and 
the allocation of water resources are the available policy instru-
ments. 
The model of Sparrow et al. [1979] is a public-private sector 
interactive model for the formulation of a conservation policy in 
the iron and steel industry. The objective of the public sector 
is to maximize real benefits, measured in terms of the energy 
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saved while the objective of the private sector is to minimize 
cost of production in the industry. The model solution provides 
the mix of research and development expenditures, both public and 
private, and the taxes and subsidies that optimise the policy 
objective function. 
A.1. .2 Solution Algorithms  
Because of space limitations, a brief survey of the existing 
algorithms for solving MLP is provided here. More elaborated sur-
veys are done in Candler, Fortuny-Amat and McCarl [1981] and Wen 
[1981], among others. 
(a) The Replacement Method:  
In the first approach, which is termed the Replacement Method, 
the lower level problem is replaced by its Kuhn-Tucher conditions 
(Bard and Falk [1982], Bialas, Karwan and Shaw [1980], and Fortuny-
Amat and McCarl [1981]). The transformed MLP problem thus becomes a 
single level mathematical programming problem although a non-convex 
one. This is caused by the complementary slackness conditions of 
the lower level problem. 
Fortuny-Amat and McCarl [1981] solve this non-convex program-
ming problem as a mixed integer programming problem by replacing the 
complementary slackness conditions by zero one integer constraints. 
Bard and Falk [1982] solve the transformed MLP by an algorithm which 
is based on branch and bound methods. Another method termed as the 
parametric complementary pivot approach is developed by Shaw (1978]. 
In this approach, the objective function of the upper level problem 
is placed in the set of constraints which includes the complementary 
slackness conditions.. A restricted basis entry simplex procedure is 
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used to obtain a solution to the resultant problem. The objective 
function of the upper level problem is varied parametrically until 
all the feasible complementary basis are enumerated. 
In the Bisschop et al. [1982] Model, the objectives of both 
levels of the two level programme are the same i.e., minimization 
of the cost of the agricultural sector. The principle of the 
algorithm in this model has been to determine the shadow prices 
and optimum values of the activities from the model ignoring the 
lower level objective followed by the placement of these values to 
the lower level problem to solve the optimum values of the lower 
level activities. 
In the Candler and Townsley [1982] approach, the dual beha-
vioural problem of resource control MLP is solved as a parametric 
programme to explore all the feasible basis to find the global 
optimum of the policy problem. 
(b)  Other Solution Algorithms  
The most important of the other remaining approaches is 
based on the Sequential Unconstrained Minimization Technique 
(SUMT). With this approach, the constraints of the lower level 
problem of ML? are replaced by their penalty functions and the 
problem is transformed to an unconstrained optimization problem. 
The lower level problem can be optimized by the INSUMT algorithm 
(SUMT in the lower problem), and the simultaneous optimization of 
the two problems can be performed by a combined program: SUMT-
INSUMT. 
Another approach is to solve multi-level programmes itera-
tively/heuristically. The basic principles of the iterative 
algorithm have been stated by Fortuny-Amat [1979]. In this ap- 
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proach, 'some reasonable levels' of the policy instruments are 
exogenously determined and the. lower level problem is then solved 
for all these levels of policy instruments. That level of policy 
instrument is chosen which produces the optimum value for the 
upper level objective function. 
The essence of the algorithm is the exogenous selection of a 
finite number of values within a finite range of intervals of the 
policy instruments by adopting one of the methods for explicating 
the preferences of policy makers. Then, it is necessary to solve 
the behavioural model for each combination of the values of the 
policy instruments and to consider the value of the policy objec-
tive function for each set of values -of policy instruments and to 
choose the one with the optimum value. 
From the above discussion of the MLP algorithms, it appears 
that some sort of transformation of the original problem is neces-
sary in most of the algorithms. This makes the solution of MLP 
relatively difficult. Also, in most cases the size of the trans-
formed MLP becomes large in comparison With the original problem. 
Again, the algorithms are not usually commercially available. . 
APEX III is the only commercially available software for MLP that 
requires easy transformation of an MLP model to be solved by it. 
Therefore, there is a general need for developing both algo-
rithm and software that are easily operational and readily avail:- 
able. 
The development of an alternative algorithm in the present 
study, was motivated by the general necessity for development of a 
new algorithm as well as by the hitherto non-availability of 
software for the problem under study. 
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A.2 A CRITICAL EVALUATION AND THE DIRECTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH:  
The limitations of existing MLP studies are as follows: 
• (1) The illustrative MLP models cannot be used for any real 
policy studies since these models are not capable of representing 
the necessary details of the systems under study. 
(2) The limitations of the large scale models are that (i) 
the policy planning problem characterized by the classification of 
variables as targets and instruments is not included in these 
models, and (ii) in some studies, the emphilsis has been on the 
analysis of the reactions of economic agents to the changes in the 
public policies rather than on the formulation of a set of optimum 
policies that can achieve the government objectives. 
(3) The general difficulty with some of the existing algo- 
rithms is that they can find only an approximate solution to MLP 
through an iterative process. In these cases, it is not possible to 
determine the global optimality of the solution. 
The algorithms which find the exact MLP solution by simultane-
ous solution of a complete MLP, can not be used to solve large scale 
MLP models due to several reasons including the computer space 
problem. 
The needed directions for further research are as follows: 
(a) Large MLP models should be developed representing the de-
tails of the underlying systems for undertaking useful policy 
studies. 
(b) Algorithms need also be developed that can solve large 
MLP models exactly, preferably not iteratively, with minimum 
computer space and CPU time requirements and those should be 
available commercially. 
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In view of this needed research in MLP, attempts are made in 
this study to develop an approach that can overcome some of the 
limitations of existing MLP models. 
APPENDIX B 
SOME ADDITIONAL TOPICS OF THE PROPOSED MLO MODEL 
In this appendix, some additional information about the 
theoretical MLO model developed in Chapter Two is provided. This 
includes (a) a discussion of the characteristics of the present 
modelling approach, and (b) a demonstration on the type of analyt-
ical, insights that a theoretical MLP model can provide on the 
characteristics of multi-level decision making in the energy 
sector (such numerical results are discussed in Chapter Five). 
B.1 SOME FEATURES OF THE PRESENT ENERGY PLANNING STUDY/APPROACH  
Some of the important characteristics of the multi-level 
energy planning approach developed above are stated below. 
(i) Applied Welfare Economic Study:  
The present approach is adoptable to applied welfare study 
since it deals with the principles of maximization of social 
welfare in the energy sector. Therefore, this study is following 
the established steps of an applied welfare economic analysis: 
(i) to define a social welfare criterion, (ii) to identify the 
factors that may prohibit the achievement of the optimum level of 
welfare and (iii) to suggest a set of policy actions, the adapta-
tion of which will maximize social welfare (Oser and Brue [1988]). 
• (ii) Multi - Level.Optimization Approach: 
As the objective of this study is to formulate an optimum 
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energy plan, this requires an optimization approach. The present 
multi-level energy planning approach recognizes the existence of 
and is explicitly based on the two-level decision making system 
existing in the energy sector (the upper level decision maker - 
the government and the lower level decision makers - producers and 
consumers). In this MLO approach, it is assumed that both the 
government and economic agents engage in optimizing behaviour for 
making decisions (rational choice). The assumption that the gov-
ernment engages in optimizing behaviour is implied by the theory 
of economic policy of Tinbergen (Tinbergen [1952]) and , the assump-
tion of the optimizing behaviour of economic agents is implied by 
the neoclassical economic theory. The government attempts to 
maximize social Welfare, while economic agents optimise their well 
being (Oser and Brue [1988]) 1 . Such a two level decision making 
system requires a two-level optimization approach for modelling 
the energy sector planning problem. 
(iii)Multi-Disciplinary Character: 
The present approach is multi-disciplinary in character. 
Energy planning and modelling (Meier [1984]) involves the utiliza-
tion of the knowledge of mathematics, operations research, econom-
ics and energy engineering to develop computerised models to 
address energy planning and policy issues. 
(iv) Partial Equilibrium Model: 
The energy sector planning may address only the energy sec-
toral issues and options (partial equilibrium approach) or it may 
1. Although the Chicago School does not believe that the govern-
ment optimizes social welfare. 
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incorporate energy macro-economic interactions and policy issues 
(general equilibrium approach). Both of these approaches have 
advantages and disadvantages. 
Economic planning is generally considered in a general/multi-
market (sector) equilibrium context because of the welfare implica-
tions of general equilibrium analysis. As a result, a general 
equilibrium planning approach in which simultaneous interrelation-
ships between different sectors of the economy are considered is 
usually to be preferred. The disadvantage of this approach is that 
in this type of models, the details of the energy sector, specially 
the technical details, can not be incorporated, and computational 
difficulties may arise. 
However, the partial equilibrium approach to energy sector 
planning is well established and accepted in the profession follow-
ing the Marshallian approach to partial equilibrium analysis (Mir 
shall, [1920]). It is true that such an approach can not capture 
the secondary benefits/losses of the interrelated markets. 	But 
the partial equilibrium approach is justified by arguing that the 
optimum welfare in ,a partial equilibrium setting will also result 
in optimum welfare in a general equilibrium framework (Griffin and . 
Steele [1980]). The theory of second-best (Lipsey and Lancaster 
[1956-1957]), howeer, advocates a different view: in a situation 
where some markets are not perfect, achievement of optimum condi-
tions in one market may lead to overall welfare loss in the econo-
my, rather than welfare gain. This theory may be true under some 
restrictive situations such as the strong substitutability and 
complementarity of goods, and markets characterized by implacable 
distortion. 	Generally, these conditions are not met and the par- 
tial equilibrium analysis is considered to have optimum welfare ' 
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implications (Harberger, [1971], Griffin and Steele, [1980]). 
• There are several other advantages of partial equilibrium 
analysis of the energy sector or energy sector planning: it allows 
consideration of special characteristics of each industry within the 
sector, it is computationally simple, it requires minimum data, and 
it provides an aggregated viewpoint in the appraisal of individual 
projects by presenting detailed'information about the processes 
etc. (Riaz, [1984], p. 26). 
The real choice of the scope for energy sector planning hinges 
on some factors such as the objective and nature of the planning 
studies, adopted methodology, and computational facilities (avail-
ability of algorithm, software and hardware). Ignoring any computa-
tional problem, a partial equilibrium approach to energy planning 
will be found desirable if the objective of an energy planning study 
is to focus mainly on the detailed economic, technical and policy 
issues in the energy sector. The emphasis of such studies is on 
the (Munasinghe and Schramm [1983], p. 85) 
.. detailed analysis of each sub-sector with special 
emphasis on interactions among them, substitution possibili-
ties, and the resolution of any resulting policy 
conflicts...." 
As the emphasis of this study is on the detailed and comprehen-
sive sectoral policy issues and options, the partial equilibrium 
approach (micro-energy planning) is adopted in this study. 
(v) Multi-Level Energy Planning: Energy System and Policy Planning: 
The energy planning may involve the planning of the energy 
system (determination of the optimum energy demand-supply combina-
tion, technological pattern and activities), together with the 
formulation of a set of optimum energy policies or either of them 
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separately. In the present study, energy planning refers to multi-
level energy planning: the planning of the energy system and policy 
simultaneously. 
(vi) Quantitative Energy planning: 
Energy planning may refer to some qualitative energy policies 
such as the determination of the appropriate energy market regula-
tion policy, institUtional restructuring, control of ownership 
etc. It also may refer to quantitative policy such as pricing 
policy, taxation policy etc. In this study, only the quantitative 
energy policies are incorporated and studied. 
(vii)Long-Term Energy Planning 
Folie and Ulph (1977] have classified major energy policy 
issues in three groups: short, medium and long-term. The short-
term energy policies are addressed to energy problems which arise 
from the instability in the energy market (supply, demand and 
price). The medium-term energy policy issues relate to the possi-
bility of supply increases and inter-fuel substitution in energy 
supply, production and end uses within the structure of the existing 
energy system. The long-term energy policy issues deal with the 
problems of finding alternative, not readily adoptable, supplies of 
energy resources, and production and end-use technologies. This is 
only possible within a new structure of the energy system. 
In the present study, the medium and long term energy policy and 
planning issues involving substantial structural changes will be 
• addressed. Therefore, these policy studies (Chapter Five) will have 
a time horizon of 10-15 years in terms of their implementation and 
implications. 
301 
(vii) Energy Sectoral Model  
In any sector model, the energy sector is considered as an 
economic unit (Hazell and Norton [1986], Chapter 7) such as the 
household, firm Or government. A sector model should have several 
elements such as: (1) descriptions of producers' and consumers' 
economic behaviour, (2) production conditions, (3) resource endow-
ments, (4) market conditions (perfect competition in the present 
study) and (5) policy system. In the proposed MLO model, all these 
elements are present. The behavioural model represents the ele-
ments (1) to (4) and the complete MLO model represents (5). 
B.2 CHARACTERISTICS OF MULTI-LEVEL DECISION MAKING: SOME ANALYTICAL 
RESULTS  
In this section, some analytical aspects of multi-level deci-
sion making embedded in the MLO model will be discussed. These 
analytical aspects are reflected in the processes of reactions and 
adjustments in various decision variables and relationships of 
different types of decision makers and the resultant equilibrium in 
the policy system in the model. Similar aspects of multi-level 
decision making revealed by AEPSOM results will be discussed in 
Chapter Five.. 
(a) Optimum Policy in an MLO Model  
In the theory of economic policy, developed on the basis of a 
single level optimization model, the optimum values of the instru-
ments are the policies that optimise the policy objective function. 
But in a multi-level optimum energy-economic policy framework, the 
optimum policy instruments are those for which the objective func- 
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tions of different level policy makers attain their optimum values. 
The optimum policies in the framework of MLP model can be 
provided by the complete MLP model with the Kuhn - Tucker condi-
tions of the behavioural model (with +T) as follows: 
Max W = wG 	 (a) 
(G,+T1 ,+T2 ,+T 3 ,Yp) 
s.t. 
T l < {+T i ,+T 2 ,+T3 } < Tp 	(b) 
G = 	+ I2X + I 3 Z (c) 
Yp < Yc (d) 
{-(tTi )Y - (+T2 )X - (+T 3 )Z + 
(-T1 )Y + (-T2 )X + (-T3 )Z) > 0 	(e) 
c l + T l - bp - r 	>0 • 	(f) 
c 2 + T2 - ad - p - p >0 (g) 
c 3 + T 3 - a - 6 > 0 	 (h) 
Z - D = 0 	 (i) 
2- aX = 0 (j) 
X - bY'= 0 	 (k) 
Y + Yp < .17 (1) 
X < 	 (m) 
(c 1 + T l - b 11 - r )Y = 0 	(n) 
(c 2 ± T2 - a d - p - p)X = 0 (o) 
(c 3 + T3 - a -6 )Z = 0 	 (p) 
(2 - 15)a - a (0 
(Y + Yp - ) r 0 	 (r) 
(X - R) = 0 (s) 
> 0 	(t) 
(B.1) 
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(b) Selection of Energy-Economic Policies by the Government  
• Selection of levels and mix of tax and subsidy will depend on 
the condition of whether an equation is binding or not. 	If an 
equation is binding, then policy will be to employ +T (taxes) and if 
an equation is not binding the policy will be to employ z.T (subsi-
dies). This is how a selection of optimum +T is made in MLP. 
But the ultimate' choice of +T and.their optimum values will 
depend on the policy objective function. If an equation is binding, 
and the corresponding activity is preferred by the policy makers, 
then the selection will be +T. If +T is chosen, then other energy 
policies will be undertaken by the government to reduce the tight-
ness of the constraint. Other policies will be chosen because if 
the constraint is binding, it will have non-zero shadow prices 
(defined in Chapter Five) and will attract other policy attentions. 
Yp is usually exogenously determined. If Yp is endogenous in 
the model, it will be determined in such a way that it will 
control the energy resources available for economic agents so that 
the policy objective function attains its optimum value. 
(c) Conditions for Optimum Decisions of Economic Agents  
In an energy system without government tax and subsidy inter- 
vention, the energy sector equilibrium conditions 	represent the 
equalities between the market costs and the imputed costs. 	With 
government intervention, equilibrium conditions change,. 	In the 
latter case, the energy sector equilibrium conditions are per-
turbed by the government controls: +T and Yp. 
In an energy policy regime, the conditions for optimum deci- 
sions (choice of a set of optimum behavioural variables) 	for the 
economic agents are shown by the equations B.1.n to B.1.s. 	The 
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decisions of economic agents regarding energy supply, conversion, 
and end-uses are guided by the following rules: Equation B.1.n 
implies that market costs (fixed and variable costs) of the 
primary energy supplies plus net tax must be greater than or equal 
to the imputed value of the fixed energy resources (Ricardian 
rent), and to the imputed value arising from the allocation of 
these resources to different energy conversion . technologies 
(user's cost). Equation B.1.o implies that the costs of secondary 
energy conversion technologies plus net tax must be greater than 
or equal to imputed costs to different conversion technologies 
(operation and capacity costs) less the user's cost attributed to 
allocation of resources to different technologies. Equation B.l.p 
implies that the costs of end-use technologies plus net taxes must 
be greater than or equal to the imputed costs of the end-uses plus 
imputed costs of the end- use technologies. 
Equations B.1.q to B.1.s imply that different forms of pri-
mary and secondary energy will be supplied and used in cases where 
the market costs plus net + T and imputed costs of different forms 
of energy will be equal. 
APPENDIX C  
AEPSOM: DATA: SOURCES AND METHODS OF ESTIMATION 
C.1 A DISCUSSION OF THE GENERAL ASPECTS  
(a)Data Need 
For a numerical specification of AEPSOM, the following types 
of data are needed: (1) weights of the policy target variables; 
(2) average costs per unit of each type of energy and technolo-
gies); (3) the efficiency rates of the conversion and end-use 
technologies; (4) the values of the right hand side parameters of 
the constraints. 
(b)Units of Measurement  
The energy variables and coefficients are measured in peta-
oules. Cost coefficients are given in 1980 Australian dollars  
(millions). 
(c) Sources of Data  
Sources 	of data are 	indicated in different 	tables. 
Tables/data without an indication of source are the authors' 
estimates based odthe available information, mainly from Musgrove 
et al.119831. 
C.2 DATA FOR AEPSOM 
C.2.1 Policy Objective Function  
The base case weights of the policy target variables were 
Ie1:1, CNo:1, and TcEd. Sensitivity analyses were also undertaken 
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by changing the coefficients in different combinations (Table 5.12 
in Chapter Five). 
C.2.2 Policy and Budgetary Constraints. 
The policy constraints were specified numerically in the text 
of Chapter Three. There is no need for any data to be specified in 
the budgetary constraints. 
C.2.3 Behavioural Objective Function  
The MARKAL estimates of costs of supply, imports, secondary•
energy conversion, electricity generation and end-uses for the 
year 1979-80 were a major source of data for the AEPSOM behavioral 
model. Many other complementary data were used to calculate the 
reported figures. These five types of costs will be discussed 
separately. 
(1) Supply Costs  
The supply and import costs of the primary energy are: 
Table C.1 
Supply Costs of Energy 
Energy mS/PJ 
0.72 
5.00 
5.30 
0.78 
1.18 
0.13 
coal (R1 ) 
imported crude oil (le l ) 
domestic crude oil (R 2 ) 
natural gas (R3 ) 
wood (R6 )* 
uranium (R 7 ) 
*(Source: Todd [1983]) 
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(2) Costs of Secondary Energy Conversion and Electricity  
Generation 
Some costs in this category relate to the secondary energy 
flows and some relate to individual technologies. In some cases 
where secondary energy is the same in primary and secondary form 
such as coal, natural gas and wood, no conversion costs exist, and 
so no secondary energy conversion costs of these types of energy 
have been used in the model. 
Costs of the relevant secondary energy and conyersion tech-
nologies are as follows: 
Table C.2 
Costs of Conversion Technologies 
Conversion Technologies/Flows 	Costs m$/PJ 
refinery cost (x2 ) 1.39 
hydro-electricity generation {E 4 ) 	19.27 
electricity generation from coal (E 1 ) 13.98 
electricity generation from petroleum products(E 2 )18.69 
electricity generation from natural gas (E 3 ) 	22.32 
These costs are sums of the investment, operating and mainte-
nance costs of the conversion technologies or flows. 
It is difficult to calculate the aggregate refinery cost of 
petroleum product. A modern refinery consists of many types of 
units to provide facilities for different types of processing of 
crude oil. To avoid these difficulties, total aggregated costs of 
all the processes was adopted to use as the average cost of refin-
eries. 
Cost of electricity generation from hydro, petroleum products 
and natural gas have been adopted from MARKAL. 	The cost of 
electricity generation from coal has been estimated on the basis 
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of the weighted average of the different types of coal used in 
1979-80 in electricity generation. 
(3) The Costs of the End-uses  
The end-use costs are based mainly on the estimates of end 
use costs in MARKAL. Two main types of costs have been used to 
estimate the average costs of the end-uses: delivery costs where 
appropriate, and investment, operation and maintenance costs. 
(a) Delivery Cost  
The delivery charges of energy have been adopted from MARKAL. 
The weights for estimating average delivery costs of energy in the 
present model are the actual quantities of fuels/energy used in 
different sectors, and are adopted from Department of National 
Development and Energy [1982]. 
Calculated average delivery and other costs of different 
forms of energy are as follows: 
Table C.3 
Delivery Costs of Energy 
- 	(m$0J) 
.Manufacturing Agriculture Transport Domestic 
Inddstry 
coal 
petroleum 
products 
natural gas 
0.45 
0.35 
1.00 
(d1 ) 
(d2 	) 
(d3 ) 
0.35 	(de. 	) 1.45 (d8 ) 
1.32 
1.40 
2.19 
(d10) 
(d11) 
(d12) 
(b) Investment, Operation and Maintenance Costs  
Calculation . 	of 	the 	cost 	of 	aggregated 	end-use 
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technologies/flows is more difficult than aggregated cost esti-
mates in the other cases. This is so since a substantial amount 
of investment, operating and maintenance costs are not involved 
in all end-use technologies. For example, there are different 
technologies in the manufacturing sector that use coal. However, 
not all these technologies involve substantial amounts of invest-
ment, operation and maintenance cost's. Therefore, aggregation of 
the costs of all these technologies may not give a representative 
figure for aggregated end-uses. Also there was a lack of infor-
mation about all these end- use technologies except for the use 
of coal in the industrial boiler, so that the average cost of 
using coal in the manufacturing sector has been adopted as typical 
of technology costs. 
The costs of using different forms of energy to raise steam 
in the manufacturing sector are: 
Table C.4 
Boiler Costs 
Energy 	Costs m$/PJ 
Coal(di ) 2.02 
Petroleum Product (d 2 ) 	1.42 
Natural Gas (d 3 ) 	1.23 
Table C.5 
Investment, and Operation and Maintenance 
Costs of Other Energy in Manufacturing Industry Sector 
Energy 	 Cost (10/PJ) 
Electricity (d 4 ) 	 2.30 
Wood (d 6 0.25 
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The cost of a heavy mobile plant has been used as the cost of 
end-use of energy in the agricultural sector. The cost is as 
follows: 
Table C.6 
Heavy Mobile Plant Costs 
Energy 	Costs m$/PJ 
abb 
petroleum products (distillate)(d 8 ) 	71.93 
Calculation of the cost of end-uses of energy in the trans-
port sector is complicated by the fact that there are various 
types of end-use technologies (vehicles) which use different types 
of energy. The weighted average costs of the end-uses were calcu-
lated. The weights are the actual uses of the particular energy 
by different types of vehicles 1979-80 (source of the weights: 
Musgrove et al. [1983], Department of National Development and 
Energy,[1982]). Calculated investment, operation and maintenance 
costs of the end- use energy flows are given in Table 3.6. 
Table C.7 
Investment, and Operation and Maintenance 
Costs of End-uses of Energy in the Transport Sector: 
Energy 	 Cost 	Transport Type 
m$/Pj 
petroleum products (d 8 ) 
electricity (d9 ) 
	
237.56 	railway 
220.40 	railway 
The investment, and operation and maintenance, costs of the 
energy uses in the domestic sector are given in Table C.8. 
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Table C.8 
Investment, and Operation and Maintenance Costs of Energy Uses 
in the Domestic Sector 
Energy 
coal 	(d10) 
Cost mS/PJ 
1.32 
petroleum products (d11 ) 0.98 
• natural gas (d12 ) 3.39 
electricity (d 9 ) 6.17 
solar 	(d15 ) 	. 6.69 
C.2.4. The Behavioural Constraints  
(1) Demand Constraints  
Data necessary for these constraints are only the amounts of 
energy.demanded in each of the sectors. 
The following figures for the end-uses of energy in different 
sectors are adopted from Department of National Development and 
Energy ((1982);p.18): 
Table C.9 
Energy End-Uses: 	1979-80 
Sectors 
Manufacturing (including mining) 	(DE') 
Agriculture . (DEA ) 
Transport (bET ) 
Domestic (DED ) 
Demand for electricity in 
manufacturing industry 	(d4 ) 
Demand for electricity in agriculture 
Demand for electricity in domestic 
sector(d13 ) 
Export 
Coal 	(Eel) Petroleum products (Ee2) 
Uranium (Ee3 ) 	• 
Energy PJ 
837.20 
142.32 
812.08 
389.30 
129.77 
(d7 ) 	4.19 
154.88 
1272.54 
133.95 
581.85 
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(2) End-use Energy Flow Constraints  
These constraints define the flows of energy uses in the differ-
ent sectors. It has been mentioned that the flows are gross energy 
uses, so the efficiency factors have not been incorporated to calcu-
late net energy uses in these equations. There is no need for any data 
to be specified in these equations. 
(3) Secondary Energy Supply Constraints  
Efficiency factors that have been derived in AEPSOM are shown . 
in Table C.10. 
Table C.10 
Efficiencies of Different Technologies 
Energy Efficiency Factors 
x3 0.86 
E1 0.24 
E2 0.33 E3 0.33 x2 0.86 
x4 0.14 
(4) The Primary Energy Balance Equations  
There is no need for any data to be specified in these equa-
tions. 
(5) Resource Constraints  
The next set of numbers that we have adopted in our study 
represents the availability of resources in 1979 - 80. Total domes-
tic supplies of coal, crude oil and natural gas are the upper 
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limits on the availability of primary energy resources in the 
model. 
Table C.11 
Primary Energy Resources: 1979-80 
Energy 	PJ 
Coal (R1 ) 
Crude oil (R2 ) 
Natural gas (R3) 
Wood (R6 ) 
Solar energy (R7 ) 
Uranium (R8 ) 
2448.81 
874.87 
364.18 
138.14 
0.50* 
586.04 
(Source: Department of National Development & Energy,[1982], p.18) 
(*Solar energy supply level is adopted from MARKAL (MARKAL 
determines 0.50 PJ as the optimum level for 1979-80)). 
(6) Capacity Constraints  
The capacities of different technologies in 1979-80 
are: 
Table C.12 
Capacities of Different Technologies: 1979-80 
Energy 	PJ 
Hydro-electricity (E 4 ) 	86.61 
Total electricity ( x 4 ) 	411.11 
Petroleum products (x 2 ) 	1586.49 
(Source: 	Department 	of National Development and Energy 
[1981],pp.24-29) 
(*The electricity generation capacity and refinery capacity (MW 
and barrel/day) have been converted to PJ by the appropriate 
conversion factors. See Meier ([1984], Chapter Eight) for conver-
sion factors that relate MW to MWh/year.) 
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C.3 METHODS AND PRINCIPLES OF ESTIMATION AND/OR AGGREGATION OF 
DATA IN AEPSOM 
In MARKAL, almost all the possible existing and future indi-
vidual energy supply, secondary and end-use conversion technolo-
gies are specified. For AES in the present work, the aggregated 
energy flows at different stages are mainly specified, except in 
some cases where a single technology has been specified. To make 
the MARKAL data consistent with the requirements of AEPSOM, the 
data have been aggregated with weights. The weights are the 
actual energy production and end-uses in 1979-80, adopted from 
Department of Energy and Resources [1982]. In some cases, actual 
energy flows corresponding to some individual technologies were 
not available. In these cases, optimum values of energy deter-
mined by the MARKAL solution were adopted. 
APPENDIX D  
SOME ADDITIONAL TOPICS ON THE PPS ALGORITHM 
•Chapter Four has discussed the PPS algorithm as it applies to 
a price control MLP in detail. In this appendix, some related 
topics such as (A) the general mathematical properties of an MLP 
such as existence, uniqueness and global optimality of the solu-
tion, and (B) the application of the PPS algorithm to other types 
of MLP (resource 'control, dynamic and non-linear behavioural 
model) are discussed. In addition, a formula for changing the 
units of parametric variations is presented. 
D.1 EXISTENCE AND UNIQUENESS PROBLEM 
To demonstrate the general problems of non-existence and non-
uniqueness of ML?, we specify a non-numeridal model of an ML?, 
which is specified as follows: 
Max W = xl x2 
(t i , t 2 } 
s .t. 
2 	2 Max Z = p ixi + p2x2 -c ix1 - c2x2 - tixi - t 2x2 
{xl , x2 I t 1 ,t 2 } 
(D.1) 
s.t. 
+ a2x2 = R 
xl , x2 > 0 
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For finding the optimum values of x i , and x2 for any given t 1 
and t 2 , it is required to differentiate partially the behavioural . 
sub-problem's Lagrangean function and make it equal to zero: 
2 	' 2 L = pixi + p2x2 - c ixi - c 2x2 - tixi - t2x2 	+ a2x2 - R) 
(D.2) 
- =p1 - 2c 1x1 - t i + a i r =0 
- 	p2 - 2c 2x2 - t 2 + a2T = 0 
6 x2 (D.3) 
- = a ixi + a2x2 r =0 
For solving this set of linear simultaneous equations, they 
are redefined in matrix form: _ 	_ 
-2c 1 0 a i xi t i - p i 
0 -2c 2 .a2 x2 = t 2 - p2 
_ 	ai a2 0 r _ _ R 	- (D.4) 
Solving the set of simultaneous equations by the Crailler's 
rule, the values of x i and x2 are found: 
a2 (pi - t i ) + a1a2 (t 2 - p 2 ) + 2c 2a 1R 
xl 
2 	2 2 [c 1a2 + c2a 1 
2c 1 (a2R) + ai [a2 (t i - pi ) - 
2 	2 2 [c 1a2 + c 2a 1 ] 
(D.5) 
2 
1 (t 2 	132 ) J x2 -- 
The values of x i and x2 are substituted in the policy objec-
tive function to find the optimum values of t i and t 2 . First, the - 
policy objective function is differentiated with respect to t i and 
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t 2 , and the values are put equal to zero: 
S W 	x 	6 xi 
- = xl - +x2 - =0 
6 t i 	6t 1 	6 t 1 
6W 	6 x2 	6 x1  - = xl - +x2 - - = 0 
t 2 	6t 2 	6 t 2 
By substituting the values of x i and x2 , we get: 
. 	f* -1 -22  [-2 - p1 ) + a1 a2 (t2 - p2 ) + 2c2a 1R] 
2 	2 2 {2 [c 1a2 + c2a1 ] ) 
2 	 2 a2 [2c 1a 2 R + a 1a2 (t 1 - p i ) - al (t2 - p2)) 
	
2 	2 2 (2 [c 1a2 + c2a1 ] ) 
2 2 6w 	- a2 [a2 (t1 - 	pi ) + a1 a2 (t2 - p 2 ) + 2c2a 1R] 
6t 2 	. 2 	2 	2 {2 [c 1 a2 + c 2a1 ] } 
2 a 1 a2 [2c 1a2R + a1a2 (t 1 - p i ) - a l (t2 - p2)] 
2 	2 	2 {2 [c 1a2 + c 2a1 J ) 
W 
6 t 1 
(D.6) 
(D.7) 
To solve for t i and t 2 the two equations are rearranged as: 
2 4 3 	3 aia2 + a2 - (a 1 a 2 + a 1a 2 ) 
(D.8) 
3 	22 • - 2a1a2 2a1 a 2 
22 	3 	3•3 	3 	4 al a 2 (2c 1R - pi ) - p2 (a 1 a2 + a1a2 ) - p2 (a1 a2 + a1a2 + a2 p i 
2 + 2a1 a2 c 2R = F1 
22 	3- 	3 	2 2a a 	+ 2c a R 2a a 2  D 1 2 p  2 	1 2 	- 	1 	.1 - 2c 2a 1 
t i 
2 = F2 
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If the right hand side expressions are defined as F 1 and F2 
and the two simultaneous equation are solved, the results are; 
( 2 	2.1 	3 	3 aala2 /F1 + (al a2 + a1a2 ) F2 
t 
44 	26 	44 	26 2a1 a2 + 2a1 a2 - 2a 1 a2 - 2a1 a2 
and 
t 2 
3 	2 	4 (2a1 a2 )F1 + (al a2 + a2 )F2 
(D.9) 
  
44 	26 	44 	26 2a1 a2 + 2a1 a2 - 2a 1 a2 - 2a1 a2 
In both cases, the values of the denominators are zero, and ' 
thus the determinant of the coefficient matrix is zero..? So. any 
unique solution to the MLP cannot be determined. 
D.2 APPLICATION OF THE PPS ALGORITHM TO DIFFERENT TYPES OF MLP 
In Chapter Four, the principles of solving a price control MLP 
by the PPS algorithm was stated. In this sub-section, it will be 
demonstrated that the PPS algorithm can also be applied to other 
types of MLP, such as resource control, price and resource con- . 
trol, dynamic, and' non-linear (behaviour model) MLP. 
In a parametric programming problem, there can be three types 
of parametric variations: variations in the cost coefficients, 
variations in the right hand side parameters, and a simultaneous 
variation in both. The case of variations of coefficients of 
the objective function is already dealt with (price control ML?). 
• A parametric' programme with variations in the right-hand-side 
parameters can be used to solve . a resource control ML?, and 
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parametric programme with both types of variations can be used to 
solve a price and resource control ML?. 
D.2.1 Solution to a Resource Control ML? 
(i) Resource Control ML?  
A resource control ML? (bi-level programming) is usually . 
defined as: 
Min W1 = wX11 
IX11 , X21 ) 
s.t. 
Min C =.c 1X21 + c 2X22 
	
{X22 I X21 } 
	 (D.10) 
s.t. 
A1X21 + A2X22 R 
X11 	I *X + I *X 11 	1 21 	2 22 
X11! X2 l' X22 	0 
Here X11 and X21 , and X22 are the energy target and beha-
vioural variables respectively. 
It would be more appropriate to redefine the above MLP as an 
activity control ML?, since the upper level controls the activi-
ties (production and consumption) of the lower level, but - not 
the supply (domestic production or import) of resources. 
If the above MLP is called an activity control ML?, then 
another type of MLP can be defined as a resource control MLP in 
the case where supplies of resources are controlled by the upper 
level decision makers. A resource control MIX can be stated as: 
Min W1 = wX11 
(X11' X21 ) 
s.t. 
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Min C = c2X22 
{X22 I X21 } 
	 (D.11) 
s .t. 
A2X22 R + A1X21 
X11 = I2*X22 
X11 ,X21 ,X22 ?- 0 
For solving this resource control problem, the parametric 
programming of the behavioural sub-model may be represented as: 
Min C = c2X22 
(X22 ) 
s.t. 	 (D.12) 
A2 X22  > R +AB 	(AB - -AIX21 ) — — 
X22 
where B = a vector of the units of parametric variations 
(b1 ,b 2 ,....,bn ), and A = parametric variation. 
The complete resource control ML?, with the parametric pro-: 
gramme in the lower level .problem, may be stated as: 
Min Wl= wX11 
(X11' +gB = +X21 ) 
s.t. 
Min C A c 2X22 
{X22 I +X21 = 4." }  
s.t. 
A2X22 R + AB 
X11 = I*X21 
X11 ,X22 ?- 0 
(D.13) 
Here 	A1,. , . . ,Qn are the marginal rates of substitution 
between the optimum value of the behavioural objective function 
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and the changes in the level of supply of resources. The reaction 
function X 22 0 (R + AB) shows the changes in optimum responses of 
individual economic agents due to changes in levels of resource 
supplies or control of resources. Like a price control ML?, the 
solution to resource control MLP requires finding the value of 
QB (additional supplies of resources) and the corresponding values 
of X22 that provide the optimum values of the policy objective 
function. 
The solution to a resource control MLP using parametric 
programming is illustrated in Figure D.1. In this case, the 
resource level varies with the different levels of parametric 
variations (shown in Figure D.1,c). Optimum solution to MLP 
• occurs at the 9th level of parametric variation. 
(ii) An Example  
To demonstrate the applicability of the PPS algorithm to a 
resource control ML?, we refer to the following example: 
The RHS parametric programming formulation of the linear 
programming problem in (D.13) is as follows (Daellenbach et al., 
1983, P.140). 
Max C = 24x 1 + 20x2 
S. t. 
0.5x1 + x2 5- 12 
xl + x2 < 20 
 
(D.14) 
0.06x 1 + 0.0412 5. 1 + Q 
1200x1 - 800x2 > 0 
xi ,x2 > 0 
(-1 < Q < + co) 
 
In this example only one constraint is subject to the para- 
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FIGURE D  
PPS ALGORITHM SOLUTION OF RESOURCE CONTOL MLR 
X1 
WL 
Ri 
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metric variation, but all the constraints can be subject to .para-
metric variations. 
The following are the results of the parametric solutions: 
Solution 1: Q = 0 xi = 12 x2 = 6 C - 408 
Solution 2: A = 1 xi = 0 x2 = 0 C 0 
Solution 3: A = 0.25 xi = 6 x2 = 9 C = 324 
Solution 4: A = 0.17 xi = 16 x2 = 4 C = 464 
Solution 5: Q = 0.25 xl = 20 x2 = 0 C = 480 
A resource control MLP formulation consisting of the above 
right hand side parametric programme is given below: 
Max W = 2x 1 + x2 
s.t. 
Max C = 24x 1  + 20x2 
s .t. 
0.5x 1 + x2 	12 (D.15) 
x i + x2 < 20 
0.06x1 + 0.043e2 <1 + Q 	(-1 < 	< +00) 
1200x 1 - 800x2 > 0 
xi , x2 > 0 
The application of the PPS algorithm involves searching of 
those five solutions and finding the one which provides the opti-
mum value of the upper level objective function. The following is 
an illustration of how the PPS algorithm finds the optimum solu-
tion: The five parametric solutions to the programming problem 
provide the following values of the upper level objective func-
tion: Solution 1: W =30, Solution 2: W = 0: Solution 3: W = 21, 
Solution 4: W =36, Solution 5: W = 40. The PPS algorithm search-
es all these solutions and finds solution 5 as the optimum solu- 
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tion to the above resource control ML?. The optimum solution 
results are: 
(1) Upper level objective function W - 40, 
(2) Parametric variations: A = 0.25, 
(3) Activities: x l = 20, x2 = 0. 
(iii)  Signs, Units, Direction and Range of Parametric Variations: 
If there exists a resource control policy environment, the 
signs, directions and range of the parametric variations can be 
determined by studying the underlying policy system. For example, 
if the government policy is to increase the use of a resource, 
then the sign of the parametric variation would be + and if the 
policy is to decrease the supply then it would be -. Also the 
direction of the parametric variations can be determined by 
including the resource control variables in the policy objective 
function. The range of variations will certainly be specified 
from the information about the underlying policy system. 
The units can be adopted in the following process. 	The 
policy and behavioural models are specified as: 
Min W = wX11 
(X21 ) 
s.t. 	 (D.16) 
A1X12 +A2X22 > R -
X11 = I 1 *X22 + I 2 *X22 
X11' X12' X22 	0 
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and Min C = cX 22 
(X22 ) 
S.t. 	 (D.17) 
A2 X22  > R — 
x22 	0. 22 — 
Let optimum activity vectors of the models (D.16) and (D.17) 
be X22 and X22 respectively. The units of parametric variation 
then can be determined as: 
=P 	=B U = X22 - X22 
If it is necessary to identify which activities are con-
trolled, then the signs and units of the parametric variations 
should be as follows: 
:p • > 0 	if x 	• > x 	• 22(3) 	22(3) 	• 
• < 0 	if x 	=B 
	
22(j) < x22(j) 	j = 1,2,....,n. 
:p 	=B 
Uj .0 
	if x22(j) = x22(j) 
• (iv) Algorithmic Steps: 
When the signs, units, and range of parametric variations in 
a resource control MLP have been specified, steps 5 to 7 of 
the price control MLP solution algorithm in Section 4.7 (Chapter 
Four) can be followed to find an optimum solution. 
D.2.2 Solution of a Price Control and Resource Control ML?  
• 
A price and resource control MLP 1 (bi-level programming) can 
1. This model is similar to the model (2.21) in Chapter Two. 
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be defined as follows: 
Min Wl= wX11 
(+T,X21 ) 
s.t. 
Min C = (c 2 + T)X22 
{X22 I ±T ' X21 }  
s.t. 
(D.18) 
A2 X22  > R - X21 — 
X11 = I1*X21 + I2*X22 
X11' X21' X22 	0 
The above MLP can be stated as an MLP problem with a paramet-
ric programming problem in the lower level : 
Min Wl= wX11 
(+T,X21 ) 
s.t. 
Min C = (c 2 + OU)X22 
{X22 1 +T = +AU; X 21 = AB) 
s.t. 
A2X22 > R + GB _ _
(D.19) 
= I1*(+") 	1 2*x22 
X11' X22 ?: 0 
A comparison of the behavioural problem in (D.18) with the 
parametric programming problem in (D.19) reveals that they are 
similar (subject to the conditions discussed for the price control 
ML?). The behavioural problem in (D.19) is a parametric pro-
gramming problem ; the main difference from the behavioural prob- 
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lem in (D.18) being that R - X 21 has been replaced by R + GB 	and 
+T has been replaced by +GU. 
The algorithm for solving the ML? in (D.18) will be the same 
as it was in the previous cases. 
D.2.3 Solution to a Dynamic ML? 
To demonstrate the applicability of the PPS algorithm in 
solving a dynamic ML? (bi-level programming), the following 
dynamic MLP is specified: 
T wiGi 
Min W 	= E  
(±Tii ,±T2i ,+T3i ,1pi ) 1=1 (1 + d) - 
s .t. 
G. =I1  Y. + I2  X. + I 3  Z. 1 	1 	1 	1 
Ypi Yc i 
T1 	{±T1 ,±T2 ,±T 3 } ..5. p 
T 	(c ll. ± Tli )Yi 	T 	(c2i ± T2i )Xi 
Min C = 	E + E 
(Xi,Yi,Z i ) 1=1 	(1 + r) i 	i=1 	(1 + r) i 
T (c3i ± T3i )Z i 
4 Z. 
i=1 	(1 + r) i 
s.t. 
. Z• > X. 1 — 1 
CD. 20) 
Zi = aiX i 	i = 1,2,...,t 
X. = b.Y. 
_ 
Y. + Yp. < Y. — 
E Xi > Xi 
i=1 
G. Yp. Y. X. Z. > 0 1 , 	1' 1' 1' 1 — 
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where: 
d 	social discount rate, 
r - market rate of interest rate, 
w = vector of the coefficients of the policy objective 
functions (1 x 	(1 x k), 
G = energy target variable vector (k x 1),, 
Y,X,Z - vectors of primary energy, secondary energy and 
end-uses of energy:(1 x 1), (n x 1), and (p x 1), 
1 1 ,1 2 ,1 3 - matrices elements of which are either 1 or 0, 
±Ti ,±T 2 ,±T 3 = vectors of tax and subsidy related to Y, 
X, and Z: (1 x 1), (n x 1), and (p x 1), 
Yp = amount of Y that is directly controlled, 
Yc, 2, )7, X - the right hand side constants of Yp, Z, Y, X, 
i = time period 1,2, . . .,n. 
The above model can be condensed for convenience to the 
following two period model: 
Min WL =wlbX11b wd wlp Xllp 	(a) 
{+Tb , +Tp ) 
s.t. 
Min C = (c b ± Tb )X22b + (cd Cp 	Tp)X22p 	(b) 
(X2213 ,1C22p 	±Tb , ±Tp ) 
s.t. (D.21) 
X22b1 AllbX22b Rb 
Y 	1 4-AY -22p 	-11p-22p Rp 
BllbX22b B11pX22p Rd 
Xllb Xllp = I 1 *X22b +.12*X22p 
Xl1b ,X11p ,X22b 1  ' 7-22p 1  ' 7•22bi X22p 	° 
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The b and p subscripts define the variables in the base Year 
and the planning year respectively. wd and cd are discount 
factors, while X22b 1 and  X22p 1 are the resource control variables. 
A statement of the above dynamic MLP with a parametric 
programming version of the lower level problem is as follows : 
Min WI, " wlbX11b wd wlpX11p 
y 	1 y 	11' +Tp, '"2213 .221) j 
s.t. 
(a) 
Min C = (c b + GU1 )X22b + (cd cp ± AU2 )X22p 	(b) 
(X22b,X22p 	QUi = ±Tb , 01.12= ±T 	Xp, OBI. " 22b 1 R , 	" X22p 1) 
s.t. 
	
(D.22) 
AllbX22b Rb ± AB 1 
A11pX22p Rp± 0B2 
BllbX22b + B11pX22p RT 
X 	+ X 	= I *X 	+ I * llb 	llp 	1 22b 	2 X  22p 
V 	1 y 1 1(1 113 2(11P '221) "22p' X22b' X22p 	( g ). 
By applying the PPS algorithm, the optimum solution to the 
dynamic MLP can be obtained. 
D.2.4 Solution to an MLP having a Non-Linear Behavioral Model:  
A non - lihear'ilLP (bi - level programming) is specified as: 
Min W1 = wX11 
{+T,Xii } 
Min C = (c + T)X22 2 
{ 1(22 L +7} 
s.t. 	 (D.23) 
A2X22 2 ?- R 
X11 	I*X22 
(c)  
(d) 
(e) 
(f)  
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X11' X22 ?- 0 
A parametric programming version of the above non-linear MLP 
is as follows: 
Min W1 = wX11 
• C+T,X11 } 
Min C = (c + QU)X 22 2 
0(22 	-1-QU = +T) 
s.t. (D.24) 
A2X222 ?. R 
X11 = I*X22 
X21' X22 	0 
The linearized form of the above model is as follows: 
Min W1 = wX11 
{+T i ,+T2 ,+T3 } 
s.t. 
Min C = (f 1 + 	+ (f2 + 0U2 )r2 + (f3 + AU3 )r3 
(r1 ,r 2 ,r3 I +01.11 = +Ti , +0112 = +T2 , +0U3 - +T 3 } 
s.t. 	 (D.25) 
ai ri + a2 r2 + a 3 r3 > R 
.1(11 = I1*r1 + I2*r2 + I3*r3 
X11' r1' r2' r3 
where the r's are the different grid points for linearization of 
the non-linear MLP: Notice that the model (D.25) and the linear-
ization conditions on the grid points form a linear MLP which can 
be solved by the PPS algorithm. It may be mentioned here that 
non-linear parametric programming (Brosowski and Deutsch (1985]) 
can also be used to solve a non-linear lower level problem, and 
331 
the PPS algorithm can be used to find the parametric solution that 
yields the optimum value for the upper level objective function. 
D.3. A FORMULA FOR EXTENDING THE PARAMETRIC SEARCH 
The following formula (Heaps (1985]) can be adopted to 
change the units Of parametric variation from 0 to 1 in the case 
where seven cost coefficients are subject to parametric varia-
tions; 
DO 1001 	I = 	N + 1 
u(7) = (I-1)/N 
DO 	1002 	J= 1, N+ 2-I 
u(6) =  
DO 	1003 	K = 1, N + 3 	I - J 
u(5) = (K-1)/N 
DO 	1004 	M= 1,N+ 4 	I-J- K 
u(4) = (M-1)/N 
DO 	1005 	P = 1, N + 5 - I - J -K - M 
u(3)" = (P-1)/N 
DO 	1006 	Q = 1, N + 6 	I -J - K - M - P 
u(2) = .(Q-1)/N 
u(1) = 1 - u(2) - u(3) - u(4) - u(5) - u(6) - u(7) 
1006 CONTINUE 
1005 CONTINUE 
1004 CONTINUE 
1003 CONTINUE 
1002 CONTINUE 
1001 CONTINUE 
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However, the application of this formula to AEPSOM produced 
results with multiple policy optima. Because of this non-unique-
ness problem, in this study the formula was not adopted in imple-
menting AEPSOM numerically. 
APPENDIX E 
POLICY PROGRAMME: 
THE FIRST SUB-PROGRAMME FOR FINDING AN MLP SOLUTION 
POLICY - POLICY OBJECTIVE FUNTION ROUTINE 
CHARACTER*7 LAMBDA 
CHARACTER INPUT(32) 
CHARACTER*32 OUTP 
REAL LMBA(123),X(123,123) 
REAL Y,XLAM 
REAL W(123) 
INTEGER NVARNO(123) 
REAL COEFS(123) 
1001 FORMAT(32A1) 
COMMON/XARRAY/X,LIX(123) 
EQUIVALENCE(OUTP,INPUT) 
CALL PBGPP 
C SET K, THE NUMBER OF TOTAL BASIC VARIABLES.. 
K=0 
WRITE(1,*)' WHAT IS THE BGPP OUTPUT FILE.: 
READ(1,1001,END=9999)(INPUT(I),I=1,32) 
OPEN(UNIT=7,FILE=OUTP,FILETYPE. I FSU I ,STATUS= I APPEND I ) 
CALL .READIN(LAMBDA,XLAM,LMBA,Y,KMAX,NOPT) 
CALL PUTOUT(LMBA,KMAX,NOPT) 
PROMPT FOR INPUT DETAILS. 
MIN=0 
MAX=0 
NVAR=0 
CALL INPUTS(MIN,MAX,COEFS,NVAR,NVARNO) 
C DETERMINE THE MINIMUM OR MAXIMUM. 
IF (MIN.EQ.1) CALL GETMIN(COEFS,NVAR,NVARNO,LMBA,KMAX,NOPT,W) 
IF (MAX.EQ.1) CALL GETMAX(COEFS,NVAR,NVARNO,LMBA,KMAX,NOPT,W) 
9999 CONTINUE 
CLOSE(UNIT=7) 
STOP 
END 
SUBROUTINE READIN(LAMBDA,XLAM,LMBA,Y,KMAX,NOPT) 
CHARACTER*7 LAMBDA 
REAL XLAM,LMBA(123),X(123,123) 
CHARACTER RECDIN(80) 
COMMON/XARRAY/X,LIX(123) 
1001 FORMAT(10X;A7,F16.4) 
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1002 FORMAT(12X;I2,1X,I2,1X,F16.4) 
1003 FORMAT(80A1) 
C OPEN THE FILE, READ IT AND CLOSE AGAIN. 
OPEN (UNIT=8,FILETYPE= I FSU I ,STATUS= I OLD',FILE= I PBGPP.DATA I ) 
I=0 
DO 1500 1=1,123 
LMBA(I)=0.0 
DO 1500 J=1,123 
X(I,J)=0.0 
1500 CONTINUE 
2000 CONTINUE 
NOPT=0 
KMAX=0 
K=0 
DO 2500 1=1,123 
READ(8,1003,END=9999,ERR=9998)(RECDIN(M),M=1,80) 
GOTO 2100 
9998 CONTINUE 
WRITE(1,*)' ERROR IN READING BLANK RECORD' 
GOTO 9999 
2100 CONTINUE 
READ(8,1001,END=9999,ERR=9997)LAMBDA,XLAM 
GOTO 2200 
9997 CONTINUE 
WRITE(1,*)' ERROR IN READING THE HEADER.: 
GOTO 9999 
2200 CONTINUE 
IF (LAMBDA.NE:LAMBDA=') GOTO 9996 
GOTO 2300 
9996 CONTINUE 
WRITE(1,*)' NO LAMBDA FOUND.: 
GOTO 9999 
2300 CONTINUE 
LMBA(I)=XLAM 
C WRITE(1,*)' LAMBDA.. ',I 
t WRITE(1,*)LMBA(I) 
DO 2400 J=1,123 
READ(8,1002,END=9999,ERR=9995)N0,IX,Y 
WRITE(1,1002)NO,IX,Y 
GOTO 2410 
9995 CONTINUE 
WRITE(1,*)' ERROR READING THE VARIABLES.: 
GOTO 9999 
2410 CONTINUE 
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X(I,N0)=Y 
LIX(I)=IX 
NOPT=I 
K= IX 
IF (K.GE.KMAX) KMAX=K 
IF (J.GE.IX) GOTO 2500 
2400 CONTINUE 
2500 CONTINUE 
9999 CONTINUE 
CLOSE (UNIT=8) 
RETURN 
END 
SUBROUTINE INPUTS(MIN,MAX,COEFS,NVAR,NVARNO) 
INTEGER NVARNO(123) 
REAL COEFS(123) 
C PROMPT FOR NUMBER OF VARIABLES • • 
2000 WRITE(1,*)' HOW MANY VARIABLES FOR POLICY OBJECTIVE FUNCTION ??' 
READ(1,*,END=9999,ERR=9991)NVAR 
GOTO 2100 
9991 CONTINUE 
WRITE(1,*)' ERROR.. MUST BE AN INTEGER.: 
GOTO 2000 
2100 CONTINUE 
WRITE(1,*)' WHAT ARE THOSE VARIABLE NUMBERS..?' 
READ(1,*,END=9999,ERR=9992)(NVARNO(I),I=1,NVAR) 
GOTO 2200 
9992 CONTINUE 
WRITE(1,*)' ERROR.. MUST BE ',NVAR,' INTEGER NUMBERS.: 
GOTO 2100 
2200 CONTINUE . 
WRITE(1,*)' ENTER THE ',NVAR,' COEFFICIENTS.. ?' 
READ(1,*,END=999,ERR=9993)(COEFS(I),I=1,NVAR) 
GOTO 2300 
9993 CONTINUE 
WRITE(1,*)' ERROR.. COEFFICIENTS MUST BE ',NVAR,' REAL NUMBERS' 
GOTO 2200 
2300 CONTINUE 
WRITE(1,*)' DO YOU WANT MINIMISATION.. ? 
WRITE(1,*)' 0 = NO , 1 = YES.: 
READ(1,*,END=9999,ERR=9994)MIN 
GOTO 2400 
9994 CONTINUE 
WRITE(1,*)' ERROR MUST BE 0 OR 1.: 
GOTO 2300 
2400 CONTINUE 
336 
WRITE(1,*)' DO YOU WANT MAXIMISATION.. ?' 
WRITE(1,*)' 0 = NO , 1 = YES..' 
. READ(1,*,END=9999,ERR=9995)MAX 
GOTO 2500 
9995 CONTINUE 
WRITE(1,*)' ERROR.. MUST BE 1 OR 0' 
GOTO 2400 
2500 CONTINUE 
9999 CONTINUE 
RETURN 
END 
SUBROUTINE GETMIN(COEFS,NVAR,NVARNO,LMBA,KMAX,NOPT,W) 
INTEGER NVARNO(NVAR) 
REAL COEFS(123) 
REAL X(123,123),LMBA(123) 
REAL W(123) 
REAL WMIN,LMIN 
COMMON/XARRAY/X,LIX(123) 
DO 2000 I = 1,NOPT 
W(I)=0.0 
DO 2000 J=1,NVAR 
M=NVARNOW 
W(I)=W(I)+(COEFS(J)*X(I,M)) 
2000 CONTINUE 
DO 3100 I = 1,NOPT . 
WRITE(1,*)' MINIMUM.. , ,W(I) 
IF (I.EQ.1)WMIN=W(I) 
IF (W(I).GT.WMIN) GOTO 3100 
WMIN = W(I) 
LMIN=LMBA(I) 
3100 CONTINUE 
WRITE(1,*) RESULTANT MINIMUM IS ..',WMIN 
WRITE(1,*)' CORRESPONDING LAMBDA IS ..',LMIN 
WRITE(7,*)' LAMBDA FOR MINIMUM...,LMIN 
WRITE(7,*)' THE MINIMUM..',WMIN 
RETURN 
END 
SUBROUTINE GETMAX(COEFS,NVAR,NVARNO,LMBA,KMAX,NOPT,W) 
INTEGER NVARNO(NVAR) 
REAL COEFS(123) 
REAL X(123,123),LMBA(123) 
REAL W(123) 
REAL WMAX,LMAX 
COMMON/XARRAY/X,LIX(123) 
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DO 2000 I = 1,NOPT 
W(I)=0.0 
DO 2000 J=1,NVAR 
M=NVARNO(J) 
W(I)=W(I)+(COEFS(J)*X(I,M)) 
2000 CONTINUE 
WMAX=0.0 
DO 3100 I = 1,NOPT 
WRITE(1,fl l MAXIMUM.. ,',W(I) 
IF (W(I).LT.WMAX) GOTO 3100 
WMAX = 
LMAX=LMBA(I) 
3100 CONTINUE 
WRITE(1,*) ' RESULTANT MAXIMUM IS.',WMAX 
WRITE(1,*) ' CORRESPONDING LAMBDA IS . I ,LMAX 
WRITE(7,*)' LAMBDA FOR OPTIMUM IS ..',LMAX 
WRITE(7,*)' RESULTANT MAXIMUM IS ... ',WMAX 
RETURN 
END 
SUBROUTINE PUTOUT(LMBA,KMAX,NOPT) 
REAL LMBA(123),X(123,123) 
COMMON/XARRAY/X,LIX(123) 
C WRITE(1,*)' KMAX.. ',KMAX 
WRITE(1,*)' NR OF OPTIMA..',NOPT 
C WRITE(1,fl l THE BASIC VARIABLE MATRIX-X I 
DO 1000 I=1,NOPT 
C WRITE(1,*)(X(I,J),J=1,KMAX) 
1000 CONTINUE 
C WRITE(1,*)' LAMBDA..' 
C 
C WRITE(1,fl(LMBAW,I=1,NOPT) 
C WRITE(1,*)(LIX(I),I=1,NOPT) 
C. 
RETURN 
END 
APPENDIX F 
A COMPLETE LIST OF AEPSOM SOLUTIONS  
F.1. A LIST OF MODEL SPECIFICATIONS AND SOLUTIONS  
The optimum AEPSOM specification and solution with descrip-
tions of the main characteristics of model solutions was given in 
Table 5.1. A listing of the various AEPSOM solutions with neces-
sary explanations is given in this appendix. 
AEPSOM was solved for different units of parametric varia-
tions: K, C, H ; in two types of tax and subsidy policy re-
gimes (existing mix and optimum mix); for the two types of speci-
fications stated above; for the years of 1979-80 and 1989-90; And 
under varying conditions in the energy sector (sensitivity stud-
ies). In the first three solutions only existing taxes and 
subsidies were included in AEPSOM, while the optimum mix of 
taxes and subsidies were obtained and included in the next three 
Solutions (Solutions 4, 5, and 6). The behavioural model part of 
AEPSOM for 1979-80 and 1989-90 (without policy objective function, 
policy constraints and taxes and subsidies in the behavioural 
objective function) was also solved (Model Nos 7 and 8). The 
Central Control Policy Model (Models Nos 9 and 10, behavioural 
model with policy objective function instead of behavioural policy 
objective function in it) was also solved for these two time 
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TABLE F.1 
A LIST OF MODEL SPECIFICATIONS AND SOLUTIONS 
A. BASE SOLUTIONS: (WITHOUT POLICY CONSTRAINTS)  
Model 
No. 
Brief 
Description 
Type of 
Policy 
"U* I Remarks: 
+14, +T*0 
RESULTS 
,Optimum value 
P.O.F. (1)** 
PJ 
Optimum value 
of P.O.F.(2)** 
Model AEPSOM existing +7 U- I +T-0 7031.68 7031.68 
No. 1 1979430 
data 
(+7 . 0) (+T - 0) 
Model AEPSOM existing +7 U C +T-0 7031.66. 7031.66 
No. 2 1979-80 
data 
(+T 0) (+7 - 0) 
Model AEPSOM existing +7 U H +T-0 7031.40 s 7031.40 
No. 3 1979-80 
data 
• (+T 0) (+1 - 0) 
Model AEPSOM Optimum Set U- I +T* 0 6734.20 - 19 477.51 
No. 4 1979,80 
data 
+7 (±14  0) (+T * 0) 
Model AEPSOM Optima Set U C +T* 0 6733.70 1 671.58 
No. 5 1979-80 
data 
+7 (+T * 0) (+T * 0) 
Model AEPSOM Optimum Set U H +T* 0 6733.70 1708.25 
No. 6 1979-80' 
data 
+T 
•
(+T * 0) (+T 4. 0) 
- Units of parametric variation 
** (1) P.O.F. (1) WL - Iel + CNo + TCo (the abstract model (5.1), 
but the policy constraints are not included in these solutions. 
The policy constraints are included in model solutions in Section E of 
this Table. The unit of measurement is petajoules (PJ)). 
 
37 37 
(2) P.0.F.(2) WL 7 Iel + CNo + TCo - E(+ tpx j + E (- tj)xj . j = 1.2. ...,37 
. j.1 j-1 
This specification corresponds to the abstract model (5.2) . 
(In the 1989-90 AEPSOM, j - 1,2, —.43). 
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Table F.1 (continued) 
LEVEL MODELS A.RESULTS: SINGLE 
Model 
No. 
Brief 
Description 
Type of 
Policy 
Remarks: 
+T=0, +40 
RESULT 
Behavioural 
objective 
function 
( Pi )  
Optimum value 
P.O.F. (1) * 
(PJ) 
Model 
No. 7 
Model 
No. 8 
Behavioural 
model of 
AEPSOM, 
1979-80 
data 
(Single level 
model) 
Behavioural 
model of 
AEPSOM, 
1989-90 
data 
(Single level 
model). 
- 
+T not 
Included. 
+T not 
Included 
U not 
included 
U not 
included 
+T-0 
+T-0 
225,117.84 7,031.68 
10,988.46 
Model 
No. 9 
Model 
No.10 
Central 
'control 
policy 
model for 
1979-80 
data 
(Single level 
model). 
Central 
control 
policy 
model for 
1989-90 
data • 
+T not 
Included 
+7 not 
Included 
U not 
included 
U not 
inaluded 
U not 
included 
No result' 
U not 
included 
U not 
Included 
5,101.51 
6,708.43 
(Single level 
model). 
* Computed from the behavioural model results since there is no . 
policy objective function in Model 7, 8, 9, and 10. 
• 
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Table F.1 (Continued) 
B. RESULTS: SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS: EXISTING  +T (WITHOUT POLICY CONSTRAINTS) 
Model 
No. 
Brief 1 Type of 
Description 1 Policy 
Remarks: 
+T-0, +40 
RESULT 
Optimum value 
P.O.F (1) 
PJ 
Optimum value 
of P.O.F (2) 
Model AEPSOM Existing +7 U-H +T # 0 6811.47 6 643.30 
No. 11 1979-80 
data 
and + t3 (+T t 0) (+1 -4 0) 
Model AEPSOM Existing U-H +T # 0 7,131.66 7,063.86 
No. 12 1979-80, 
Introduction 
of 
t3 
• 
(+7 = 0) (+7 . 0) 
Model AEPSOM Existing U-H +T 0 4,680.03 4,839.43 
No. 13 1979-80, 
constraints 
relaxed 
by 20% 
(+T 0) .(+T 0) 
Model AEPSOM Existing U 	H +T*0 14,045.27 9,877.63 
No. 14 1979-80, 
constraints 
relaxed 
by 100% 
(+7 = 0) (+T 'O) 
Model 
No. 15 
AEPSOM 
1979-80, . 
constraints 
on 
petroleum 
import 
Existing U-H No feasible 
solution 
Model AEPSOM Existing U-H +T t 6,027.75 6,020.37 
No. 16 1979-80, . 
eitroduction 
new 
technologies, 
1979-80 
cost for 
old 
technologies 
(+T 0) (+7 t 0) 
1989-90 
cost for 
new 
technologies 
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Table F.1 (Continued) 
C. RESULTS: SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS: EXISTING +T (WITHOUT POLICY CONSTRAINTS) 
Model 
No. 
Brief 
Description 
Type of 
Policy 
Remarks: 
+T-0, +140 
RESULT 
Optimum value 
P.O.F (1) 
(PJ) 
Optimum value 
of P.O.F (2) 
Model AEPSOM Existing U-H +T 	0 7,131.66 7,131.66 
No .. 17 1979-80, 
import 
parity 
price for 
domestic 
crude 
oil 
(+7 = 0) (+T 0) . 
Model AEPSOM Existing U-H +T-0 6258.12 6258.12 
NO. 18 1979-80, 
supply 
double, 
but demand 
same as in 
(+T = 0) (+T 0) 
1979-80 
Model AEPSOM Existing U-H +T*0 10,988.46 9,879.25 
No. 19 1989 data, 
new 
technologies 
(+1* * 0) . (+T 0) 
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Table F.1 (Continued) 
D. RESULTS: SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS: OPTIMUM +T (WITHOUT POLICY CONSTRAINTS) 
Model 
No. 
Brief 1 
Description 
Type of 
Policy 
Remarks: 
+T-0, +T40 
RESULT 
Optimum value 
P.O.F (1) 
. (PJ) 
Optimum value 
of P.O.F (2) 
Model AEPSOM Optima U-H AT *O. 8,069.45 -6,387.54 
No. 20 1979-80, , 
constraints 
relaxed 
by 20% 
(+T 0) (+T *0) 
Model AEPSOM Optimum U-H +T *0 13,449.34 -10,648.12 
No. 21 1979-80, 
constraints 
relaxed 
by 100% 
(+T #0) (+7 *0) 
Model . AEPSOM Optimum U-H +T *0 6,094.15 -6003.74 
No. 22 1979-80, 
supply 
double, 
but demand 
same as in 
(+T *0) (+T 0) 
197.9-80 
Model AEPSOM Optimum set • U-H +T *0 10,988.46 10,397.79 
No. 23 1989-90 
data, new 
technologies 
(+T = 0) (+T *0) 
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Table F.1 (continued)  
E. ALTERNATIVE MODEL SOLUTIONS:  
AEPSOM with Policy Constraints 
(Feasible Optimum Solution). 
Model 
No. 
Brief 
Description 
Type of 
Policy 
Policy 
Constraints 
RESULT 
Optimum value 
P.O.F (1)* 
(PJ) 
Model 
No.5 
Model 
AEPSOM 
1979-80 
data 
AEPSOM 
Optimum set 
Optimum set 
U 	C 
U-H 
0 < +T < 20% 
B-3777.91 > 0 
0 < +T < 54% 
6,733.70 
(+T 0) 
6,733.70 
No. 6 1979-80 
data 
18-3859.6 > 0 (+T # 0) 
Model AEPSOM Existing U-H 0 < +T < 61 4,680:03 
No. 13** 1979-80 
data 
8=-159.40<0 (+ 0) 
Model AEPSOM Existing U H 0 < +T < 56%6 10,988.46 
No. 19 1989-90 
data 
8-587.19 > 0 (+T # 0) 
* P.O. F (1) W Iel + CNo + TCo 
With the policy constraint: 
(1)0 < tj < 20% of j j 1,2, .,..37 (For 1989-90, j 1,2, ...,43) 
37 
(2)B - E (+tj)xj (-tj)xj > 0 
i-1 J-1 - 
These models correspond to the abstract 
representation of AEPSOM in (5.1), Specification 1. 
** Though Model No. 13 does not satisfy the second policy constraint 
and the range of + T is 0 <s T <61% of costs, its results are 
reported here since this model solution produced lowest value of 
P.O.F.(1) among all the model solutions. 
345 
. periods to obtain the optimum mix of taxes and subsidies (Optimum 
+T) in 1979-89 and 1989-90. This type of policy problem was 
embedded in Model nos 4,5,6, and 11 to 23. For sensitivity stud-
ies, AEPSOM was solved in two different policy regimes (existing 
mix and optimum mix of taxes and subsidies) by incorporating the 
changes to be discussed in a later section. on the sensitivity 
analysis. 
• (ii) Selection of the Appropriate Model Specification  
and Solution  
It can be seen from Table 5.1. that in the case of Model 1, 2, 
and 3 (AEPSOM with existing +T), the optimum solution to AEPSOM 
was obtained when +T = O. In other words, the behavioural 
optimum solution was also found to be optimum for the policy 
problem. • This means that persuasion of existing +T of any vaaue 
does not improve the value of the policy objective function. 
However, the situation changed in the case of the optimum +T 
mix (Model Nos 4,5 and 6). In these solutions, optimum solution 
to AEPSOM was obtainesi With +T O. This implies that the beha-
vioural optimum solution (with +T = 0) was not optimum for the 
policy problem and introduction of +T influenced the allocation of 
resources in the economy, resulting in an improved value of the 
objective function.' 
Results of Model Nos 4, 5 and 6 were preferred for discussion 
of the AEPSOM results since these solutions generated a lower 
value of the policy objective function than those of Model Nos 1, 
2 and 3. 
Optimum solutions to AEPSOM are reported in Table F.1.D. These 
are the solutions which satisfy the policy and budget constraints 
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and attain the optimum value for the policy objective function 
(feasible optimum solution). Model Nos 5, 6, 13 and 18 satisfy the 
policy constraints to various degrees. From all these models 
specifications, Model No 5 will be mainly selected for policy 
studies since it produces a lower value of the policy objective 
function and satisfies the policy 'constraint (0 < t j < 20% of the 
cost of the j-th activity) and the budget constraints. Other model 
results were also reported (Model Nos 6, 13 and 18) where neces-
sary for comparison purposes. 
It may be noticed that only Specification 1 generates optimum 
feasible solutions. Specification 2 did not generate an optimum 
feasible solution. Therefore, results for Specification 2 were not 
included in the optimum solution table and the results of the 
specification 2 were not adopted for policy studies. Moreover 
Specification 1 can be considered a realistic representation of 
the Australian energy policy system since the policy planning 
problem is really to achieve the three energy policy objectives by 
adopting a set of instruments which are subject to some con-
straints. 
It is also worth mentioning that in some cases two specifi-
cations of AEPSOM generated the same solution to AEPSOM (for 
example Model Nos 17 and 18). 
(iii) The Effects of the Units: 
The effects of the units of the parametric variations on the 
optimum solution can be observed from Table 5.1. In Model 4,5, and . 
6, the three units of parametric variations produced different 
optimum solutions to AEPSOM. It is obvious that the effects of 
the units of parametric variations on the solution of AEPSOM is 
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significant. 	In all the model specifications other than model 1, 
2, 3, 4, 5, and 6, the units identified by H were adopted, because 
these units provide appropriate directions for search in the PPS 
algorithm. 	Since the PPS algorithm is an interactive method, 
application of different 	units increases the possibility of 
finding the true/global optimum. 
F.2 THE POLICY OBJECTIVE FUNCTION 
The optimum values of the policy objective function in the 
cases of various model solutions are reported in 	Table F.1. 
These 	values are reported for two types of policy studies, .base 
cases and sensitivity studies separately. 	In every solution, 
optimum values of the policy objective function were calculated 
for the two types of specifications of the policy objective func-
tion shown in Table 5.1. (P.O.F. (1), and (2)). Definitions of 
the two P.O.F.s were presented in Chapter Five. The justification 
and significance of these alternative specifications were dis-
cussed in Chapter Three. 
It was mentioned in the previous section that Model Nos 1, 2, 
and ,3 did not produce any values of the policy objective function 
which were different from those of generated by the behavioural 
model. This applies to both the alternative specifications (1) 
and (2) of the policy objective function.. 
Model 4, 5 and 6 produce +T 4.  0 optimum values for the policy 
objective function of both specifications.. Optimum values for the 
policy objective function (1) in these three solutions are close: 
6734.20, 6733.70 and 6733.70. Optimum values for the policy 
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objective function (2) 	did not 	show the same pattern. 	The 
optimum values were numerically different from each other - 
19,477.51, 1,671.58 and 1,708.25.. 
In the case of alternative specifications, only Model No.5 
produced results satisfying the initial policy constraints 
0 < +T < 20%. Two other solutions are also reported which satis- 
fy the upper level of policy constraints of 54% and 61%. 	The 
optimum values of the policy 	objective function (1) are the 
same in the case of model solution 5 and 6, although these have 
different upper level constraints on the policy range, while model 
solution 13 produces a very much lower value of the policy objec-
tive function. 
One striking result is that optimum model solutions are dif-
ferent in two alternative specifications of the policy objective 
function. For example, Model Solution 5 produces optimum values 
for the policy objective function (1) and (2) equal to 6733.70 and 
1671.58 respectively while for the first component of the 
policy objective function (2) it is 6897.83. (First component of 
the policy objective function (2) is equal to the policy objective 
function (1)). It means that two alternative specifications of 
the policy objective function generate different optimum solutions-
to the model. 
APPENDIX G  
THE 1989-90 AEPSOM FOR SENSITIVITY STUDY 
G.1 AEPSOM:1989-90 - MODEL SPECIFICATION 
G.1.1 Preliminaries  
(a) Assumptions  
The assumptions made in AEPSOM:1979-90 are also valid for 
AEPSOM:1989-90. The additional assumption in AEPSOM:1989-90 is 
that the energy supply, demand, costs, and technologies for the 
year 1989-90 are known. 
(b) Abstract Model  
The abstract representation of AEPSOM:1989-90 is similar to 
AEPSOM:1979-80. 
(c) Foundations 
These are the same as in,AEPSOM:1979-90. 
G.1.2 Specification of AEPSOM 
The princibles and mechanism for the specification of AEP-
SOM:1989-90 are similar to those in AEPSOM:1979-80, therefore only 
a listing of AEPSOM 1989-90 equations will be provided here. 
A. The Policy Objective Function 
This is the same as in AEPSOM:1979-80. 
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B. The Constraint Set • 
(i) The Policy and Budgetary Constraints  
They are the same as in AEPSOM:1979-80. 
(ii) The Behavioural Model of the Energy Sector  
The behavioural constraints of AEPSOM:1989-90 will consist of 
an ES model for 1989-90. Specification of the ES model: 1989-90 
will be based on the Australian energy system for the year 1989- 
90. AES for 1989-90 is shown in Figure G.1. 
The 	following new conversion technologies have 	been 
introduced in AES:1989-90: 
1. coal liquefaction 
2. methanol production from biomass 
The following new end-uses were also introduced: coal, natu-
ral gas', and methanol uses in the transport sector. 
(I) The constraints of ES mode1:1989-90  
These are the same as those in the ES mode1:1979-80 in AEP-
SOM:1979-80. So we shall not discuss in detail the specifica-
tion of the constraints of the ES mode1:1989-90. The following is 
a list of the equations of the ES model: 1989-90. 
1. Demand Constraints (including the export constraints)  
d1  +d2  +d3  +d4  + d 5 > DE'  — 
d 6 + d 7 ?- DEA 
d8 + d9 + d10 + d11 + d12 	DET 
d13 + d 14 + d15 + d16 + d 17 + d18 	DED 
• Eel Eel 
(G.1) 
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Ee2 Ee2 
Ee3 	Ee3 
E > E e4 — e4 
2. Intermediate Energy Balance Equations  
xi = d1 	+ d13 + Eel 
x2 = d2 	d6 	d9 d14 	Ee2 
(1/6 2 )x3 = d3 + (110 + d15 
x4 = d4 + d + d11 + d16 
x5 = d17 
x6 = d12 
x7 = d18 
X8 = Ee3 
(G.2) 
3. Supply Balance Equations  
(i) Petroleum Products Supply Balance Equation 
x2 = (1/6 1 )RR1 + R2 + Iel 	
(G.3) 
(ii) Electricity Supply Balance Equation 
(1/e0x4 = e lEi + e 2E2 + e 3E 3 + E 4 
(G.4.) 
(iii)Other Supply Balance Equations 
R1 = x1 + RR1 + E1 
R3 = x3 + E3 
R5 = x5 + x6 
R6 = x 7 
R7 = x8 
(G.5) 
4. Resource Constraints  
R1 5- i1 
R2 i2 
R3 i3 
R5 i5 
R6 .5-
- 
 R6 
R7 
- 
R7 
(G.6) 
5. Capacity Constraints  
E 4 kHe 
x4 < kTe 
(1iejE2 + (1/y)x2 < Rk 
6.  User-Defined Constraints  
d4 a4 
d 7 11 Ti 7 
d11 d16 
(G.7) 
(G.8) 
(II) Objective Function  
The objective function of ES mode1:1989-90 is also similar to 
the objective function of ES mode1:1979-80 in AEPSOM:1979-80. 
However, the objective function of ES mode-l:1989-90 is different 
in the following respects: 
1) It contains costs of some additional activities. 
2) The Costs are 1989-90 costs in 1979-80 real prices. 
.3) Taxes and subsidies are for the year 1989-90. 
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The objective function of ES model: 1989-90 is as follows: 
7 
= E (c i + Ti)Ri t cm Ie 
i= 1 
 
(G.9) 
7 	4 
+ E c. x. + E c e Ee J 	J j1 	e1 
18 
+ E (ck - . Tk )dk 
k 1 
 
G.1.3. Output of AEPSOM:1989-90 
Same as in AEPSOM:1979-80 for 1989-90. 
G.2. DATA FOR AEPSOM: 1989-90 1 
i. The Policy Objective Function 1  
The 	weights in AEPSOM :1989-90 are : Iel : 1, CNo : 2, 
and TCe: 1. 
ii. The Policy and Budgetary Constraints  
Same as in AEPSOM 1979-80. 
iii. The BehaViout'al Objective Function  
The following real rates of increases and absolute increases 
in the base year (1979-80) costs of fuels and new technologies 
1. Sources of data: Tables /data without any source are the esti-
mates of the present author. 
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were assumed (reasons are discussed below): 
Table G.1 
Increases in the Costs of Primary Energy 
Per Annum 
Energy 	Real Increases.% 
(Cost m$/pj) 
coal ( R1 ) 
domestic crude oil 
imported crude oil 
natural gas ( R3 ) 
solar energy (R5 ) 
wood (R6 )* 
uranium (R7 ) 
(R2 ) 
(Iel ) 
2.9 
5.0 
3.0 
1.5 
0.0 
0.0 
1.5 
Table G.2 
Increases in the Costs of Conversion Technologies 
Real increases / 
Conversion Technologies/flow 	Costs m$/PJ 
refinery cost ( x2 ) 1.5 
hydro-electricity generation (E 4 ) 	2.0 
electricity generation from coal (E 1 ) 1.5 
n 	n 	from petroleum products(E 2 ) 	1.5 
electricity generation from natural gas (E 3 ) 	1.5 
Table G.3 
Costs of New Technologies 
New conversion Technologies 	Costs m$/pj 
conversion of coal to oil (RR 1 ) 	15.67 
conversion of wood to methanol (x 6 ) 	43.60 
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Table p.4 . 
Increases in the Cost of End-Use Technologies / 
(Costs m$ / pj) 
Manufacturing Agriculture Transport Domestic 
Industry 
Petroleum 	2.00 (d2 ) 	.2.00 (d 6 ) 2.00 (d8 ) 2.00 (d11 ) 
Products 
Electricity 1.00 
Exports: 
coal 1.5 
natural gas 2.00 
uranium 1.5 
Some of the features of the cost structures of 1989-90 AES 
are: 1) Increases in the costs of primary fuels at different 
rates; 2) Increases in the cost of oil-based secondary energy 
conversion technologies but no increases in the costs of other 
secondary energy conversion technologies; 3) Increases in the cost 
of oil- based end-use technologies by 5% but no increases in the 
cost of other end-uses. 
The reasons for assuming these types of increases in future 
energy costs are as follows: 1) Increases in primary energy costs 
are based mainly on the past increases; 2) No increases in cost of 
the non-oil-based secondary energy conversion technologies are 
assumed because it is expected that subsidies will be given to the 
non-oil-based technologies, and that there will be improvements in 
the efficiencies of these technologies (learning effects, see 
Schuyers, [1979], for a detailed study of these effects in the 
Australian energy sector). In contrast, oil-based technologies are 
expected to have no subsidies, and are predicted to have relative-
ly fewer improvements in conversion efficiencies; . thus their costs 
are expected to rise. 
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iv. The Behavioural Constraints  
(1) Demand Constraints  
The following figures for the end-uses of energy in differ-
ent sectors are adopted from the Department of National Develop-
ment and Energy ([1983], p.51): 
Table G.5 
End-uses of Energy: 1989-90 
Sectors 	 Notations Energy PJ 
Manufacturing (DE') 
Agriculture (DEA ) 
Transport (DET ) 
Domestic (DED ) 
1707.89 
255.35 
899.99 
489.76 
Export 
Coal (Ee l ) 	 2519.97 
Petroleum products (Ee 2 ) 	104.65 
Natural gas (Ee 3 ) 246.97 
Uranium (Ee 4 ) 4299.02 
Demand for electricity in 
manufacturing industry 	(d4 ) 	171.63 
Demand for electricity in agriculture (d 7 ) 	41.63 
Demand for electricity in domestic 
sector(d13 ) 	 230.23 
(2) End-use Energy Flow Constraints  
None needed. 
(3) Secondary Energy Supply Constraints  
The efficiency factors that have been derived for use are 
shown in Table G.6. 
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Table G.6 
Efficiency of Different Technology, 1989-90 
Fuel 	Efficiencies 
x3 0.86 
RR1 0.54 
E1 0.22 E2 0.31 
E3 0.32 x2 0.90 
x4 0.86 
(4) Primary Energy Balance Equations  
We do not need any data to be specified in these equations. 
(5) Resource Constraints  
Table G.7 
Primary Energy Resources: 1989-90 
Energy PJ 
Coal 	(R1 ) 4198.56 
Crude oil 	(R2 ) 1029.76 
Natural gas (R 3 ) 933.48 
Wood (R6 ) 171.63 
Solar energy (R7 ) 1.00 . 
Uranium (R8 ) 4299.02 
(Source: Dept. of National Development & Energy [1983]; p.51) 
(6) Capacity Constraints  
The following increases in the capacities of different 
technologies in 1989-90 were estimated(* next page ): 
Table G.8 
Capacities of Different Technologies 
Energy PJ 
Hydro-electricity (E4 ) 1.5 
Total electricity ( x4 ) 5.00 
Petroleum products (x2 ) 4.00 
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* (The electricity generation capacity and refinery capacity (MW 
and barrel/day) have been converted to PJ by the appropriate 
conversion factors. The conversion factors that relate MW to 
MWh/year (for converting MW to PJ) may be seen in Meier [1984], 
Chapter Eight.) 
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